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ON MARCH 8, 2004, the Consultative Council that advises the Centre for Democratic
Institutions (CDI) on the direction of its work met in Parliament House, Canberra. There
were some new faces around the table recently appointed by Cabinet. Among them were
four senior officials from Australia’s major political parties: Brian Loughnane, Federal
Director of the Liberal Party of Australia; Andrew Hall, Federal Director of the National
Party of Australia; Geoff Walsh, Federal Director of the Australian Labor Party; and Gary
Gray, his predecessor. They made their view clear — CDI needed to focus on strength-
ening political parties in our region of the world. The Australian parliamentarians on the
council, the Hon. Chris Gallus, chair of the council, Dr Andrew Southcott and Kevin
Rudd, agreed, as did Sir Ninian Stephen, former Governor-General of Australia, Andy
Becker, the Australian Electoral Commissioner, and Professor Ian McAllister of The
Australian National University (ANU). A consensus had formed and the ball was now in
my court.
CDI is Australia’s democracy promotion institute funded by the Australian Agency
for International Development (AusAID). As part of the Research School of Social
Sciences of the ANU, CDI assists the countries in Australia’s immediate region to
strengthen their key democratic bodies. In its first six years, CDI focused mainly on
parliaments and judiciaries. Now a difficult new subject had been placed on our agenda.
It seemed to me the first step we needed to take was to gain a better understanding of
political parties in the Pacific Islands.
One of the great advantages of being located in the Coombs Building at the ANU
is that CDI sits at the crossroads of the leading researchers in the fields of Asia-Pacific
studies and political science. So the task boiled down to identifying the leading thinkers
in the field, getting them excited about participation in a new research venture, commis-
sioning their chapters and finally putting the book together. Sounds simple …
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My first vote of gratitude must go to the authors: Alaine Chanter of the University
of Canberra, Asofou So’o of the National University of Samoa, Jon Fraenkel and Steven
Ratuva of the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka of the East-
West Center in Hawai’i, Joao Saldanha of the Timor-Leste Study Group in Dili, and
Alumita Durutalo, Ron May and Michael Morgan of the ANU. They stuck to their task
diligently, kept to their word limits graciously and eventually met their deadlines grudg-
ingly. I hope they will forgive any intrusiveness on my part.
Several other people played key roles in seeing this publication come to light.
Francesca Beddie was of enormous assistance in the editing process. She passed the baton to
my colleagues at CDI, Luke Hambly and Michael Morgan, who then ran it to the finish
line. As always, our other colleague at CDI, Sally Thompson, provided essential support.
All books must leave their authors’ hands and begin a peripatetic new life. But this
book will nevertheless remain close to CDI as it will now inform the work we do to
strengthen the political parties we have researched and help them play the critical role










POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE
PACIFIC ISLANDS
Roland Rich
ACCORDING TO DIAMOND, ‘political parties remain an indispensable institutional
framework for representation and governance in a democracy.’1 If so, many Pacific Island
nations labour under a political disadvantage in the construction of their democracies
because local political parties are generally weak and ineffective.2 They tend to have little
by way of policy platforms and therefore do not discharge the roles of aggregating inter-
ests, deliberating on policy or mediating between the policy interests of various social
groups. Most political parties in the South-West Pacific lack systematic grassroots organ-
isation and so cannot be expected to be active in civic education or consensus-building.
In Melanesia, most political parties are organised around one or more powerful political
leaders, with the consequence that personality tends to override policy importance in the
decisions of parties. Even the task of getting the vote out on election day is usually
delegated to the candidate who must draw on extended kinship or patronage networks
for scrutineers, drivers and general cajolers, not to mention ballot-stuffers, intimidators
and enforcers. Political parties are therefore a particularly tenuous link in the chain
holding together democratic governance in this region. 
Comparisons, classifications and coherence
Given that the bulk of our analysis in this collection is fixed squarely on addressing the
implications of the lack of established party systems across the Pacific, this chapter seeks
to illuminate the underlying assumptions and suppositions behind the importance of
coherent and effective parties to overall democratic functioning.
The problem of Pacific Island political parties needs attention and the purpose of
this chapter is to help provide the tools for analysis by looking for common themes,
1
      
hazarding some comparisons with other regions and attempting to apply general
taxonomies. In doing so, there is an immediate problem. Even putting to one side half
the polities in the Pacific Islands that do not have political parties, as well as several other
nations so small that personalisation dominates systematisation,3 the seven political
systems covered in this volume nevertheless are as noteworthy for their differences as for
their similarities. The convenience of lumping them together under the heading ‘South
Pacific’ or ‘Pacific Islands’ should be seen as simply that, a convenient category, not one
that necessarily implies wide commonality.
If the colonial model is accepted as broadly influential in the development of
systems of governance in post-colonial contexts, then the fact that the seven polities
covered in this volume have had at least five and possibly up to seven colonial influences4
emphasises the reality of distinctiveness. Apart from variations flowing from colonial
history, each of the subjects has a unique mix of constitutional and legal regimes, as well
as institutional designs and electoral systems, influencing the formal environment in
which political parties must operate. 
The particular political cultures of the countries under examination in this collec-
tion are equally relevant determinants of difference. Arguably, the differences in political
styles, behaviour and expectations between highland, coastal, island and urban areas of
Papua New Guinea may be greater than differences that exist within any Western nation
that has been politically ‘homogenised’ by civil war, state conquest, industrial revolution
or, more recently, national political parties delivering national messages through nation-
ally available media. Among the nations of the Pacific Islands, these differences are
further magnified because of linguistic, ethnographic and environmental variations as
well as significant differences in leadership cultures.
Regional comparisons
Having accepted the reality of diversity, it is nevertheless necessary to focus on the
common aspects of democratic functioning in the region for the purposes of comparison
and generalisation. While expansive and diverse, there exists a geographic and ideological
Pacific community, derived from an understanding of the island states as linked
contiguously by the Pacific Ocean; as ‘a sea of islands’, to use Epeli Hau’ofa’s appealing
terminology.5 One could even argue that a sense of Pacific-ness is growing in the various
urban centres of the Pacific Rim. In Los Angeles, Auckland, Sydney or Brisbane, the
other-ness of Pacific heritage might promote conceptualisations of a broader Pacific
identity, beyond specific national identifications or ethnic classifications of Melanesian-
ness or Polynesian-ness. 
There is a foreign relations community, formalised in regional architecture such as
the Pacific Islands Forum and informally sharing the carriage of Australian influence, as
well as alternately bridling at the world’s neglect or complaining about the bewildering
impacts of globalisation. Built on the principles of self-determination, the establishment
of the South Pacific Forum in 1971 was ‘the most sophisticated institutional expression
of a post-colonial vision of regional community’.6 Most directly, there is a development
community, in which the various countries share aspirations and frustrations, deal with a
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Figure 1.1: Pacific Islands
 
similar array of donors, merchants and adventurers and face a similar struggle to establish
the institutions of governance and free markets. As members of these communities, the
leaders follow developments in the other countries assiduously and freely borrow ideas
from each other. It is particularly the membership of this imagined policy community
that justifies the grouping of these countries for the purposes of this study. Yet even
behind the latest iterations of Pacific community are a myriad ‘contending visions of
regional community, and of community-building’, based on pragmatism, alliance,
dominance and resistance.7
For the purposes of this collection, fault-lines are also in evidence. Clearly, Timor-
Leste is an outer planet on the fringes of this system, while New Caledonia is centrally
located but tenuously linked within it. Sämoa will often consider itself distinct from the
others while many Pacific states tend to put PNG into its own category because of its size
and complexity. 
The problem of comparing like with like can be resolved partly if those being
compared believe they are alike in certain ways and see themselves as unlike the rest of the
world in many other ways. Comparisons are thus useful if the group under study is distinct
from other groupings. Its own diversity notwithstanding, politics in the Pacific Islands is a
distant relation to politics in Europe or Australia. Oral tradition dominates over electronic
communications. Personality completely swamps policy in voters’ perceptions. Ascriptive
allegiances continue to be decisive in the Pacific whereas in European polities voters behave
far more as atomised individuals. In the spectrum of political culture and behaviour, Asia,
Eastern Europe and Latin America might be slightly closer to the Pacific, but are neverthe-
less at the opposite end of the spectrum. Perhaps most comparable with the Pacific would
be politics in the Caribbean and Africa, though even the latter comparison draws criticism
from some Pacificists.8 Once again, the views of the actors themselves become critical.
Michael Morgan points out in his chapter on Vanuatu the influence of the writings of
African nationalists Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) in shaping
the emerging discourse on ‘the Melanesian Way’. In his autobiography, Michael Somare
recalls that the name given to the Pangu Party was inspired by Kenyan political party names
KANU and KADU.9 And Joao Saldanha notes in his chapter on Timor-Leste the decisive
influence of the returned Mozambique expatriates. 
Nevertheless, the questions to be asked in relation to regional comparisons need
particular care. Common colonial heritage might allow for certain comparisons.
Historical intersections might do likewise. Reliance on similar institutional designs might
be worthy of study. But in all processes of comparison, generalisation and attempts at
cross-regional ‘lessons learned’, the ultimate reality of distinctiveness remains prominent.
Temporal comparisons
The problem of attempting regional comparison is compounded when temporal calibra-
tions are added. It is certainly not the contention of this chapter that processes of
representative democracy follow an inevitable path, well trodden by the early adherents
to democracy and slavishly pursued by those who follow. The variation in the design
and workings of democratic institutions in established democracies puts paid to any
Political Parties in the Pacific4
    
teleological temptation. Choices between presidential or parliamentary systems, unitary
or federal states, and unicameral or bicameral assemblies had to be made by Pacific
countries just as they were made by long-established democracies. Nor is there anything
inevitable about the type of political culture each nation will evolve. Politics in the Pacific
Islands is less secular than the politics practised by the former colonial masters, and
debate in Pacific parliaments is less robust than is the practice in Australia, the regional
power. At the same time, gender problems in Pacific Island politics are even more acute
than in neighbouring regions.
While there is no inevitable path, there has nevertheless been a dynamic evolutionary
path of institutional development. By tracing the point reached by a Pacific Island country
on that path, comparisons are possible with progress made by other polities at similar
periods. In most parts of the Pacific Islands, people have now enjoyed an entire generation
of institutional representative democracy.10 Young people voting for the first time in the
most recent elections in PNG, Sämoa or Vanuatu will have known no other system in
their lifetimes. There is even a small handful of political parties in the Pacific Islands that
came into being at the time of independence and that still exist even though most political
parties in this region tend to have a short life span. Comparisons might therefore be
attempted with the early period of democratic development in Western countries and with
the post-independence period of political development in Africa.
A telling feature of the earliest development of political parties in the United States
and the United Kingdom was the tactic of cooperation on certain issues among individual
legislators of like mind.11 Another early development, according to Duverger, was the
creation of the ‘party of notables’.12 With the adoption of universal suffrage and the
involvement of ‘the masses’ in elections, mass parties developed in the 19th century from
the social and political pressures of the day and evolved to become powerful features of the
political landscape in the 20th century.13 When applying this brief history to the Pacific
Islands, it would seem that the point of comparison should be somewhere between the
creation of loose clubs of legislators and the early period of outside mobilisation of polit-
ical passions. We can also find an echo of Duverger’s ‘parties of notables’ in the Pacific
context in the creation of parties based on local interests and led by local ‘big men’.
When examining key features of post-independence political party development in
Africa, two aspects stand out starkly: the emergence of many single-party systems flowing
from the results of the national liberation struggle; and the ‘primordial loyalties’ of adher-
ents to parties in multi-party systems.14 The relationship between the independence
movement and the formation of political parties in the immediate post-independence
period in the Pacific Islands will be instructive, as will recognition of the continuing
effects of familial, ethnic and kinship relationships.
Classifications of political parties
The next question that presents itself concerns the various methods that have been
employed to classify political parties. Mair provides a useful summary of the formative liter-
ature by focusing on the principal criteria used in the classifications.15 Duverger was
content in 1954 to simply count the number of parties. By 1966, Dahl had added the
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important consideration of the competitiveness of the opposition. Blondel in 1968 looked
beyond mere numbers of parties and asked questions about their relative size. Rokkan in
1968 also sought a level of analysis beyond mere numbers and included criteria concerning
the likelihood of single-party majorities and the distribution of minority party strengths. In
1976, Sartori added an important new criterion concerning the degree of polarisation of
the party system through an examination of ideological distance between parties.
Measurements can thus be devised to calculate the numbers of parties, their size and
strength, their potential to enter into government and the choices they offer the electorate.
The level of sophistication of the measurements has increased commensurate with
the levels of complexity of party systems in the world. Sartori transformed the simple
counting of numbers into a six-part categorisation:16
— Monopoly;
— Hierarchy;




Sartori pointed out, however, that the counting of parties was interesting only insofar as
it explained aspects of the mechanics of the party system.17 His classification establishes a
spectrum of systems from monopoly to fragmentation. It is only in the midpoints of that
spectrum that one finds party systems that allow for alternation as well as relatively even
concentration encouraging system stability. In examining political parties in the polities
in the Pacific Islands, a question to be posed is where they fit in this spectrum and
whether any are near or approaching the midpoints.
Sartori also introduced another measurement spectrum, the ideology-to-pragma-
tism continuum.18 Are political parties motivated by policy outcomes in the interests of
their supporters or are they vehicles for politicians to pursue the accumulation of wealth
and power? In applying this concept to Pacific Island political parties, it will be useful to
distinguish between the two concepts. While pragmatism as an end in itself can be
motivated by simple self-interest, it can also be applied in the interests of the group. This
aspect will be of particular relevance in Pacific Island political culture in view of the tight-
ness of kinship and wantok loyalties and because of the perception of most voters that the
role of their representatives is to deliver concrete benefits to their support base.
The ideological classification can be difficult to apply in established democracies and is
particularly problematic in the Pacific Islands. Commentators note the current process of
ideological convergence in established democracies.19 But this phenomenon follows a
century of cleavage politics with political parties representing fundamental divisions in
society. Lipset and Rokkan argue that political parties in Europe established their mass bases
from the results of two major social and economic revolutions — the national revolution
associated with the emergence of modern nation-states and the industrial revolution leading
to urbanisation and the identification of economic classes within society.20 The class cleavage
established the left-right dimension in descriptions of political parties. The national revolu-
tions created regional parties, religious parties and ethnic parties. The task this suggests, for
Political Parties in the Pacific6
    
the purposes of this volume, is to identify the Pacific Island social bases for ideological orien-
tations. Ideological comparisons with other polities are possible but problematic: there is
clearly no comparison, for example, between the absence of ideological debate in a Pacific
Island nation and the convergence of ideological positions in Western democracies.
The most recent, and least Western-centric, typology of political parties comes from
Gunther and Diamond, who elaborate a sophisticated matrix with 15 segments.21 The
matrix usefully incorporates time and organisation axes. At one end is the earliest
manifestation of political party organisation based on local elites with minimal organisa-
tional structure. The matrix evolves through time to mass-based, ethnicity-based and
electoralist parties and movements. The matrix also plots the evolution of party struc-
tures from thin to thick, beginning with the Duverger’s amateurish party of notables all
the way to the highly professional Leninist party. Positioning Pacific Island political
parties within this graph thus has the advantage of enhancing comparability with other
regions and systems. It also adds an element of dynamism to the classification process by
providing an indication of where the parties might be headed. Even if the parties
discussed in this volume are clumped together in one corner, the Gunther and Diamond
chart nevertheless allows them to be situated and thus better understood.
Figure 1.2: Gunther and Diamond: Species of Political Parties
Source: P. 173, Gunther, Richard and Larry Diamond. 2003. ‘Species of Political Parties — A New
Typology.’ Party Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2. pp. 167–99.































    
Institutionalisation of parties and party systems
The final issue of classification requiring application to the Pacific Island context
concerns the degree to which the system in which the parties operate has become institu-
tionalised. A necessary corollary to this question is the level of institutionalisation of the
parties themselves. The issue was first suggested as critical to democratic practice by
Huntington, who identified four dimensions of political party institutionalisation:
adaptability and the capacity to survive setbacks; organisational complexity as measured
by the number of sub-units; autonomy in relation to other institutions and groups; and,
coherence within the party and the ability to resolve differences.22 In relation to institu-
tionalisation of the party system, Mainwaring and Scully in their study of Latin
American systems set out four criteria: regularity of party competition; whether parties
have ‘stable roots in society’; the extent to which the major players accept election results
as ‘determining who governs’; and the level of organisation of parties.23 Clearly, the two
processes of institutionalisation are linked and, indeed, it would be expected of one to
reinforce the other.
Recent work has been done on applying some of these concepts to Africa. Randall
and Svåsand24 make a number of points that might have some applicability to the Pacific
Islands. They point to the origins of the party as a significant factor, focusing in part of
the role of the movement or party in the struggle for independence. They argue that the
relationship of the party to the leader is critical in the institutionalisation process, with a
key test being whether the party can survive the initial leadership transition. They list the
overriding advantages of incumbency as possibly destabilising to the process of institu-
tionalisation. They identify clientelism as undermining rules and regularised procedures
necessary for institutionalisation to take place. And they note that cleavage in the form of
ethnic exclusivity might not be able to serve the same purposes as class cleavage served in
the institutionalisation of European political parties.
In relation to party systems, Kuenzi and Lambright25 applied the methodology
utilised in the study of party system institutionalisation in Latin America to the African
situation. They found the level of institutionalisation in Africa to be generally lower than
in Latin America and that an important factor was the length of time a country has had
experience of democracy. Only five of the countries reviewed fell into the institution-
alised category. While it is not the intention of this volume to attempt a statistical
analysis, a conclusion will be hazarded as to the relation of degree of institutionalisation
of Pacific Island party systems in comparison with Africa.
Applying Classifications to the Pacific Islands
Attempts to apply the classic literature on political party taxonomy to the developing
world are notoriously difficult. Sartori expressed great caution in applying criteria
designed for ‘modern political systems’ to ‘polities whose political process is highly undif-
ferentiated and diffuse, and more particularly to the polities that are in a fluid state, in a
highly volatile and initial stage of growth’.26 Rakner and Svåsand accept that Sartori’s
typologies might not be applicable to African political parties, but nevertheless argue that
Political Parties in the Pacific8
     
criteria concerning party systems may yet be applicable.27 Even in relation to the large
and often strong nations of East and South-East Asia, Sachsenröder argues that Sartori’s
typologies ‘appear rather difficult to apply’.28 They are even more difficult to apply to the
Pacific Islands. There might well be an inverse relationship between the applicability of
such criteria and the level of development of the polities in question.
Apart from the development impacts affecting literacy, education and the
emergence of a politically engaged middle class, Pacific Island polities are also affected by
small size, isolation and poor communications, each of which contributes to placing
these polities in Sartori’s undifferentiated and diffuse category. Counting the numbers of
parties in itself will explain little about the political system other than the likelihood of its
fragmented nature. Ideological distance between political parties will rarely be a telling
factor in the Pacific Islands because this measure is based on the presumption that the
parties are speaking a common language concerning issues of economic growth, trade
and service delivery. There might be a common rhetoric under these headings but it
could not be dignified with the label of ideology or policy prescriptions. The measure-
ment most applicable in the Pacific Islands in this regard is simply to ask whether a
political party has a meaningful policy agenda.
The Gunther and Diamond taxonomy is more useful in relation to developing
countries. Its identification of personalistic parties and clientelistic parties is of consider-
able assistance in gaining a better understanding of the formative motivations of Pacific
Island political parties. While there might be some overlap in the classification into
categories, and there is also likely to be considerable bunching in the group of parties in
early formation with thin organisational capacity, this taxonomy is relevant and useful.
The method that might produce the most interesting results is to ask a series of
questions about these political parties, the answers to which will aid in classification and
understanding. While some questions might be posed generally in relation to political
parties anywhere in the world, others are specific to developing countries and lend
themselves in particular to parties in Africa and the Pacific Islands.
Does the party trace its origins to an independence
movement?
This question might well point to the most important distinction to be drawn between
the political parties under review. Beginning political life as an independence movement is
a sure means of obtaining the popular legitimacy and developing the substance, organisa-
tion and critical mass to sustain a successful transformation into a ruling political party.29
Africa is teeming with examples; SWAPO in Namibia, ANC in South Africa, ZANU-PF
in Zimbabwe, Frelimo in Mozambique, MPLA in Angola, UNIP in Zambia up to 1991
and KANU in Kenya up to 2002. The independence struggles in Africa also saw the
genesis of prominent opposition parties such as Renamo in Mozambique, UNITA in
Angola and the Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa. Decades after independence and,
in most cases, after the passing of the independence leader, having been the national liber-
ation movement that took over the reigns of power from the colonial power is probably
the most important single factor for success as a political party in Africa.
Analysing and Categorising Political Parties in the Pacific Islands 9
    
The transformation from a national liberation movement to a political party presents
great difficulties. Baregu describes 10 challenges: the need to set new goals; the change in
tactics from radicalisation to consensus-building; eschewing armed conflict; reversing-
mindsets from that of a destroyer of the system to its defender; the need to cater to voters
beyond one’s immediate support base; the change from merely making promises to being
held accountable for actions in government; the move from secretiveness to openness;
the requirement to move to more open internal debate after the habit of suppressing
internal dissent; the harmonisation of internal and external wings; and the need to forgo
democratic centralism and Leninism in favour of decentralisation and checks and
balances.30 The challenge is thus to carry forward the strengths of the national liberation
movement into the self-denying disciplines of multi-party democracy. A lesson from
Africa, and southern Africa in particular, has been the preponderance of the old strengths
over the new disciplines resulting in single-party or dominant-party systems.
This phenomenon of transformation from national liberation movement to polit-
ical party repeats itself in the Pacific Islands, though on a more muted and modest scale.
As Morgan points out, the Vanua’aku Pati situated itself as the party of independence
and had a difficult relationship with the Condominium Administrators. Its reward on
being tested in elections was 15 years of government in the first 24 years of independ-
ence. As Donald Kalpokas, one of the founders of the party, noted recently, party
members were in no doubt about the self-interested nature of the Colonial Administration
and refused to enter into pliant compromises, thus strengthening the party’s reputation
among voters.31 The party was unable to sustain a predominant role in the Vanuatu
party system as it became subject to island politics and conflicting personal ambitions,
leading to splits and loss of influence. The end of its predominant role in Vanuatu began
in 1991 when its independence leader, Walter Lini, split with the party he helped found.
In Ron May’s chapter on PNG, the early success of the Pangu Party is described, as
is its slow demise into just another of the fractious political parties in PNG’s fragmented
party system. Its first leader, Michael Somare,32 traces the emergence of the party to a
small study group including members of the House of Assembly in the 1960s, the ‘Bully
Beef Club’,33 and their increasing impatience for independence. May notes that once the
issue of independence was settled, there was very little by way of policy differentiation
between the various PNG political parties.
Similarly, Alaine Chanter’s chapter on the politics of New Caledonia situates the
FLNKS as the party of independence, describing the difficulties and tactical compro-
mises it had to face over the years as its goal became increasingly difficult to achieve.
While FLNKS was able to achieve considerable support among the Melanesian popula-
tion, it was not able to translate this into incumbency in a society where the Melanesian
population is in a minority. FLNKS became subject to the commonplace splits of
Melanesian politics.
The independence party of the region most closely resembling the African precedents
is Fretilin in Timor-Leste. Joao Saldanha describes Fretilin’s dominant position gained
through the first post-independence elections and plots Fretilin’s path from a revolutionary
movement to the main resistance organisation in the struggle against Indonesian occupa-
Political Parties in the Pacific10
  
tion to a predominant party holding 55 of the 88 seats in the National Assembly. Fretilin
used its reputation as the primary resistance party to reach down to the grassroots level and
establish an invincible political position in the formative first elections.34
In the three remaining nations dealt with in this volume, the establishment of polit-
ical parties was not based on the independence process. Asofou So’o in his chapter on
Sämoa shows how the first eight years after independence were characterised by a form of
consensus politics during which time political parties had not yet been formed. Tarcisius
Tara Kabutaulaka notes that parties, in any case of little significance in the first years of the
Solomon Islands, did not emerge from the small and scattered independence movements.
Alumita Durutalo’s chapter on Fiji describes the curious situation in which colonial
economic interests and Fijian nativist interests saw a common problem in the growing
political demands by the Indo-Fijian community and thus worked together to maintain a
large part of the status quo in the immediate post-independence period. The issue for Fiji
was not the usual whether and when questions about independence but the more difficult
question of how to manage it through democratic institutions without leading to majori-
tarian results seen as likely eventually to favour the Indo-Fijian community.
A comparison between the African and Pacific Island cases suggests that some
conclusions might be drawn from the contrasting experiences. While the transformation
of an independence movement into a political party would seem to be the surest path to
success in Africa and parts of the Pacific Islands, the differing fates of such parties in the
two regions are worth noting. In Africa, many of the parties born from independence
movements went on to dominate the political stage in their nations. The popularity and
legitimacy gained from the independence struggle facilitated their entry into the electoral
process. The strengths and habits built up from resistance days made them reluctant to
share power. The result has been a number of single- or dominant-party situations,
increasingly the subject of criticism by the international community.
A similar story can be told in some of the Pacific Island states under study in
relation to the transformation of independence movements into political parties, but
whereas in many of the African cases a position of power has been sustained over several
decades, in the Pacific Islands, the political momentum slowed after a decade or so. The
reason might flow from the differing experiences in the struggle for independence.
Where it took the form of armed struggle, the independence movements had to be
organised, disciplined and motivated. They needed leadership, good internal communi-
cations and, if possible, national reach. These attributes were put to the test in the
sternest manner and thus hardened the fighting independence movements. These are also
admirable qualities in a political party. To begin political life with a tried and tested
leadership able to communicate with followers who are hierarchically organised
throughout the country and exhibit the discipline of a military force is a good recipe for
political success. Perhaps the hardest aspect of the transformation is, as Baregu notes, the
abandonment of the weapons and techniques of war, both physically and psychologically.
With the exception of some skirmishes in New Caledonia and Vanuatu as well as
those problems flowing from the Dutch and Portuguese withdrawals from the region,
independence processes in the Pacific were and are political, not military. Leading figures
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of the local elites, native and expatriate, demanded independence from the colonial
rulers. The debates took place in colonial offices and tertiary education colleges. The
focus was invariably the capital. Excepting Vanuatu, none of the Pacific Island countries
had a national independence movement similar to those in Africa. Almost none had a
national organisation, partly for the reason that in some cases the nation was to be forged
from an archipelago or from disparate groups only by the flimsy means of a document
granting independence and partly because village life remained largely divorced from the
urban elites. And so the Pacific Island political parties were not tested in the same way as
their African counterparts. They tended to be small groups of committed people with
little by way of an organisation to back them up. They benefited from the popularity
of having been seen to confront the colonial power, but this tended only to have opened
the path to political power in the immediate post-independence period. Thereafter,
the Pacific Island parties could not fall back on much by way of organisation, partisans
or resources.
Fretilin might eventually challenge this rule. Its struggle for independence was of
African proportions but it was directed not at the colonial administration but at the subse-
quent occupation. Indeed, this struggle might be considered even more daunting than a
struggle against British, French or Portuguese colonialism because, having been occupied by
a Third World neighbour, the people of Timor-Leste had little by way of support from
progressive forces in the colonial capital. A quarter of a century of guerrilla warfare and inter-
national agitation against a powerful occupying force might well be the sort of background
that helps establish a very strong political party.
Has the party emerged from cleavage politics?
Lipset and Rokkan developed a seminal description of the cleavage basis of many
European parties flowing from the nationalist revolutions and the industrial revolution.35
These events established large identity groups based on unifying factors such as language,
culture, religion and class. With the granting of universal suffrage, the basis for mass
political parties was established. While not frozen for all time, the cleavage basis of polit-
ical parties was sufficiently enduring to assure those parties the longevity they required to
establish themselves as part of the political bedrock of their societies. Social Democrat,
Christian Democrat and regional political parties can be seen as cleavage parties and, in
view of their prominent role in European politics, they demonstrate the critical impor-
tance of cleavage in politics.
Can we find comparable situations in the Pacific Islands? Fiji provides the starkest
example of cleavage politics in the Pacific Islands. Durutalo makes clear the racial basis of
party development in Fiji. Beginning with the handover of power to Ratu Sir Kamisese
Mara’s Alliance Party, Fijian politics has had at its core the issue of how to deal with Indo-
Fijian political mobilisation. The first attempt was through the Alliance Party itself,
which had Fijian, Indian and general elector wings. This was an attempt to build a
Fijian-dominated consociational party along the lines of the Malay-dominated Barisan
Nasional of Malaysia.36 The experiment was to last 17 years before it was cast aside after
Alliance lost the 1987 elections. It suggests that consociationalism has a certain logic for
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a ruling party but not in opposition. It also points to the problems of asymmetrical
consociationalism as a basis for enduring national leadership. Malay dominance through
UMNO continues to be acceptable to the Chinese and Indian members of the Barisan
Nasional because of fears of the Islamist alternative.37 Fijian domination of the Alliance
Party, which is described by Durutalo as ‘unbalanced and unequal’, ultimately was unable
to satisfy any of the cleavage bases of its component parts. The racial, regional and class
cleavages of Fijian society eventually demanded expression in parties catering to
specific nativist, Indo-Fijian, economic class and regional sentiments. A telling
example of the racial basis of Fijian politics can be seen in Yash Ghai’s description of
the 1995 submissions from the political parties to the Constitutional Review
Commission concerning electoral systems.38 Ghai’s analysis confirms the racial basis of the
political parties’ objectives and concerns.
New Caledonia provides a further example of possible cleavage-based political
parties. Chanter describes the basis for such cleavage in the component parts of New
Caledonian society: the original Melanesian Kanak people; the early French settlers now
dominant economically; the Broussards, who, though French, work the land and identify
themselves as less privileged than the urban settler elite; the Metros who are more recent
arrivals from the metropole and who are concerned about their rights and prospects;
and the migrant minority communities including Wallisians and Futunians, Polynesians,
Indonesians, Vietnamese and ni-Vanuatu. Political parties have been established to
respond to the demands of these distinct communities. The FLNKS and its later
offshoots represent the Kanak people and agonise over issues of native rights, land owner-
ship, independence and autonomy. The RPCR is the party of the establishment and the
status quo and as such attracts support from the urban elite and the minority migrant
groups concerned about their fate under a future native administration. Insofar as
Broussard and Metro interests do not converge with the establishment, new political
parties such as Front Caledonien and the Front National have sprung up to cater to these
political needs. As Jon Fraenkel notes in his chapter analysing electoral systems, there
might be evidence of an emerging trend in the 2004 election success of Avenir Ensemble
of shifting the political agenda away from ethnic issues to common issues of concern
such as corruption.
Vanuatu also displays some elements of cleavage politics, though Morgan counsels
caution in seeing some of the colonial distinctions as enduring. Geographic distinctive-
ness is the most obvious fact of life in the Vanuatu archipelago and it is reflected in the
political system. Identification on the basis of the island of origin is probably now the
first fact of national life. Political groupings have sprung up in some islands without
much ambition of seeking a national audience. The Jon Frum Party from Tanna and
Namangki Aute from Malaluka are examples. The next distinction flows from the condo-
minium nature of colonial government. British and French influence competed, often
pettily, in the New Hebrides and it has left its mark on Vanuatu. The francophone and
anglophone distinction was deepened by corresponding Catholic and Protestant
allegiances and found political expression in differing views on the pivotal question of
independence. In their formative periods, the Vanua’aku Party and the Union of
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Moderate Parties, generally speaking, gathered together the nation’s opposing political
persuasions, the former representing anglophone, Protestant and pro-independence inter-
ests, the latter standing up for francophone, Catholic and pro-autonomy views. Thus
were the origins of the Vanuatu party system influenced by cleavage. In succeeding
decades, however, party splits, leadership ambitions and new ideological questions have
weakened the original basis of Vanuatu cleavage politics, leaving personality and island
politics as more dominant themes.
PNG sets an analytical dilemma in relation to cleavage politics. As May makes clear,
ascriptive allegiance is the dominant theme of PNG politics yet the groups to which the
allegiance is owed do not fit within the concept of cleavage as developed by Lipset and
Rokkan. Allegiance is owed to a person’s wantok, those who speak the same language. As
there are more than 820 living languages in PNG,39 the allegiance group tends to be
rather small, often no larger than 10,000 people. Though PNG voters continue to vote on
the basis of this linguistic affiliation, the diversity of the nation combined with an
inappropriate electoral system has not established the conditions for political stability or
economic growth.40 For cleavage politics to influence PNG politics by being reflected in
political party formation, voters would need to imagine themselves beyond their wantoks
as members of wider groups, such as Papuans or New Guineans, or Highlanders, coastal
or island people, or people from distinct regions such as the Sepik or Morobe. May notes
some hints of this, but, for the moment, PNG politics remains resolutely personalistic and
narrowly based on wantok loyalty.
Solomon Islands politics follows a similar model. As Kabutaulaka discusses in his
chapter, the violence that erupted in the early 1990s in the Solomon Islands had as one of
its causes simmering ethnic frustrations and rivalries based on land and resource issues. The
frustrations were sufficiently acute to lead to the formation of militias with ethnic names
and membership. Yet those same frustrations did not lead to the formation of political
parties based on ethnic cleavage. One can only conclude that political parties were seen as
an ineffective way of tackling the key problems facing society.
So’o argues in relation to Sämoa that political parties emerged because of differ-
ences of opinion among the elected leaders who had begun political life without the
benefit of parties. While island and village distinctions remain important in Sämoa, they
are not such as to create the sort of cleavages that might lead to the process of forming
political parties that respond to their members’ needs. Distinctions in Sämoan politics
flow from whether one is a matai, a family leader or nobleman, from whether one has a
foreign education and from issues of opinion, age and friendships. We can conclude that
Sämoan political parties have no cleavage basis.
The situation in Timor-Leste is complex. While distinctions exist between localities
and between the urban and rural people, these are not sufficiently deep to be the basis for
political party formation. There are, however, a number of important dividing lines
based on recent history: those who supported Indonesia and those who did not; those
who speak Portuguese and those who do not; and among the resistance movement, those
who fought from the mountains and those who fought from abroad. Even within the last
category, a distinction can be made among the returning Timorese between those
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returning from Portugal, Mozambique or Australia. Yet Saldanha’s description of the
political scene puts little emphasis on these historical distinctions. The key to the
existence of today’s political parties in Timor-Leste lies in the politics of the generation
that established these parties in the early 1970s in the confusion of the implosion of the
Portuguese Empire. The politics of the 1970s is the guide to why the parties were formed
and Fretilin’s ability to present itself as the party of victory in the struggle for national
independence is the key to its success.
To what degree is the party systematised?
The degree to which a party is systematised is a fundamental determinant of its substance
and worth. The mass parties of Europe providing ‘cradle-to-grave’ services to their
members and the Leninist parties of Asia that see themselves as above government, must
support their ambitions with vast party structures based on deep membership, rules,
congresses and hierarchies. They are quasi-permanent institutions of the political life of
the nation, though even the mightiest has succumbed, and others yet might, to revolu-
tionary upheavals. No party under review in the Pacific Islands has such ambitions, and,
even if it did, as Fretilin might, it would not have the means to implement them. What
needs to be looked at in the Pacific Islands are far more modest structures in keeping
with the small village-based societies they represent.
The key distinction is whether the party has some structure beyond the present
leadership and its parliamentary support. Is a political party simply a term to describe the
livery under which parliamentarians have come together for the immediate purposes of
parliamentary business? Is it a type of franchise that candidates must purchase in advance
of an election because it is seen as a popular brand? Is the political party synonymous
with its leader and, indeed, inseparable from him (it is almost invariably a ‘he’ in the
Pacific Islands)? Or does the party have some manifestation beyond the current crop of
parliamentarians sitting under its flag? In this regard, the questions to be asked concern
autonomy, membership, branches, congresses, party rules, party officials and party
finances, in line with the criteria suggested by Huntington.
One could take as the Melanesian norm the situation in PNG described by former
minister Tony Siaguru as follows: ‘In Papua New Guinea, we have political parties —
plenty of them — but they are creatures of parliament not of the people or country …
they form, they grow, regroup, fade and then dissolve all within the context of parliament
and with no relevance for what is outside.’41 The short answer is that the political party
with some form of organisation and structure is very much the exception in the Pacific
Islands. Neither could one say that the parties are autonomous in the Huntington sense.
Either they follow the vacillations of parliament and government or they are in thrall to
their leaders. Most political parties are still at the stage of ‘parliamentary clubs’ akin to the
early days of Westminster. Parliamentarians get together usually for the purposes of
strength in numbers or sometimes because of a common regional interest. The party is all
too often simply livery. There are few party officials, concrete operational party constitu-
tions or separate party accounts. These clubs-cum-parties are often dominated by
moneyed individuals or charismatic leaders; the combination of both is rare. These struc-
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tures seem to be even less coherent than what Duverger imagined might exist in relation
to cadre parties. If one were to seek a precedent for this type of party structure it would
be in the colonial assemblies in pre-Federation times in Australia. New South Wales
and Victoria had populations of only one million each, parties did not exist, politicians
were primarily constituency representatives and alliances in parliament were tenuous
and transitory.42
Among the handful of Pacific Island political parties that can be said to have some
degree of systematisation are the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), the Vanua’aku Party, the
Human Rights Protection Party of Sämoa, Fretilin and the major parties in New
Caledonia, in particular the RPCR and the FLNKS. These parties have, to a greater or
lesser extent, established a party structure based on rules, congresses and branches and
are run by officials, though most officials have day jobs. For the most part, these are also
parties of patronage that rely on incumbency or at least the strong prospect of it for
their coherence.
The exceptions to the rule based on the motive of incumbency are the FLP and
FLNKS. The unspoken consensus among the Fiji elite is to keep the FLP out of office.
When not achieved by electoral means, extra-constitutional methods have been used to
that end. Yet, in spite of the coups d’état and the confessionalism introduced into the Fiji
electoral system to formalise the Indo-Fijians’ permanent opposition status, the FLP
continues to function effectively and to insist on its rights under the rules of the game. It
could be argued that because of its dim prospect of ever again winning government, the
FLP, in its need to benefit its support base, has to compensate by being ever more system-
atic in its tactics and organised in its approach. Indeed, the need to match the FLP’s
electoral strategies and parliamentary conduct might be the factor that forces other polit-
ical parties in Fiji to try to become better organised and more strategically focused.
FLNKS has had some experience of provincial government. A moderate line on the issue
of independence could, one day, see it share in the spoils of territory government. The
reason these parties can succeed beyond the confines of clientelism is that they represent
disadvantaged communities and are thus sustained by the logic of cleavage politics.
Does the party have ideology?
Ideology and party platforms are not common currency among Pacific Island political
parties. Parties that are clientelist in the narrowest of senses have little use for the
encumbrance of policy positions. Parties that are little more than informal clubs of
parliamentarians cannot afford to develop firm ideological positions. Candidates who
seek support from electorates still influenced by a cargo cult mentality would be wasting
their time espousing policy positions when all the voters want to hear are promises of
future wealth. Elections in the Pacific Islands are simply not fought over policy
positions. Where policies are formulated in the electioneering context, they are more
often than not the broadest and crudest form of populism offering unfunded free
education or medical care.43
Part of the problem lies in the current global confusion over the breadth of the
policy spectrum. The left/right distinction had very little echo in the Pacific Islands even
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at the height of the Cold War. These days, leftist politics has some substance only insofar
as the FLP represents sugar-cane and textile workers. Bartholomew Ulufa’alu’s National
Democratic Party in the Solomon Islands had some links with the trade union
movement, as did PNG’s Pangu Party in its early days. Perhaps Fretilin is today the
closest to its leftist roots in that policy postures were largely frozen during the quarter-
century of Indonesian rule. Yet Saldanha points out that the realities of government have
forced Fretilin to moderate many positions leading it more in the policy direction of a
social democratic party.
It is also difficult to identify much in the way of right-wing politics in the Pacific
Islands. The French racist Front National party is represented in New Caledonia, but the
Pacific version of the party is quite distinct from its parent. It has adopted a more Pacific
way of dealing with issues and its main burden is to secure the positions of those arriving
more recently from France. Ironically, its main arguments are based on human rights and
non-discrimination in voting rights, a position that would have the effect of increasingly
marginalising the Kanak population. A number of parties can be identified as pro-
business and pro-status quo. Jacques Lafleur’s RPCR is probably the most rigorous of
these, though in small societies it can sometimes be difficult to find the dividing line
between broad principles and individual interests. The RPCR is certainly the party that
protects established nickel interests. Laisenia Qarase’s Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua
(SDL) in Fiji also puts itself forward as pro-business, though it probably should be seen
as pro-native business.
To conduct a discussion of policy aspects of Pacific Island politics in terms of
left/right distinctions is clearly unsatisfactory as it misses the point. Issues of independence
and nation-building dominated the formative stage of Pacific Island politics. Establishing
national structures, determining language policy, working out what to do with expatriate
experts and learning how to conduct the business of government were the factors
dominating the attention of the political leadership in the early years. While it cannot be
said that these overriding problems are now resolved, it can be said that the political
discourse has gone beyond them. They no longer motivate people the way they did in the
first blush of independence.
In many ways, the present political discourse is not policy focused at all. It is about
competence and corruption. It is about making government work and having services
delivered. Those services, such as roads, schools and clinics, are the issues people worry
about and so they become part of the political rhetoric. But it is difficult to describe this
discourse in policy terms. The issues being dealt with — teachers and nurses should be
paid their salaries, roads should be fixed — are so basic that they defy translation into
contested policy positions.
If there is a policy dimension to the public debates in many Pacific Islands
countries, it can perhaps be portrayed as being between traditionalists and modernists. As
Steven Ratuva makes clear in his chapter, tradition retains considerable rhetorical power
in the Pacific. Because tradition has always been an oral and oratorical institution,
conceptions of kastom (custom) must be recognised as highly fluid and contestable. As
Bronwen Douglas noted, one of the paradoxes of nationalism in Melanesia was that
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despite its diversity the essential ingredients of nationalism were everywhere the same:
‘From Papua New Guinea to Fiji, nation makers play particular tunes on the common
motifs of custom/tradition and Christianity.’44 In the context of national parliamentary
politics, it has always run the risk of simply becoming a form of sophistry for self-serving
politicians. Practices represented as traditional or kastom continue to be practiced widely
in the region in the form of communal support, circle discussions and status positioning,
but they run into difficulty when being applied to the processes of national government.
Simultaneously, kastom alongside Christianity became central to assertions of nation-
alism. Tradition tends to be a major part of the political rhetoric of the parties supported
by Melanesian Fijians, the Vanua’aku Party and its offspring, and Papua New Guinean
and Solomon Islands parties, but it is not much contested by other MPs as virtually all
politicians wish to portray themselves as emerging from and supportive of local kastom.
Where the rhetoric of kastom is strongest is in criticising the disappointments of
modernisation. There have been some resounding successes in the Pacific Islands in terms
of health improvements, tackling illiteracy and establishing profitable tourist industries
in several countries. But, at the very least, the benefits of modernisation have fallen far
short of the vast expectations placed on it, thus providing powerful ammunition for
politicians’ rhetoric. The dominance of foreign companies, the lack of job opportunities
for locals, the capricious impacts of globalisation and the politically ever-useful sins of
colonialism are standard parts of the traditionalist politician’s armoury. Those politicians
arguing the merits of ‘progress’ have the harder case to prove in the popular discourse and
it is little wonder that progress soon translates into cargo.
Are there any new policy positions capturing the attention of the voting public?
Christianity would have to top this list. Several of the country chapters describe the influence
of various Christian churches on the political scene. Yet the issue of Christianity in the
Pacific Islands goes beyond the question of influence; it has become part of the policy debate,
for example in the many policy proposals to ‘Christianise’ society. In some ways, Christianity
has become the largest segment of tradition in these countries by taking over the role of
mediating between individuals and the spiritual world, setting social norms and establishing
the means of gaining status. Many Pacific politicians have church backgrounds and many
more evoke biblical terminology. When the Fiji Times expressed some scepticism about the
veracity of a German evangelist faith healer, the then Information Minister, Simione Kaitani,
labelled the paper ‘anti-Christ.’45
Tradition and religion aside, there are few other policy issues that have excited the
voting public. While there is a Green Party in Vanuatu, environmental protection issues do
not present themselves to Melanesian villagers in the same way as urban Westerners see
them. The politics of the environment are entangled with the local patronage politics
mentioned above. For example, logging is a keenly contested issue in PNG, Solomon Islands
and Vanuatu but the contestants tend to be local politicians making quick deals with foreign
logging companies against the donor community, responding primarily to the voters in their
home countries. Environmental protection has its champions in the Pacific Islands but it has
not gained the momentum to become an issue on which political parties can be built.
Gender equality is another issue that has its champions among Pacific Islanders.
Traditional Melanesian society is male-dominated. In the Highlands of PNG a ‘big man’
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will have several wives who will bear his children, tend his gardens and breed his pigs. The
PNG Parliament of 109 members currently has one woman member, the widow of the
former Chief Justice. The situation is similar in other Pacific Island parliaments, reflecting
a traditional view that women are not leaders. Women are becoming better organised and
most countries have a formally recognised women’s association, though it is difficult to
judge at times whether this is an exercise in inclusiveness or tokenism. Women are not
sufficiently well organised or committed to elect their own to parliament or to make
gender issues politically important. The donor community is a leading proponent for
women’s rights, often sparring with male leaders extolling the virtues of tradition.
Clientelism generally takes the place of policy or ideology in Pacific Island politics.
A candidate who solicits one’s vote in PNG and offers nothing concrete in return is consid-
ered a ‘rubbish man’.46 Clientelism tends to take a clan dimension in Melanesia, as Tovua
notes: ‘Loyalty to the wantoks is much greater than loyalty to broader society and it is
greater than loyalty to the law, greater than loyalty to the system of democracy.’47 This
inescapable feature of Melanesian society is likely to continue to dominate the policy-
setting process.
Is there a party system?
‘A party system becomes structured when it contains solidly entrenched mass parties.’48
Applying Sartori’s definition to the Pacific would simply produce a nil return. ‘The
success of democratization is in part dependent on the existence of institutionalized
parties and party systems of government.’49 Applying Smith’s description would lead us
to conclude that democratisation has failed in the Pacific Islands. But applying
Mainwaring and Scully’s four criteria — regularity of party competition; whether parties
have ‘stable roots in society’; the extent to which the major players accept election results
as ‘determining who governs’; and, the level of organisation of parties — might allow for
a more nuanced result.
In spite of all the turmoil and troubles around election time, PNG has held
elections regularly and constitutionally since independence. The elections are hard
fought and meaningful in terms of winners and losers. So there is regular competition,
but the problem is that it is competition primarily between candidates rather than
between political parties. The parties can hardly be said to have stable roots in society
and, as noted above, the level of party organisation is low. On the positive side, elections
are seen as the key to gaining power in PNG but on the negative side, how the election is
won is dependent on what a candidate can get away with. Intimidation, violence,
encouraging dummy opponents to split the vote of an opposing wantok, ballot-stuffing,
curious counting and working courts of disputed returns are all known practices. All this
suggests that if there is a party system, it is rudimentary. May describes the various
attempts to engineer a party system in PNG culminating in 2001 with the Organic Law
on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPC). The jury is necessarily still
out on OLIPPC, but early indications are that it will be no match for the politicians it is
trying to police.
Analysing and Categorising Political Parties in the Pacific Islands 19
        
Other political processes reviewed in this volume show higher degrees of systematisa-
tion. Vanuatu began its national political life with two broad families of political
persuasion competing for power. Based as they were on some notions of cleavage, these
two groups suggested a political party system in embryo. Since independence, however,
the trend has been towards the PNG end of the spectrum with increasing fragmentation,
doubts about party longevity and the dominance of personality politics. The Solomon
Islands would also need to be situated at the fragmentation end of the spectrum.
Fiji began independence with what looked like a dominant catch-all party
committed to the status quo battling a more narrowly based Indo-Fijian party seeking
fundamental reform. Again, this had the makings of a party system of some sort. But, if
there is a party system in Fiji, it is probably today best described in a series of negative
propositions. No Indo-Fijian party will be allowed to have the dominant say in a govern-
ment. No single party representing the views of native Fijians appears able to gain a
dominant position. Personalities and chiefly title, not political party platforms, will
continue to play the most influential role. It is a disquieting reflection on the body politic
of Fiji that coups have had more impact than constitutions. The ambitious and idealistic
Constitution of 1997 has not engineered the results it sought.
New Caledonian politics can give the impression of being systematised along party
lines in view of the racial and economic cleavages that underpin the parties. It also has
the advantage of being more rules-based than other systems in the Pacific Islands given
the applicability and enforcement of French electoral laws. For example, French law
requiring an equal number of men and women on the party lists was a contributing
factor to a woman leading the Territorial Government. Yet even in New Caledonia, the
tendency towards fragmentation is evident. Vote-splitting among Melanesian Kanaks is
one reason why they do not have representation commensurate with their voting
strength. But the problem exists on the conservative side of politics as well. Chanter
traces the various splits that have affected that side of politics in the territory. Thus even
where a cleavage basis for party development exists, it seems that fragmentation is never-
theless the direction in which New Caledonia is moving.
While the Melanesian countries have strong electoral competition without necessarily
enjoying the benefits of a strong party system, Sämoa and Timor-Leste reflect a different
problem. One-party dominance clearly militates against the systematisation of political
contestation. It cannot yet be said that the dominance of the Human Rights Protection
Party (HRPP) and of Fretilin is immutably entrenched. But the likely cause of any future
decline of these parties will not be strong competition from political opponents but rather
internal splits. Without a party system that attempts to establish a level playing field, the
advantages of incumbency will work to entrench the dominance of the ruling party.
Sämoan opposition politicians complain bitterly about the HRPP’s dominance of the
parliamentary process. The Fretilin Government is already showing ambitions of control-
ling key aspects of electoral governance.
A persuasive piece of evidence of the lack of party systems in the region is the
growing consensus on the need to engineer them. Given the acute nature of the problem
in PNG, it is of little surprise that efforts to engineer a party system are most advanced in
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that country. One feature of OLIPPC is the anti-party-hopping rule intended to reduce
the ‘horse-trading’ that can go on after the election (or after a no-confidence vote in
Parliament) by tying elected members to the party that nominated them and with which
that member first votes. The tough penalty for crossing the floor is the declaration of a
vacancy for that seat and the fighting of a by-election. A sweetener is offered to the
parties in the form of a small subsidy from the State to help defray the costs of the organ-
isational requirements of the law. Fiji’s 1997 Constitution has a similar anti-party-
hopping rule covering not just resignations from the party but expulsion, provided the
expulsion was within the rules of a registered political party and does not relate to the
parliamentarians’ work in a parliamentary committee.50 The Solomon Islands and
Vanuatu are studying these initiatives closely.
Engineering party systems can also be achieved through the voting method
employed. Fraenkel points out that Pacific Island nations use a variety of electoral
systems and some favour political party systems more than others, though he also notes
that the eventual impacts might differ markedly from those intended by the designers.
There is no doubt that some institutional designs are less appropriate than others. PNG’s
first-past-the-post system leading to pluralities in the single digits did much to under-
mine confidence in the electoral process. It follows that reforms in institutional designs
are necessary and beneficial. But the record is not positive in relation to the use of institu-
tional redesign to re-engineer political systems. The more ambitious the intention of the
redesign, the less likely it is to succeed. In relation to political parties, neither the Fiji
Constitution of 1997 nor OLIPPC have yet borne fruit. The Pacific Islands might prove
to be so under-systematised as to be impervious to institutional redesign.
Conclusions
Two caveats need to be placed before attempting to pull some of the threads together.
The first has already been alluded to: there is no one-size-fits-all description or analysis
applicable to the Pacific Islands. The polities differ in their sizes, economies, histories and
politics. The case studies in this volume extend from Timor-Leste to Sämoa, a distance
greater than from London to New Delhi, so it is not surprising to find significant polit-
ical differentiations among them. Having accepted this caveat, it remains that five of the
seven case studies are polities with native Melanesian populations. Timor-Leste and
Sämoa act as bookends to the Melanesians and share some of the geographic attributes
and development challenges. The region therefore lends itself to political generalisations
tempered by the need occasionally to take note of exceptions to the rule.
The other caveat concerns the place of political parties in the broader issue of society.
Many problems concerning political parties and criticisms of their conduct appear in this
and other chapters. This might lead to the erroneous conclusion that political parties are
the fundamental problem plaguing Pacific Island societies. If only it were that simple.
Village life might well continue at its normal rhythms in many places in the Pacific Islands,
economically sustained by fishing and subsistence farming, and spiritually sustained by
church and tradition. Some of these villages might be touched by modernisation and
globalisation in only the most tangential of ways and thus have little contact with the insti-
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tutions of modern political life. This is often the South Seas idyll imagined by urbanites in
their cold Western cities. But world history and the global economy insist that these polities
behave as nations and this is where the problems begin. Establishing, managing and
sustaining the governance institutions of a nation in the modern world are tasks that Pacific
Island polities are finding particularly difficult to achieve. The reasons for this must be left
to other publications in this and other disciplines, but the point to be made is that before
we even get to the problems of political parties we must traverse a forest of other national
problems; before we arrive at Westminster, we must pass through Westphalia.
If national and industrial revolutions stoke the furnace in which so many political
parties are forged, then the Pacific Islands have difficulty in raising the temperature to the
required intensity. Generally speaking, the Pacific Island nations are pre-industrial.
Village life remains the ideal and while the trend to urbanisation exists, it has not led to
the formation of organised working classes. In Fiji, there is something of an exception to
the rule in that the FLP is built on the bedrock of Indo-Fijian cane workers and has
recruited urban textile workers. The level of development in New Caledonia has also had
the effect of a quasi-industrial revolution in its creation of segments of society with
common economic perspectives and grievances. But these are timid exceptions when
compared with the great workers’ parties of the developed world.
The story in relation to national revolutions is more complex and varied. Perhaps it
can best begin with the only nation in the Pacific Islands not to be colonised, Tonga. The
Kingdom of Tonga was certainly influenced by British colonisers but it remained
independent and under the stewardship of its monarchy. Tongans share a common
history and see themselves as a people distinct from Maori or Melanesians, but it could
not be said that they have had any sort of a national revolution. The struggle in Tonga is
that of commoners against nobility and it is played out in polite slow motion. Perhaps
one day the nobility’s excesses will spur commoners to greater action, but until that time,
there are no political parties in Tonga. The Solomon Islands, lightly colonised by the
British, comprises a number of islands, including the two most prominent, Guadalcanal
and Malaita. Friction between these groups contributed to the violence that ravaged the
country. The combatants were militia ostensibly representing the interests of their fellow
Islanders. To reiterate a point made earlier, it is noteworthy that the system produced
militia to take on these grievances but no political parties to do so.
The closest historical parallel to a national revolution has been the process of
gaining independence. As in Africa, the elites leading the independence movements
reimagined their lands and islands in accordance with the maps drawn by their
colonisers. The debate was not about the return to the pre-national existence of pre-
colonialism, but rather the demand to take over the local institutions of colonial
governance. The national revolution took place by way of this thought transfer. All at
once, disparate peoples became ni-Vanuatu or Solomon Islanders or Papua New
Guineans. The problem with this conceptual revolution is that it has been restricted to a
small band of urban educated leaders. The majority of the people of these nations think
of themselves primarily and perhaps at times exclusively in terms of their village, their
island or their wantok. The nation suggested by map-makers remains a sparsely imagined
construct. Little wonder that we do not see broadly based political parties emerging.
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It is the struggle for independence that was the primary force in forging the first
political parties. In that sense, the Pacific Islands follow African precedent ahead of
European models. The comparison with African examples sheds light on a key difference.
Decolonisation in the Pacific Islands was more of a debate than a struggle. To continue
the blacksmith’s analogy, the fires generated by these debates were sufficient to form
political parties but perhaps not to forge them strongly enough to withstand the passing
of time and memory. While Fretilin might yet prove to be the exception, the decades
since independence have seen the bearers of that mantle fall back to the field. Perhaps the
conclusion to be drawn here is that the more intense the independence struggle and the
greater the need to form strong, broadly based and disciplined national liberation
movements, the greater the likelihood that the emerging political party will have the
longevity and organisational ability to make a prominent if not dominant place for itself
in the newly independent state.
The first generation of leaders has passed or they are on their last political legs in the
Pacific Islands. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Walter Lini, Matä’afa Fiamë Faumuinä
Mulinu’ü and Jean-Marie Djibaou have all died. Michael Somare has been politically
resurrected in PNG. Peter Kenilorea is the non-elected non-partisan Speaker in Solomon
Islands. Mari Alkatiri in Timor-Leste is the exception in that he probably sees himself as
the long-term leader of his country. They are all better known than the parties they led,
again with the exception of Alkitiri’s Fretilin. Ratu Mara’s once formidable Alliance Party
has disappeared. Matä’afa in Sämoa always saw himself as above parties anyway. Walter
Lini and Michael Somare abandoned the parties they helped form. This is a rather sorry
record from the point of view of political parties and suggests that leaders are the more
prominent political institution.
The conclusion to be drawn is that personalisation of politics is a more enduring
feature of the Pacific Islands than its systematisation. The regrettable corollary is that
opportunism generally wins out over policy in such a system. One highly visible manifes-
tation of this situation is the prevalence of party splits, walkouts, revolts and
abandonments. Fretilin has so far been spared but its prominence is in part due to the
dismemberment of the CNRT, of which it had been a leading member. Virtually all the
major Melanesian political parties have been subject to this fissiparous phenomenon.
Gelu provides a striking example in cataloguing the splits in the Pangu Pati, starting with
the first split in 1985 followed by further splits in 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994 and two in
1997.51 Melanesian ‘big man’ concepts seem to militate in favour of rugged individu-
alism and personal ambitions over disciplined membership of a group and broad societal
ambitions. There does not appear to be an imminent circuit-breaker for this cycle of
splits. Melanesian politics therefore appears to have an almost inevitable trend towards
high fragmentation. It is a fragmentation not based on representing the spectrum of
policy positions but generated by personal ambitions and narrow small-group interests.
This clearly does not augur well for the systematisation of the party system, or for
stability in politics. The Pacific Islands region is therefore probably behind Africa in
terms of the systemisation of political parties.
Perhaps the most positive comment open is that Pacific Island electoral politics is in
its early years and might well mature into a more stable and cohesive framework in which
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political parties play the role foreseen by the theorists. This could support an argument
situating many of the parties in Duverger’s description of the party of notables. This is an
early manifestation of the political party with narrow membership and thin organisation.
Gunther and Diamond begin their typology at the same spot and this would be the
closest point at which Pacific Island parties could be accommodated. But there are hints
of other typologies as well. Staying with Gunther and Diamond, the notables or big men
have certainly adopted clientelist features into their political philosophy, though the
parliamentarian himself is all too often the principal client. There are some suggestions of
ethnic parties, especially in Fiji and New Caledonia, but not within the predominantly
uni-racial nations. There might well be a trend towards denominational parties with the
increasing prominence of the churches in politics. Personalist parties are common but
not strong. And there is a hint of a party with Leninist dispositions in Timor-Leste.
These classifications are helpful for analysis and comparisons but there is an inevitable
degree of artificiality in applying them to a system with such weak party systems.
The comparison with the early parliamentary periods in other polities might be
more to the point. Political parties at this point of political development resemble clubs
more than disciplined organisations. There might be a concept of club membership and
livery but it tends to be loose to the point of interchangeability. The members of these
clubs are primarily constituent representatives and ambitious individuals with quite
narrow goals and often consumed with the reality that they might have only one parlia-
mentary term in which to achieve them. Eventually, changes in the demands of society,
the rules of parliament and the stability and longevity of the political system would lead
these clubs to the path of parties. This might be the path down which the Pacific Island
polities are currently meandering.
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This chapter is concerned with the role of cultural tradition in political parties in the
Pacific. Specifically, it explores how ‘tradition’ is deployed as an organising and mobil-
ising schema, how it is transformed into a political ideology and how traditional
institutions and leadership systems are used to facilitate party interests. The chapter
argues that tradition plays a significant role in shaping the form and dynamics of political
parties in the Pacific, with parties embracing tradition as an instrument of mobilisation
and legitimisation. As a consequence political parties also become agents of political and
cultural transformation and reproduction.
Political parties are relatively recent innovations in Pacific Island polities and are still
in various stages of formation and transition. There are presently about 57 political
parties registered throughout the Pacific that follow various organisational and political
ideals, and many more social organisations that seek political power but which fail to
fulfil the respective requirements of party registration.1 At one end of the continuum are
those political parties (as in the case of Fiji) that are established and institutionalised with
a structure and ideological framework. At the other extreme are political groups held
together loosely under various labels by individuals or self-centred political interests.
Party names are often symbolic of the party’s identity, interests or principles, but
sometimes they might be largely rhetorical (such as when they incorporate ‘democratic’,
‘unity’, ‘people’s’, ‘national’, ‘alliance’), chosen to articulate certain broadly recognised
principles. This is true of many political parties in PNG (United Democratic Party), Fiji
(National Alliance Party), Solomon Islands (Peoples Alliance Party) and Vanuatu
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(Melanesian Progressive Party). In between the two extremes are groupings that encom-
pass varying degrees of coherence in organisation and principle. Increasingly, ideological
parties have emerged in urban areas — Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and PNG each
have Labour Party — but most political parties in the Pacific Islands represent specific
local, tribal or ethnic interests.
Globally, the major forces in the spawning of political parties were the waves of
decolonisation that swept the globe from the 1940s to the 1980s and the collapse of the
Soviet Empire and demise of one-party Marxist regimes in the 1990s. Most political
parties in the Pacific emerged after independence. While colonial hegemony was highly
centralised under the colonial state, independence saw a period of transition towards
more local control and democratisation. The new mode of post-colonial leadership was
organised around political parties and signalled a new era of democratisation, while also
manifesting the complex relationship between tradition and modernity.
In this chapter, I define the term ‘tradition’ rather loosely to refer to practices,
values, institutions and belief systems that were inherited from the past. This notion of
“past” is quite complex because history consists of a continuity of events that are
constantly changed, reshaped and redirected by internal forces (such as warfare and polit-
ical struggle) or external forces (such as globalisation). In Pacific states, as in other
post-colonial states, what is usually considered ‘tradition’ is a combination of surviving
pre-colonial practices, colonially reshaped institutions and practices and even some new
post-colonial values repackaged as ‘traditional’.2
I use the words ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ here not in a dichotomous sense but as
dynamic concepts with highly adaptive and interchangeable characteristics. For instance,
tradition does not necessarily imply only primordial features but can be reinvented,
repackaged and rearticulated as something to suit emerging circumstances. On the other
hand, modernity is not a fixed state since it embodies a range of characteristics, some of
which are ‘old’ and some of which are ‘new’. Within the dynamics of cultural transforma-
tion tradition and modernity not only define each other, they oscillate between each
other to the extent that sometimes it is difficult to distinguish one from the other.
This chapter is divided into four main parts. The first provides an overview of polit-
ical parties in the Pacific and the basic principles on which they operate. This is
important to gauge the extent to which political parties use various modes of traditional
organisation such as kinship for purposes of mobilisation and legitimisation. Secondly, it
provides a broad framework within which we can understand the dynamic and utilitarian
nature of tradition and how it is deployed readily as an instrument of politics. Thirdly, it
discusses some of the dynamic relationships between political parties and tradition and
how one uses and modifies the other; and, lastly, the chapter looks briefly at the contin-
uing dilemma between tradition and democracy as a ‘foreign flower’. 
Political parties in the Pacific: an overview 
It is difficult to make generalisations about political parties in the Pacific because of their
diversity. At one extreme are political parties with cohesive organisations and coherent
ideologies and at the other are those that are much looser and less coherent. The oldest
    
political parties in the Pacific were formed in the 1950s and ’60s, although there have
been political protest groups in existence since the 1800s. The average life expectancy of
political parties in the Pacific is relatively short. In the case of the Solomon Islands, some
political parties emerge in a few days and disappear, some live for a month or two and, if
lucky, some might exist for more than one year. There is usually a proliferation of parties
during the elections and many die out after that.
Although there are a lot of differences between political parties in the Pacific, there are
also similarities that are worth generalising. First, many are small and elitist in nature,
without mass party membership as in many Western liberal democracies or even socialist
regimes. Often the leaders of parties are also the only members. Secondly, many political
parties are very unstable and often break up into different parts as a result of power strug-
gles, differences of opinion or defections to greener pastures. Thirdly, many lack coherent
political ideologies and are driven by specific local interests rather than the national interest.
Hence, many parties are held together by kinship ties or networks of patronage, making
them more accountable to the local community than to a national constituency. This
makes political parties organisations that are embedded in community rather than national
institutions. Fifthly, tradition is used as a mobilising and legitimising tool; and, lastly,
churches exert a strong influence in the party membership and leadership (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1 represents political parties registered officially under their country’s respective
electoral laws, irrespective of their representation in parliament. It shows that some states,
especially the Melanesian ones, have significantly larger numbers of political parties than the
smaller Micronesian and Polynesian states. The only Polynesian states with formal political
parties are Sämoa and Cook Islands. A large number of states, such as Kiribati, Tuvalu,
Tokelau, Tonga, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Niue, Palau and Nauru, do not have
political parties, while Marshall Islands has only one. For these states, elections revolve
around personalities, kinship and loose associations of individuals rather than formally
constituted parties.3
In recent years, PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have witnessed a proliferation
of political parties before national elections. Small political parties that fail to win
elections tend to dissipate quickly, although they might resurrect themselves using the
same name and form to contest future national elections. 
Many political parties articulate socioeconomic and political issues as platforms for
their debates; however, the principles on which they exist and mobilize support and
membership are still strongly linked to kinship and local loyalty. Some parties do not
even articulate national issues since their focus is largely local. There is a complex interac-
tion between issues of personality, kinship, tribal-regional loyalty and ethnicity.
Ideological differences in terms of adherence to standard political principles as in
Western liberal democracies or in terms of religious or cultural ideologies rarely exist.4 In
Fiji, these ideological differences find expression through the platforms of the major
parties. For example, some Fijian political parties are based on conservative nationalist
principles (such as the Matanitu Vanua), with others being more moderate and multira-
cial (such as the Fiji Democratic Party). The Fiji Labour Party (FLP), which was founded
in 1985 on social democratic principles, later evolved into an ethnic party (for Indo-
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Fijians) after the leading leftist intellectuals quit the party in response to Mahendra
Chaudhry’s autocratic and conservative style of leadership. 
Issues of personality, kinship and regional-tribal loyalty are closely associated with
cultural traditions. In fact, these are some of the social mechanisms within which tradi-
tion is defined, articulated and reproduced. The fact that they feature prominently in the
dynamics of political party formation and function shows the significance of tradition in
the political process. Before we discuss the relationship between political parties and
tradition, we need to consider the broader issues relating to tradition and politics. 
Contextualising political parties: the politics of tradition
debate 
Political parties in Melanesia engage in a dynamic process of identity creation. On one
hand is the appeal to tradition and on the other is the accommodation of modernity. To
understand the relationship between political parties and tradition it is important to
contextualise our analysis within the broader debate relating to politics and tradition and
how this informs our empirical study. 
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Table 2.1: Number of Pacific Island Political Parties and their Political Principles as at
October 2004.
Country No. of Major principles of party organisation, support and 
political parties membership
Cook Islands 3 Kinship, business connections, locality, religion 
Fiji 11 Ethnicity, political ideology, regional loyalty, religion 
Kiribati 2 Personality, kinship, religion
Marshall Islands 1 Personality, kinship 
Federated States 




Papua New Guinea 24 Personality, kinship, regional/tribal loyalty, religion
Sämoa 7 Personality, kinship, religion, locality 
Solomon Islands* 2 Personality, kinship, regional/tribal loyalty, religion
Tokelau 0 –
Tonga** 1 Democratic Participation of commoners in the affairs of state
Tuvalu 0 –
Vanuatu 7 Personality, kinship, regional/tribal loyalty, language
Total 57
*In the Solomon Islands, although there are two major political parties, there are numerous groupings and parties that
comprise these. 
**The Human Rights and Democracy movement in Tonga is technically not a political party, although it campaigns for
elections and fights for issues just like normal political parties. 
        
The dynamic relationship between tradition and politics often involves
reinventing certain assumed primordial aspects to serve practical purposes in given
situations, usually for the benefit of dominant groups, political parties or elites. The
notion of ‘inventing tradition’, especially in relation to the encapsulation of presumed
past practices to exert new identities, has been the subject of analysis by people such as
Hobsbawm and Ranger.5 Others, such as Shils, Clifford, Keesing and Lawson, have
explored the theoretical issues of representing and evoking traditional identity using new
norms in post-colonial societies.6
Keesing described the trend in the Pacific thus:
Across the Pacific, from Hawai’i to New Zealand, in New Caledonia, Aboriginal
Australia, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea, Pacific peoples are
creating pasts, myths of ancestral ways of life that serve as powerful political symbols.
In the rhetoric of post-colonial nationalism (and sometimes separatism) and the
struggle of indigenous Fourth World peoples, now minorities in their own homelands,
visions of the past are being created and evoked.7
The links between ‘creating pasts, myths of ancestral ways of life’ and ‘political symbols’
is part of a complex historical process emanating from contact between Europeans and
indigenous people. Some of these were defensive reactions to colonialism and cultural
encroachment while some were to facilitate change. For instance, recreation and articula-
tion of ‘new’ identity by Aboriginal Australians or New Zealand Maori were part of
resistance to colonial dispossession as well as adaptation to the new society. The same
could be said of the Tahitian and Kanaky colonial situation, where political resistance
meant creating new identities to consolidate an anti-colonial front. However
constructed, these identities provided an important ideological reference framework with
which they could redefine their position in the changing world. 
The politics of resistance involves invoking traditional identities, whether based on
assumed primordial links or recently created discourses, which act as powerful political
symbols. In the case of Fiji, tradition as a basis for identity construction has in the past
been used for the purpose of colonial resistance (as in the case of the semi-religious
Luveniwai Movement) and, more recently has been deployed to maintain chiefly
authority and communal hegemony and as an ethnic leverage against Indo-Fijians.8
Keesing’s basic argument is that there is a fundamental contradiction in the process
of political and traditional identity creation in the Pacific in the sense that ‘the temporary
discourse of cultural identity derives from Western discourses’.9 In other words, many
things that have been presented as being authentically traditional have often been based
on colonial practices and discourses and have been accepted as immemorial. France
makes the same observation about the land-ownership system in Fiji, arguing that what is
now assumed to be the traditional Fijian landowning system was in fact a codified system
recommended by a colonial Lands Commission in the early 1900s.10
In her study of the political systems of Fiji, Tonga and Sämoa, Lawson observed two
interrelated processes taking place with respect to traditionalism and cultural revival.11
The first pertains to the transformation of the notion of tradition into a political
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ideology and how this is deployed by political elites to serve specific purposes. The
second deals with constructing a dichotomy as a way of invoking an oppositional image
and providing justification for the ideology of traditionalism. An example is the use of
the term ‘Pacific Way’ in the Pacific to mobilise opinion against what are seen to be
‘Western’ or ‘foreign’ ways.
The terms ‘Melanesian Way’ or ‘wantokism’ have also been coined to serve the same
political purpose. This refers to attempts to rediscover some primordial cultural or
kastom (custom) links between the people of ‘Melanesian’ background as the means of
political and cultural unity.12 In a country as large as PNG, with more than 820
languages,13 the notion of wantok would have various levels of contextualisation. At one
level, it would refer to identification according to the same language and at another level
it might refer to identification in relation to the same province or region.
Institutionalisation and deployment of tradition can take place in two forms. First,
it might be used as an anti-foreigner ideology, as studies in Africa have shown.14 To some
extent, this has also been true in the Pacific, where appeal to traditional culture has been
a reference point for anti-foreign articulations such as ‘democracy is a foreign flower’.15
Secondly, tradition can be deployed as a means of reinforcing the political status and
power of traditional and ‘modern’ elites and political parties. The deployment of tradi-
tion as a legitimising tool in politics takes place in ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ societies.
It has been observed that the preoccupation with genealogy by the European ruling
classes was a way of legitimising their contemporary dominance and perpetual exclusion
and subordination of the lower class. For example, Melman argues that various desirable
aspects of the Anglo-Saxon traditions have been fabricated to maintain exclusivity of
membership for the group.16
In Fiji, the development of tradition for political ends has always been linked to
conservative and racial politics. Political practices and institutions, considered by many
Fijians to be immemorial, were colonial constructions — formally codified and univer-
salised practices deemed appropriate to colonial rule. For example, the Great Council of
Chiefs and Fiji’s land-ownership system were created as institutions of colonial
dominance, but came to be thought of as ‘traditional’ over time. These were imbued with
divine authority thus strengthening their normative force and authenticity. In this sense,
elite indigenous interests dovetailed with British colonial agendas.
The close (and often inseparable) links between the church and the indigenous
Fijian socio-cultural system and traditional hierarchy provided the framework for the
unquestioned divinity and reification of tradition. Local practices that served the
purposes of the local elites and colonial states were codified and became timeless tradi-
tion to be observed. Hobsbawm and Ranger summarised this tendency thus:
Codified tradition inevitably hardened in a way that disadvantaged the vested interests
in possession at the time of its codification. Codified and reified custom was manipu-
lated by such vested interests as a means of asserting or increasing control …
Paramount chiefs and ruling aristocracies … appealed to ‘traditions’ in order to
maintain or extend their control over the subjects.17
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During the post-colonial period in the Pacific, political parties became important
vehicles for local political rule as well as for redefining and reproducing tradition whether
codified or practised. This was especially so since many Pacific political parties emerged
from community organisations and were spawned by the new era of decolonisation and
self-expression. Their survival and legitimacy depended on how well they used and artic-
ulated tradition, whether invented or authentic. The importance of the distinction
between authenticity and invented tradition deteriorated in the minds of political leaders
because the issue was no longer to do with understanding and analysing the contents and
dynamics of tradition but how tradition could be used for practical political purposes.
Tradition thus became a political ideology in itself, which was subject to modification
and manipulation by political parties. We examine this in more detail next. 
Political parties and tradition: the dialectical relationship 
Pacific political parties engage dialectically with tradition in various ways. These include
political parties transforming traditional values into political party ideology and using
them to mobilise support; traditional socio-cultural networks and kinship systems can be
invoked to extend and consolidate influence; traditional modes of leadership can be used
to consolidate support and legitimacy; and political parties often use revival of tradition
as a party policy to win acceptance by the community. These processes often have a two-
way dynamic between political parties and community: the political parties might make
use of the community for purposes of mobilisation and legitimacy and likewise the
community (or various sections of the community for that matter) might make use of
political parties to serve their own interests. As the epitome of political organisation and
articulation of political issues, political parties represent the link between the political
community (defined narrowly here as politicians and the State political hierarchy) and
the civil society at large. In the Pacific, this takes place in a complex way because of the
influence of tradition through kinship, regional and tribal loyalty. 
Traditional values as political party ideology
Traditional values have often been used as a basis for creating political ideology to invoke a
sense of continuity, immemoriality and mythology to ensure political legitimisation and a
sense of permanence. Political ideology is defined here in a general sociological sense to
refer to a body of values and ideals, which is used as the basis for political action.18
This has especially been the case in Melanesian societies, where the use of tradi-
tional cosmology, whether in its symbolic or practical forms, by political parties to bolster
ideological appeal is common practice. Because of its mystical nature, traditional
cosmology can be translated easily into political ideology. The will of the ancestors and
the power of the land can be invoked to maximum effect by political parties to project
themselves as the anointed ones. Parties in the Solomon Islands, PNG and Vanuatu use
local traditional cosmological discourses as their basis for consolidating legitimacy.
Moreover, the dynamics of politics is often based on a reciprocal relationship where
politicians are supposed to provide something tangible for the people in return for votes. 
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To consolidate their local popularity and legitimacy, politicians invoke traditional
cosmological discourses. Ancestral spirits are often called on in ceremonies for their inter-
vention to make a politician win an election and thus bring prosperity to his community.
An election loss is sometimes blamed on sorcery by opponents. The use of sorcery is an
effective political tool for ‘weakening’ and defeating adversaries in elections. Traditional
symbols with deep cosmological significance might be used as party symbols. A case in
point is the use of whale tooth (tabua), a symbol of peace and wealth, by the Fijian
National Party (FNP). 
One of the common tendencies is to invoke the traditional cosmological order to
provide spiritual and psychological appeal. In Fiji, the Alliance Party, which ruled Fiji for
13 years before being ousted in a general election in 1987 by the FLP, used the appeal to
the mythical mana of the vanua effectively as a means of mobilising support among
indigenous Fijians. The notion of vanua in Fijian communal thinking exists at three
levels. The first refers to land as an entity for subsistence living; the second to the totality
of socio-cultural relationships and individual roles within these; and the third to the
cosmological dimension — the ancestral and spiritual worlds.
As the only Fijian political party in the first seven years after independence, the
Alliance Party had the monopoly over the appeal to Fijian cosmology. The political logic
was that Fijians were bound by their vanua and therefore their political loyalty should be
directed to the Alliance Party as the ancestrally ordained soqosoqo vakapolitiki ni vanua
(party of the vanua). Those who did not support the soqosoqo vakapolitiki ni vanua were
exhibiting un-Fijian characteristics and would be punished by the jealous ancestors.
While this synergy between tradition and ideology was taking place at one level, the
Alliance Party was articulating a multiracialist discourse at another in order to appeal to
other ethnic groups and win national and international legitimacy. 
Other Fijian political parties subsequently used the same cosmological appeal,
provoking competition over who was the legitimate guardian of the Fijian cosmology.
Winning the election was a way of exerting one’s claim. Sometimes, debates about
economic and political issues between Fijian political parties would degenerate into compe-
tition about who best represented the vanua and Fijian-ness and thus who best represented
the Fijian cosmology. This was most evident in the formation of the Kudru na Vanua
(Grumble of the Land) Party, headed by a defrocked Catholic priest, which has failed ever
to win a parliamentary seat. The leader claimed that his party was the only one to have the
blessing of the ancestral spirits of Fiji and that he was a kalou vu (ancestral god), who in
cosmological ranking was higher than everyone else in Fiji, including the high chiefs.
In Vanuatu, political party issues revolve largely around the notion of land. Land is
the embodiment of culture and tradition, the link to ancestral cosmology. The name
Vanuatu literally means ‘our land’ and the ruling party after independence, the
Vanua’aku Party (party of ‘our land’), adopted a policy that supported ownership of land
‘according to custom’ and the ‘reservation and protection of important tambu [taboo]
places’.19 Indeed, such policies are common reference points in Vanuatu’s political
culture. Perhaps the most prominent party advocating the protection of tambu places is
the Jon Frum Party, which started as a cargo-cult type movement in 1940, but which
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remains a powerful political force on the island of Tanna. In these instances, kastom
represented a remedial strategy to Western advance. Indeed, one of Vanuatu’s most
prominent kastom groups, Nagriamel, advanced the theory that returning to kastom was
the best way to protect community land from encroaching European ranchers. Their
policy perhaps summarised what most Vanuatu political parties believe: ‘Land is the
basis, the essence of everything. Restore KUSTOM.’20
Use of traditional socio-cultural and kinship networks
Throughout Melanesia, parties usually consist of loose associations of individuals and
groups whose political orientations are locally based, with community-oriented land
policies being prominent in party platforms. Thus, utilising kinship systems is a common
political strategy for political mobilisation by parties and candidates. These systems
constitute an important mechanism for reproducing traditional culture in the Pacific.
Kinship is the major means for socialisation and cultural reproduction and ensures the
survival of a community. Kinship is a system and a process and has complex links to land
and to the cosmological world of the ancestors. 
Kinship is often a powerful centripetal force around which political party loyalty
revolves. Because many politicians have localised interests, kinship is a means by which
they can access the community to carry out campaigns and also the means whereby the
local communities demand ‘payback’ in terms of money and services. This is where the
dilemma between kinship responsibility and public accountability becomes obvious. For
the politician, using public money to satisfy his or her kinspeople’s wishes could be
labelled ‘corruption’; on the other hand, being seen not to be giving generously to his or
her people would be political suicide. 
There are two types of kinship: biological kinship and social kinship. Biological
kinship is where there are identifiable blood ties. Social kinship has to do with links that
are based on claims to common origin, history or experiences. Blood ties also have social
obligations and relationships to make them legitimate and social kinship is sometimes
assumed to also involve primordial relations with common biological origins at some
point in the past. In Melanesia, the notion of wantok represents biological and social
kinship existing at different levels. There are circles of wantoks starting at the nuclear
family and extending outwards. The external boundary extends as far as one can identify
(in many cases assume) a common feature of identification. Thus, the external boundary
could be just a nuclear family or extended family, a tribe, a region, a town, a country or
even all speakers of Melanesian pidgin.
Political party mobilisation usually takes place at the most immediate boundary,
usually at the nuclear family, extended family and tribal levels. This is not only because of
the closeness of the social links and the existence of the traditional obligations that bind
people together, but because closer kinship groups are considered the most politically
trustworthy. Close kinspeople tend to see the political success and associated privileges of
their relatives as their own.
For political parties in Melanesia, the use of kinship provides the easiest, cheapest
and most effective way of mobilisation, extending influence and winning legitimacy.
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Over the years, many political parties in Fiji had developed extensive links and networks
based on kinship. The Alliance Party used these networks extremely successfully after
independence in 1970. Whole families were recruited by relatives to join the party and all
the leading Alliance politicians in the 1970s, namely Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (the Prime
Minister), Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau (Deputy Prime Minister and later Governor-General
and President), Ratu Sir George Cakobau (former Governor-General), were all related by
blood. There were lower levels of chiefs who were also related to these ‘big three’. The
hierarchy reached down to the village level where various levels of kinship were linked
together through their links to the Alliance Party. The Alliance Party was not only ‘the’
Fijian party — it was also ‘the’ family party. Any member of the family who did not vote
for or support the Alliance was considered a dau vakau nona — a political ‘deviant’. 
A number of political parties that were formed in the 1980s and 1990s used
kinship in subtle and obvious ways. For instance, a number of parties, such as the Party
of National Unity, Tako Lavo and the Bai kei Viti (literally, fortress of Fiji), both formed
in the 1990s, revolved around tribal and kinship linkages. The Matanitu Vanua, formed
by supporters of coup-maker George Speight, had a significant kinship base in the
Tailevu Province. 
Traditional leadership and political legitimacy
Closely associated with the use of kinship is the use of traditional leadership. Notions
of ‘traditional’ leadership in the Pacific have evolved in various ways over the years,
some reinvented and some retaining certain aspects that were presumably pre-colonial
in nature. By and large, the two most significant determinants of ‘traditional’ leader-
ship are inheritance and achievement. On the ‘hereditary’ extreme is Tonga, where
monarchical or noble status is purely through birth, while on the other ‘achievement’
extreme are some Melanesian communities that do not have chiefs as such but ‘big
men’, who gain social prestige through the accumulation of cultural capital such as
leadership skills, personal and social wealth. In between these two extremes, however,
are shades of hereditary and achievement and often a coexistence of these two modes of
traditional leadership. 
In Fiji, there is a complex interplay between hereditary and achieved leadership.
Through their Native Policy, the British restructured the chiefly system to facilitate
indirect rule. The previously isolated chiefdoms were centralised under the Fijian
Administration. New chiefly titles were created and made to fit into the new hierarchy.
The inherited and highly stratified system of leadership that was prevalent mostly in the
eastern parts of Fiji was universalised as traditional, although many parts of Fiji possessed
more egalitarian Melanesian modes of leadership. Today, because of the complex inter-
play between the inheritance and achievement leadership modes and the lack of clear
guidelines regarding inheritance, there is constant competition for chiefly positions.
Given the complexity of what now constitutes traditional leadership after recent recon-
ceptualisation and restructuring, this chapter will define it specifically in terms of
localised modes of leadership in community settings such as villages and clans, which are
recognised as ‘traditional’ by the communities concerned. 
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Political parties in Melanesia have used traditional leadership as a means of mobili-
sation and legitimisation. Often traditional leaders have deliberately been made party
leaders, leaders of local party branches, campaign managers and party stalwarts, or
election candidates, as a way of consolidating party discipline and authority as well as to
project images of respectability and coherence to the public.
In Fiji, Mara, the first leader of the Alliance Party and first Prime Minister, had
three very high chiefly titles as well as having read economics at the London School of
Economics and being an MA graduate from Oxford. In his lifetime, he was awarded
two knighthoods and a host of other decorations, including honorary doctorates and
fellowships from universities around the world. Mara’s standing as a regional and
Commonwealth statesman no doubt contributed to his heightened mana. His case was a
classic example of a situation of synthesis between inheritance and achievement, but still
needs to be put in proper historical context. For instance, Mara’s education was driven
largely by the colonial policy of deliberately educating chiefs to prepare them for future
leadership. He was no doubt a brilliant scholar — being chosen from the rank of poten-
tial Fijian chiefs — but he was also advantaged by the ‘accident of birth’.21
The political organisation and structure of the Alliance Party revolved around
Mara’s skilful political strategising, as well as his chiefly mana.22 Interestingly, his closest
friends were Indo-Fijian businessmen and politicians, not Fijians, because Fijians were
restricted by socio-cultural protocol compared with Indo-Fijians, who were not bounded
by the traditional Fijian hierarchy. 
In Vanuatu, chiefly titles are either hereditary or achieved. Both are linked to party
politics in dynamic ways. For instance, one’s chiefly background could provide an impor-
tant fulcrum for political party leadership. The first leader of the Vanua’aku Party and
first Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Father Walter Lini, was a hereditary chief (from the
maternal and paternal sides) from the island of Pentecost, with the bestowed title of
Molbwango. His chiefly status boosted his political career.23
Some, such as the controversial politician, Barak Sope, managed to accumulate a
number of traditional titles as a result of their national political status. In turn, they used
the socio-cultural status of these titles to mobilise political support. This is also the case
in the Solomon Islands and PNG, where national political status is gained largely
through one’s success in politics. Later, this success is often used to build up ‘traditional’
status within the community. Consequently, this newfound status is later used to
reinforce national political status further. A consequence of this is the development of a
mutually reinforcing relationship between traditional status and political party interest. 
To ensure acceptance by the community, it is common in Melanesia to use tradi-
tional chiefs as a medium for party campaigns at the local level. In cases where traditional
leadership is hereditary it is usually easy to identity who the chiefs are, but in cases where
there is open competition for chiefly positions, there are competing claims that can cause
conflict. In such cases, links with political parties might provoke further tension. Political
parties are usually wary of individuals who make arbitrary claims to the ‘big man’ title
since they might turn out to be political liabilities. 
There are, however, times when chiefs are not used directly as instruments for polit-
ical mobilisation within a local community. This is because of sensitivity about potential
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tension due to allegations of political bias, with some chiefs wary of losing their tradi-
tional status in the event of conflict. In these circumstances, political parties rope in
relatives of chiefs (usually through the secret blessing of chiefs) as tactical manoeuvres to
avoid any publicly visible connection that might prove politically fatal for the chief.24
Tradition as party policy
Tradition is often the subject of political campaigns. This involves tradition or particular
interpretations of it being used as a subject of debate by political parties in order to legit-
imate their projects and policies. In Fiji, PNG, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, almost all
indigenous political parties refer to preservation of tradition as one of their aims.
Although it is usually somewhat unclear how this is to be done, the political purpose is
apparent — the ideological undertones sound positive and are comforting to voters who
feel that tradition and cultural identity are synonymous and need protection. 
Most Melanesian political parties have not really articulated the ‘tradition as policy’
argument nor put in place practical frameworks to preserve culture.25 In Fiji, tradition
has often been invoked as a means of ‘saving’ Fijian culture and a tool of ethnic mobilisa-
tion to arouse fear of Indian domination, and in Solomon Islands and PNG it has been a
utilitarian tool for party unity and attracting votes. Perhaps the only country where this
has happened successfully is Vanuatu, where, in the early days of independence, the
policies of the Vanua’aku Party attempted to unite the country through preservation of
traditional culture. This found expression in the Vanuatu Cultural Centre (VCC). The
VCC was formed before independence but was nurtured and given inspiration by a
succession of ruling parties.26
In Fiji, traditional institutions that are meant to protect Fijian culture, such as the
Fijian Affairs Board, Native Land Trust Board and Ministry of Fijian Affairs, are theoret-
ically outside the ambit of party politics. Nevertheless, over the years all the major Fijian
political parties, such as the Alliance Party, Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) and
the currently ruling Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewe ni Vanua (SDL), have used these institu-
tions to serve their political ends. Moreover, because Fijian tradition is assumed to be
alive and well through these institutions it is not deemed necessary to do anything
further to revive it. 
The dilemma of party identity: ‘foreign flower’ versus tradition 
As we have seen, most indigenous political parties in Melanesia use tradition extensively
to consolidate their identity. So while political parties are at one level organisational
manifestations of modern democracy, they have also been ‘traditionalised’, often as a
reflection of sentimental opposition to foreign influence. In countries such as Fiji, the
notion of democracy as a ‘foreign flower’ has been part of the nationalist vocabulary since
the military coups in 1987. In other Melanesian societies, there is sometimes an inherent
disdain of the ‘foreign’ and love for the traditional. The flawed logic behind this is that
democracy has destroyed traditional institutions and thus democratic ideals and influ-
ences need to be minimised in favour of retaining traditional systems. 
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This presents an interesting set of contradictions. Much of what is being referred to
here as traditional is in fact quite recent in origin and is often a product of the colonial
era. Furthermore, in many cases, those who articulate for the anti-foreigner and pro-
tradition stance are some of the greatest beneficiaries of modern education and modern
life. Theirs becomes an ideological construction to look for scapegoats (often foreigners)
as well as a mobilising tool for local political support, especially from more conservative
members of the electorate. 
This was particularly evident in Fiji, where the utility of the concept of ‘the foreign
flower’ grew in parallel with the waning fortunes of the Alliance Party. Invoking tradi-
tion was used as an anti-Indian rallying call by supporters of the Alliance Party, which
lost the 1987 election to the FLP, a month before the May coup.27 The rhetoric was that
the foreign flower benefited only foreigners and undermined the political aspirations of
the indigenous people. While the Alliance Party was winning elections between 1965
(when Fijians were first allowed to vote) and 1987, the foreign flower concept was never
heard of. Indeed, it was only after the Alliance lost the election that democracy came to
be demonised. 
Because of their dynamic roles, political parties will continue to face the dilemma of
multiple identities — being a vanguard of tradition one minute and an agent of
modernisation the next. This process of identity flux continues to define the ideological
and political characteristics of Pacific political parties. 
Conclusion 
Tradition still plays an important role in the broader dynamics and configuration of
politics in the Pacific. Articulations of tradition by politicians are reinvented to suit
particular circumstances and interests, just as politics can be used to reinforce certain
traditional modes of organisation. Political parties need to be understood in the context
of this broad schema. 
The relationship between political parties and tradition can be understood in four
key ways. First, tradition can be used as the basis for formulating political ideology as a
means of mobilisation and legitimisation. In this way, political parties invoke traditional
socio-cultural mythology and cosmology to provide convincing arguments based on
ancestral and divine intervention. Second, the use of socio-cultural and kinship struc-
tures and linkages expands party influence and consolidates community support. One’s
own kinspeople provide visible avenues for electoral support. Traditional socio-cultural
systems based on reciprocity also come into play in a dynamic and functional way. Third,
the tendency of traditional leaders to become party leaders, candidates for election or
party stalwarts involved in community party organisation is commonplace. Last, there is
the use of tradition as a policy framework in itself; that is, the preservation of tradition as
a policy for cementing community support.
Political parties in Melanesia range from very loose associations of individuals and
groups to more organisationally coherent groups. Some are relatively stable while others
are constituted opportunistically to contest national elections. While what qualifies for a
political party is generally determined by the respective laws of the Pacific Island
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countries, their operation on the ground is guided by broader political and socio-cultural
forces. Tradition constitutes one of those forces and will continue to be a defining factor
for Melanesian political parties for years to come. Tradition is embedded in people’s
communal psyche and, as such, becomes a powerful political force for mobilisation and
legitimisation. Its utilitarian characteristics make it readily deployable by political parties
for various purposes — all the more so because tradition is highly adaptable and subject
to constant transformation.
Footnotes
1 See chapters on political parties in Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Tonga, Sämoa, Tuvalu, Kiribati,
Nauru, Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia by Steven Ratuva in Alan J. Day and
Henry W. Degenhardt (eds) 2004, Political Parties of the World. London: John Harper Publications.
There are now more than 2,550 political parties across the globe. See Day. 2004. ‘Introduction.’ In
Day and Degenhardt (eds), ibid. p. vii. 
2 See Lawson, Stephanie. 1997. Cultural Tradition and Identity Politics: Some Implications for Democratic
Governance in Asia and the Pacific. Canberra: ANU Publishers.
3 See Ratuva, 2004, op. cit.
4 It must be stated here that ideological differences between political parties are decreasing the world
over. For instance, the differences between the once left-wing British Labour Party and the conserva-
tive Tory Party are no longer as obvious as before.
5 See Hobsbawn, E. and T. Rangers (eds). 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
6 See Shils, E. 1981. Tradition. London: Faber and Faber; Clifford, J. 1988. The Predicament of Culture:
Twentieth Century Ethnology, Literature and Art. Cambridge (Mass): University of Hawai’i Press; Keesing,
R. 1989. ‘Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific.’ In Contemporary Pacific,
Vol. 1, pp. 19–42; and Lawson, Stephanie. 1996. Tradition Versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji,
Tonga and Western Samoa. Canberra: ANU Press.
7 Keesing, ibid. p. 19. See also Keesing, Roger and Robert Tonkinson (eds). 1982. Reinventing
Traditional Culture: The Politics of Kastom in Island Melanesia. Special Issue Mankind, Vol. 13, No. 4.
8 See Ratuva, Steven. 1999. ‘Ethnic Politics, Communalism and Affirmative Action in Fiji: A Critical
and Comparative Study.’ PhD Thesis, University of Sussex. 
9 Keesing, 1989, op. cit., p. 19.
10 See France, Peter. 1969. The Charter of the Land: Custom and Colonization in Fiji. Melbourne: Oxford
University Press.
11 Lawson, 1996, op. cit. 
12 Narokobi, Bernard. 1983. The Melanesian Way. Port Moresby: Institute of Pacific Studies.
13 The Ethnologue: Languages of the World, published by SIL Inc., lists 823 living languages for PNG.
See http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=Papua+New+Guinea
14 See Hobsbawm and Ranger, op. cit.
15 The term was first used after the coups of 1987 as the tide of Fijian ethno-nationalism swept Fiji. One
of the most vocal nationalist politicians, Finau Tabukaucoro, first introduced the term in a public
speech in Suva in May 1987. See also Larmour, Peter. 2005. Foreign Flowers: institutional transfer and
good governance in the Pacific Islands. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
16 See Melman, B. 1991. ‘Claiming the Nation’s Past: The Invention of an Anglo-Saxon Tradition.’
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No. 3l. pp. 575–95.
17 Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds), op. cit., p. 254.
Political Parties in the Pacific40
                              
18 See Day, op. cit. For most of the modern political discourse, especially in the 20th century, political parties
in western states were identified in relation to either ‘left’, ‘right’ or ‘centre’ and variants in between
(‘centre-left’, etc.). There are also those with non-secular ideology, based on religion and other mythical
beliefs.
19 Lini, Walter. 1980. Beyond Pandemonium: From the New Hebrides to Vanuatu. Suva: Institute of Pacific
Studies. p. 32.
20 Ibid., p. 47. 
21 For details of Mara’s political ideology and vision, see Mara, Kamisese. 1997. Pacific Way. Honolulu:
University of Hawai’i Press.
22 See Ratuva, 1999, op. cit.
23 Personal communication with Jeanette Bolenga (Walter Lini’s sister), Electoral Fellow, University of
the South Pacific (December 17, 2004).
24 Personal communication with Jeanette Bolenga (December 19, 2004).
25 See Lindstrom, Lamont and Geoffrey White (eds). 1994. Culture, Kastom, Tradition: Developing
Cultural Policy in Melanesia. Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific. pp. 67,
85.
26 See Roe, D., R. Regenvanu, F. Wadra and N. Araho. 1994. ‘Working with Cultural Landscapes in
Melanesia: Some Problems and Approaches in the Formulation of Cultural Policies.’ In L. Lindstrom
and G. M. White (eds), Culture, Kastom, Tradition: Developing Cultural Policy in Melanesia, Suva:
Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific. pp. 115–30.
27 Ratuva, Steven. 2004. Storm in Paradise: The 1987 Military Coup Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute.
Primordial Politics? Political Parties and Tradition in Melanesia 41




PACIFIC ISLAND ELECTORAL LAWS
Jon Fraenkel
AT FIRST SIGHT, the Pacific Islands seem like a graveyard for institutional determinist
theories regarding the impact of electoral systems on party polarisation. Maurice
Duverger’s well-known ‘sociological law’ was that first-past-the-post electoral rules tend
to deliver two-party systems. Proportional representation systems were more loosely
associated by Duverger with multi-party settings.1 Yet in the Pacific, countries using first-
past-the-post systems, such as the Solomon Islands and PNG (1975–2002), have
developed multiple-party systems. The proportional representation-using territories of
New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Vanuatu have veered towards a two-camp polarisa-
tion around the issue of independence. Some first-past-the-post-using democracies, such
as Palau and the FSM, have not witnessed the emergence of any party-based system at all.
Neighbouring Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu have similar styles of loose and fluctuating
parliamentary alliances but no election-oriented political parties, despite the first using a
two-round electoral system, the second a unique simultaneously tallied preferential
voting system, and the third a block-voting system in two-member constituencies.
Electoral laws would appear to exert negligible sway over Pacific party systems. 
On closer examination, Duverger’s theory does shed some light on the direction of
electoral incentives in some of the Pacific countries, once hedged with the necessary
qualifications and confined to appropriate settings. Negative cases, where electoral laws
do not bring about the anticipated party structures are not confined to Oceania. India
and Canada, for example, have numerous political parties, but use first-past-the-post
electoral systems. Guyana uses a list proportional representation system but has a two-
party centred system, as did Austria from 1945–90. Much of the literature has
consequently been aimed at revising Duverger’s theories about the impact of electoral
laws on party systems, either by emphasising that the critical association is in fact
between district magnitude and the number of parties or by specifying the role of inter-
vening variables, such as ethnic heterogeneity or the number of competing ‘issue
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dimensions’ to the political process.2 It is in situations where a single salient political
cleavage (such as labour/ conservative, or Catholic/Protestant) dominates the political
order that distinct electoral laws might work in different directions, encouraging or
limiting multi-partyism. In Fiji and New Caledonia, those varying electoral pressures on
party systems exerted considerable control over the success or failure of compacts aimed
at mitigating ethnic conflict. 
In most South Pacific nations, the decolonisation issue did not prove an enduring
ideological influence over post-independence politics (except in Vanuatu, and, if we
include countries still under some kind of colonial rule, New Caledonia and French
Polynesia). Class politics nowhere proved a central cleavage regulating post-colonial
political organisation, except plausibly on one level within Fiji’s Indian community
during the 1990s. Nor — again except in ethnically bipolar Fiji — did other issues
emerge that stimulated the formation of organisationally robust or durable alliances. In
many cases, political parties remain either non-existent or they comprise only fleeting
and regularly changing assembly groupings, commanding little loyalty or popular
respect.3 ‘Party politics’, to the extent that it exists, is frequently viewed with disdain, and
charged with aggravating social tensions that run counter to Pacific traditions of
consensus and compromise. Fluidity of parliamentary alignments, and the readiness of
MPs to ‘cross the floor’, ensure a frequent turnover of governments, particularly in
western Melanesia but also in Nauru and Kiribati. The Pacific Island states have conse-
quently eminently passed Samuel Huntington’s ‘two turnover’ test of democratic
consolidation.4 Indeed, they have done so to such a degree that the primary concern is
endemic instability rather than the absence of regime change. 
During the decolonisation era, colonial authorities frequently anticipated and
encouraged the emergence of local political parties, identifying these as a necessary
counterpart of the removal of official majorities and post-independence political stabili-
sation.5 Drawing on experience in other parts of the world, analysts suggested that ‘the
appearance of political parties in a democratic political system tends to be associated with
the expansion of the franchise and the introduction of a significant elective element in
national decision-making councils’.6 Party politics was often viewed as an evolutionary
stage and any sign of the crystallisation of fleeting alliances or greater organisational
rigour was seen as indicative of its imminent realisation.7 The lessons from 20th century
Western Europe or North America, after all, seemed to indicate the universality of party-
centred political development, and elsewhere anti-colonial movements and/or labour
movements often coalesced into political parties that served as governments-in-waiting
and endured after the handover of power. Political parties are consequently frequently
deemed indispensable for functioning democracies, to provide linkages between citizens
and their representatives and to facilitate collective decision-making.8
Influenced by such ideas, contemporary Pacific governments have introduced a
range of reforms designed to strengthen political parties. Fiji’s 1995–96 Constitutional
Review Commission, for example, gave a high priority to the ‘recognition of the role of
political parties’ in its choice of institutions capable of achieving ‘multi-ethnic govern-
ment’.9 Parties, it was hoped, would serve as agents of moderation and inter-ethnic
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conciliation, and, to accomplish this, they were provided with considerable control over
the transfer of preference votes.10 As part of the new electoral system adopted in
1997–98, a split-format ballot paper was introduced, with an ‘above-the-line’ section
enabling voters to indicate their support for party-endorsed preference schedules. The
hope was that this would enhance political parties’ bargaining capacity and simultane-
ously encourage inter-ethnic deals on politically sensitive policy issues. Constitutional
rules governing the post-election formation of cabinets in Fiji also potentially had reper-
cussions for the party system. All parties with more than 10 per cent of seats were entitled
to a proportional share of ministerial portfolios, implying a considerable disincentive for
smaller parties and independent candidates. 
PNG’s Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPC) is
the most ambitious of the contemporary party engineering projects in the Pacific. MPs are
given financial incentives to join political parties, and are required to toe the party line
during critical votes in Parliament, including those on motions of no confidence, constitu-
tional amendments and budgets. PNG’s reforms, and the underlying concerns that inspire
these, also influence the reform-oriented discourse elsewhere in the region. In Sämoa, the
governing Human Rights Protection Party in 1995 facilitated the passage of legislation
obliging candidates to specify their allegiance with the objective of enhancing the electoral
significance of political parties. Sämoa, Fiji and New Zealand adopted laws against party-
hopping, with a view to strengthening party parliamentary organisation and diminishing
government instability.11 The ‘strengthening of parties’ is frequently a smokescreen for
reforms aimed at consolidating the grip of executives (or incumbent parties). Given the
threat of instability associated with recurrent regime change and the often gridlocked
nature of governments threatened by ‘no confidence’ challenges, such reforms (with or
without the smokescreen) have often understandably found tacit support among donors
and diplomats from neighbouring metropolitan powers. 
This chapter surveys the range of electoral system types and party structures across
the Pacific Islands and considers the viability of contemporary electoral reforms aimed at
strengthening party systems. For each region, the chapter surveys in brief all countries,
but focuses in detail on one or two countries in which particularly topical electoral issues
arise. As an antidote to the approach of setting up the familiar party-based model, and
then examining the extent to which Pacific politics achieves that style of organisation, we
examine first the western and northern independent Pacific states where political parties
are of least significance, then look at those Polynesian countries where political parties
have assumed greater significance before focusing on the most strongly party-centred
ethnically bipolar states of Fiji and New Caledonia. 
Table 3.1 surveys the types of electoral system used in legislative elections across the
region. First-past-the-post systems (used in single-member districts) are the most
frequent arrangement, although often combined with a number of block-voting districts
(with multiple members), where eligible citizens have as many votes as there are seats.
Guam, where citizens have 15 votes to fill 15 places, has the most sizeable of such
districts, but Majuro in the Marshall Islands elects five members and tiny Niue has a six-
member island-wide constituency, as well as separate single-member village-based
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constituencies. Vanuatu and Pitcairn Island have multiple-member constituencies
combined with only a single vote for each eligible citizen (i.e., single non-transferable
vote systems). Kiribati has a multi-member block-vote district system, but uses a second
round of voting where necessary. Fiji and PNG have adopted the alternative vote, which
involves the redistribution of preference votes, either until majorities are secured (Fiji) or
until ballots are exhausted (PNG).12 Nauru’s preferential system is distinctive, because it
uses multi-member constituencies and because all preferences are simultaneously
counted. New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna use list proportional
representation systems for territorial elections. Voters back a single party, and the propor-
tion of candidates elected from that party’s list depends on its district percentage of the
vote. These countries also have the largest constituencies in the Pacific: for example, 37
members are returned by French Polynesia’s Windward Islands (Tahiti and Moorea), and
32 congress members are elected from New Caledonia’s Southern Province. All three
French territories also participate in metropolitan French elections, which entail a two-
round system for legislative and presidential elections.
Table 3.1 also constructs an index for the ‘effective’ number of parties using an
adjusted variant of the widely used Laakso/Taagepera Index combined with data covering
distribution of seats by political party recorded in the 2005 Political Parties of the World.
The Laakso/Taagepera Index aims at obtaining a meaningful composite number so as
to establish whether each country has a two- or a multi-party system. For example, a
country with three parties that secure 55 per cent, 45 per cent and 5 per cent of seats is
shown as having a 2.2-party system, rather than a three-party system. The results are
inevitably as good or as bad as the underlying data, in the sense that for some Pacific
states the ‘parties’ recorded exist merely on paper.13 Since party vote shares are impossible
to establish meaningfully for the more fluid party systems, the index is calculated using
party seat shares.14 The standard Laakso/Taagepera Index is not well honed to deal with
situations where a large number of independents enter parliament. To handle this,
column three removes independents from the calculation while column four indicates
the preponderance of the party system. Hence, for example, PNG’s 22 parties that
secured seats at the 2002 polls (including many single- or two-seat parties), once
weighted to yield an adjusted Laakso/ Taagepera measure, suggest a 10-party system,
whereas column four tells us that 79 per cent of PNG MPs were affiliated with political
parties and that the residual, 21 per cent, were independents. 
In terms of the robustness of party political organisation, the Pacific states straddle a
range that extends from relatively strongly party-centred polities (such as Fiji and New
Caledonia, where bipolar ethnic frictions have, historically, encouraged the emergence of
relatively strong party organisations) to no-party or only nominally party-based systems
(such as PNG, Solomon Islands, Palau, Nauru and the FSM). Political parties are
regularly provided for in Pacific constitutions. Even where they are not envisaged, other
legislative provisions might facilitate the emergence of assembly groupings. The cohesion
of ‘the opposition’ is often encouraged, for example, by provisions regarding the estab-
lishment of an ‘Office of the Leader of the Opposition’, and laws regulating the
competitive selection of the ‘Leader of the Opposition’. In the Solomon Islands, provisions
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Table 3.1: Electoral Systems, Effective Number of Political Parties and Extent of Party
Preponderance in Pacific Island Legislative Assemblies. 
Country/Territory Electoral Year ‘Effective’ Party 
System No. Parties Preponderance 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
American Sämoa (US) FPP N/P 0.0 0.00
Cook Islands FPP 1999 2.6 1.00
Fed. States of Micronesia FPP N/P 0.0 0.00
Fiji AV 2001 2.7 0.96
French Polynesia (France) LPR1 2001 2.3 1.00
Guam (US) BV 2002 1.9 1.00
Kiribati TRS2 1998 2.0 0.64
Marshall Islands FPP/BV 1999 1.0 0.55
Nauru STPV N/P 0.0 0.00
New Caledonia (France) LPR 1999 4.5 1.00
Niue FPP/BV N/P 0.0 0.00
Comm. Northern Marianas (US) FPP 2003 2.5 1.00
Palau FPP N/P 0.0 0.00
Papua New Guinea FPP 2002 10.0 0.79
Pitcairn Island (UK) SNTV N/P 0.0 0.00
Sämoa FPP/BV 2002 1.9 0.73
Solomon Islands FPP 2001 3.3 0.98
Tonga FPP/BV 2002 1.03 0.78
Tuvalu FPP/BV N/P 0.0 0.00
Vanuatu SNTV 2004 6.9 0.85
Wallis and Futuna (France) LPR 2002 1.8 1.00
Sources: Levine, S. and N. Roberts. 2005. ‘The Constitutional Structures and Electoral Systems of the Pacific Islands.’ Journal
of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3., pp. 276–95; Szajkowski, B. (ed.) 2005. Political Parties of the
World. 5th edition (1st edition, 1980).
Notes: FPP — first-past-the-post; AV — alternative vote; LPR — list proportional representation; BV — block vote; TRS — Two
round system; STPV — simultaneously tallied preferential vote; SNTV — single non-transferable vote; N/P — no party system.
The Laakso/Taagepera Index is one minus the sum of squared seat shares, with independents calculated as parties with
single seats (Taagepera, R. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven: Yale
University Press. pp. 78–9). The index shown here is adjusted by excluding independents, and by weighting parties by their
share in the total seats secured by parties in assemblies. The party preponderance index (column four) shows party-affili-
ated MPs divided by total parliamentary membership (with 1.0 conveying an entirely party-centred system and 0.0
indicating an entirely non-party system). Election years are the latest recorded in the 2005 edition of Political Parties of the
World. 
1 With 30 per cent plurality Seat Bonus.
2 Block vote with second round in several multi-member constituencies.
3 Only the nine universal franchise seats are counted, and, in this context, the Human Rights and Democracy Movement
is counted as a political party.
           
under the 1978 Constitution for the ‘Leader of the Independents’, oddly, encouraged the
quasi-party-style functioning of reputedly non-aligned MPs. After general elections,
independents operate virtually like the country’s loosely knit political parties, and come
together in the capital, Honiara, to select their own, or back another, candidate for the
premiership. Similarly in Sämoa, a Sämoan United Independents Party emerged after the
2001 polls, although laws against post-electoral party formation were used by the
Government to declare illegal its subsequent efforts to form a new party together with
the major opposition party. As we have seen, legislation aimed at strengthening political
parties has been adopted widely across the region, whether it be through direct financial
incentives for party-aligned candidates or, indirectly, by ‘grace periods’, rules prohibiting
‘party-hopping’ and other restraints on ‘no-confidence’ votes. 
Melanesia 
PNG
PNG used an optional preferential voting system in elections held in 1964, 1968 and
1972, but then switched to a first-past-the-post system in 1975.15 The number of candi-
dates contesting elections subsequently increased at every election, reaching an average of
27 per constituency at the 2002 polls. Numbers of victors obtaining more than 50 per
cent of the vote declined, with the majority of MPs being elected on the basis of less than
20 per cent of the vote in 1992, 1997 and 2002. National elections became vehicles for
the articulation of clan rivalries, particularly in the Highlands. Parties proved, at most,
loose associations, which politicians were readily willing to ditch in pursuit of ministerial
portfolios. Customary ‘big men’ competed for wealth, influence and authority through
electoral processes, driven by pecuniary rewards attached to state office-holding.16
Whether or not they joined nominal political parties, victors’ positions remained highly
precarious. More than half of all MPs lost their seats at most elections after independ-
ence, with incumbent turnover reaching an all time high of 75 per cent at the 2002 polls. 
Inside Parliament, politicians frequently steer clear of political parties, or form
fleeting party attachments that play second fiddle to personal advancement. No single
party has ever obtained an absolute majority in Parliament. PNG had 10 governments
from 1975 to 2002, three of which were dislodged by votes of no confidence.
Governments are frequently formed by backroom cabals (‘lock-ups’), which proceed to
divide among themselves the spoils of office. MPs on the Opposition benches thus have
every incentive to, and little institutional inhibition against, plot the next no confidence
bid. Many prefer to sit on the ‘middle benches’, in a twilight position between govern-
ment and opposition, hoping to secure ministerial portfolios at the next reshuffle.17
Instead of yielding the frequently anticipated advantage of strong and stable government
(due to seat swings that enhance or magnify narrower vote swings), the first-past-the-post
system provides the backdrop for a highly volatile parliamentary set-up, in which
unscrupulous and opportunistic ‘rubber band’ or ‘yoyo’ politicians prove willing to
repeatedly switch allegiances for personal or constituency gain.18
As a result, Papua New Guinean reformists have taken steps to strengthen the party
system. The OLIPPC was enacted in 2002 and was aimed at strengthening political
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parties via controls over funding and restrictions on party-hopping. Those who contest
elections as members of parties receive state financial support. Independents do not. Once
a vote has been held for a prime minister, MPs are obliged to follow the party line on
budgetary and constitutional votes, and in votes of no confidence. Cases involving MPs
who cross the floor or fail to follow the party whip on these issues are heard by an
Ombudsman Commission and, if necessary, are referred to a Leadership Tribunal, with
the ultimate sanction being the forfeit of seats. New rules are aimed at restricting post-
election horse-trading, by giving the party with the largest number of seats the first
opportunity to form a government. One consequence, witnessed at the 2002 polls, was a
sizeable increase in the official number of political parties, which rose from 12 in 1997 to
43 in 2002, although many of these existed only on paper and failed to obtain a single
MP. The rules have proved difficult to implement, and, as in India after the introduction
of similar legislation in 1985, much party side-switching continues, either illegally or
(where this is sanctioned collectively by a party) legally.19
A limited preferential voting system (LPV) was also introduced in PNG, and came
into effect in the wake of the 2002 general elections. It was aimed chiefly at avoiding the
proliferation of MPs elected on the basis of less than 10 or 20 per cent of the vote. To cast
a valid (or formal) ballot, citizens are required to list three candidates in order of prefer-
ence (incomplete ballots with only one or two preferences marked are to be discarded as
invalid or informal). If no candidate gets a majority of first-preference votes, the lowest-
polling candidate is eliminated and his or her voters’ second-preference votes are
redistributed among the remaining candidates. This process of elimination of candidates
and redistribution of votes continues until one candidate obtains 50 per cent plus one of
valid votes or until ballots are exhausted. PNG’s new electoral system is designed to
encourage more moderate or conciliatory candidates, who reach out beyond their core
bases of support in the hope of obtaining second- or third-preference votes from other
communities. Both reforms, in different ways, anticipate and encourage a more issue-
and/or party-based political culture. Just as the candidate with the broader appeal is
anticipated, after the introduction of the LPV, to pick up preference votes outside his or
her community, so too the more broadly aligned party MP is to receive financial encour-
agement under the OLIPPC. 
Implicit in the philosophy behind the introduction of the OLIPPC and the LPV was
the view that Westminster-style political organisation and the first-past-the-post system
were in fact responsible for vote-splintering among numerous candidates, high incumbent
turnover and volatile allegiances inside Parliament.20 If these are shown to owe their origin
to inappropriate electoral laws or the constitutional set-up, then institutional change
would appear to be a viable method of broadening the basis of parliamentary representa-
tion and stabilising governments. If those features have other origins, the two reforms are
likely to do more to change the form, rather than the substance, of PNG politics. Claims
that electoral rules were responsible for PNG’s hyper-fractionalised party space sit oddly
next to the Duvergerian association between plurality rules and a two-party system,
suggesting that the ultimate origin of vote-splintering lies elsewhere. Variations in the
financial incentive structure made little difference in the past. As Ron May points out in
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Chapter Five of this volume, even a tenfold rise in the PNG nomination fee in 1991 did
little to arrest candidate proliferation. 
Solomon Islands
In the Solomon Islands, as in PNG, the political spectrum at the national level lacks the
enduring ideological cleavages necessary to facilitate the emergence of a stable party
structure, partly because customary leadership systems are so individualised and partly
because political allegiances are so localised. The political parties that emerged about the
time of independence were loose associations clustered around political leaders such as
Solomon Mamaloni and Bartholomew Ulufa’alu. Owing to the spread of parliamentary
constituencies and the strength of regional loyalties, governments had to be formed that
drew on alliances across the island group, in particular balancing the interests of
populous Malaita against those of the Western Province and Guadalcanal. Those parties
that did emerge usually lacked branch structures and did not have the kind of regional
spread that would assist the formation of governments. Peter Kenilorea, a former civil
servant from the Are’are District on Malaita who was initially an avowed opponent of
‘party politics’,21 secured the premiership after elections in 1976 and 1980, although he
lacked strong party backing. In 1981, ministerial defections brought down his govern-
ment.22 Archrival Solomon Mamaloni, from Makira, replaced Kenilorea as Prime
Minister, and his three terms in office proved critical in shaping the post-independence
style of Solomon Islands governance. 
As Jeffrey Steeves has shown, the post-colonial Solomon Islands became an arena of
so-called ‘unbounded politics’, based on the weaving together of fragile power bases that
drew on personal allegiances.23 As in PNG, party attachments proved of limited signifi-
cance and loyalties changed regularly. MPs’ positions were highly precarious, with about
50 per cent losing their seats at each election. Parliamentarians were much less likely to
face defeat if they sat on the Government benches, and they were often prepared to
abandon party allegiances to achieve that goal. Ministerial portfolios offered access to
state funds or other government-controlled public service networks that permitted the
forging of ‘big man’ networks of patronage. A Prime Minister’s survival depended on
judicious distribution of cabinet portfolios and other state appointments, as well as
forging links with powerful local or foreign business interests. 
Nevertheless, the Opposition was not entirely ‘unbounded’ by party or principle. In
1997, a reformist coalition came into office headed by Bartholomew Ulufa’alu. It sought
to reduce the country’s crippling debt, reduce the rate of log extraction and restructure
government finances. From late 1998, however, the Solomon Islands became increasing
engulfed in conflict, first on Guadalcanal and then also on Malaita and in the Western
Province. On June 5, 2000, the Ulufa’alu Government was overthrown by a ‘joint opera-
tion’ involving the paramilitary wing of the police force and Malaitan militia groups, and
replaced by a government under the control of the militia groups. After elections were
held in December 2001, a new government, headed by former ‘Mamaloni man’ Allan
Kemakeza, secured office, relying on support from the People’s Alliance Party and
independents. Both post-coup governments relied on personalised mechanisms for
procuring political allegiance, although now with the added need to buy off increasingly
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intransigent militants roaming the streets of Honiara or hanging around with guns
outside the Finance Ministry and the Prime Minister’s office. Although the Australian-
led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) arrived in mid-2003,
disarmed and arrested most of the militants and took some steps to clean up government
finances, Kemakeza served his full term as Prime Minister. Indeed, the stabilisation of the
security situation initially strengthened his administration, with a number of former
opposition leaders crossing the floor to join the Government. 
Vanuatu
At independence, Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) adopted an electoral system that is
often believed to promote intra-party competition.24 The single non-transferable vote
system (SNTV) allows eligible citizens a single vote, but in multi-member constituencies.25
The system has peculiar repercussions for party strategy. Parties must more or less accurately
anticipate the extent of their electoral support in each constituency, and, where they are
potentially able to secure more than one seat, they need to be capable of directing different
groups of voters to support each strategically preferred candidate. If Party A potentially has
78 per cent support in a four-member constituency, it might obtain maximum advantage
by fielding three candidates and directing precisely one-third of its potential voters to evenly
back each favoured candidate (so that each gets 26 per cent). SNTV is crudely propor-
tional, because Party B, if it has the residual 22 per cent support, is potentially capable of
returning one of the four victorious candidates. The system was introduced at the time of
Vanuatu’s independence in 1980 in order to ensure some representation for the
francophone minority, and to prevent a clean sweep in favour of the anglophone Vanua’aku
Pati (as would have been likely under a first-past-the-post system). Although only crudely
proportional, SNTV does have the advantage of simplicity, and removed the need to divide
Vanuatu’s ethnically mixed islands into separate constituencies.26
For the first 11 years after independence, Vanuatu’s two major groupings were the
predominantly English-speaking Vanua’aku Pati (VP) and an alliance of francophone-
backed parties, the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP).27 Despite exceptional
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and allegiances to varying Christian church denomina-
tions, the polarising issues of independence and land rights encouraged the temporary
advent of a two-party system. Until the 1987 polls, the VP and UMP, taken together,
accounted for an increasing share of the national vote, although with VP’s share falling
and the UMP’s share steadily increasing. From then onwards, Vanuatu’s two-party system
splintered, with numerous rival party groupings emerging and a rising number of
successful independent candidates. Owing to the emergence of an increasingly fraction-
alised party system, coalition governments became a permanent feature from 1991 and
there were at least 18 wholesale changes of government between 1991 and 2004.28 
Whether those splits and that instability are due to the usage of the SNTV system is
debatable. SNTV rewards minor parties with concentrated regional bases of support and,
potentially, promotes internal party rivalry and splintering.29 But the late 1980s and
early 1990s splits that arose in the VP in were the result of top level power struggles
between Walter Lini, Barak Sope and the rest of the VP leadership, rather than grass-
roots-driven splintering due to the incentives arising from the SNTV system.
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Ni-Vanuatu politicians’ frequent shifts of allegiance, the willingness of party-aligned MPs
to cross the floor and continual real or threatened no-confidence challenges were, after
all, characteristic also of neighbouring first-past-the-post-using Melanesian countries.
SNTV provided a considerable degree of seats/votes proportionality at elections held in
1979, 1983 and 1987, and only in the subsequent years did it become less effective in
this respect. As the number of candidates contesting elections rose, the former disciplined
party adjustments to predicted voter base gave way to a free-for-all, with candidates
potentially able to secure election on the basis of only a small share of the vote. Despite
their distinct electoral systems, this cumulative and self-reinforcing candidate multiplica-
tion was common to Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and PNG. 
Micronesia
In most of the North Pacific states that have ‘Compacts of Free Association’ with the US,
plurality-based electoral systems have not triggered the emergence of political parties.
The key bases for political organisation in the FSM are the separate states of Chuuk,
Pohnpei, Kosrae and Yap, or further subgroupings, but the Federal Assembly is
dominated by individual powerbrokers with fluctuating allegiances.30 In Palau, the
‘Compact of Free Association’ with the US and the nuclear-free status question for a time
proved strongly polarising issues. The compact was rejected at seven referenda, before
being passed in 1993. During the 1980s and early 1990s, loose groupings did come
together in support of, and in opposition to, the signing of the compact. Yet, as in the
FSM, shifting loyalties were centred on ‘family, clan and village ties more than party affil-
iation’, and ‘some elected leaders, who do not hold chiefly titles, win and hold office
because they are supported by and represent the interests of traditional power struc-
tures’.31 In the two northernmost territories, Guam and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Marianas (CNMI), tighter integration with the US encouraged ascendancy of
American-style parties. 
Of the American-associated Micronesian countries, only the Republic of the
Marshall Islands has developed a locally based two-party system. In the wake of the death
of long-serving President Amata Kabua, local political struggles culminated in the forma-
tion of the reformist United Democratic Party (UDP), which won the 1999 election.32
At fresh elections in 2003, the UDP was able to retain office, defeating the Kwajalein and
other Ralik chain chiefs, who, for the first time, aligned themselves in a political party,
the Ailin Kein Ad.33 The renewal of the Marshall Islands’ ‘Compact of Free Association’
with the US in mid-2003 and the issue of ‘rental’ payments for US usage of Kwajalein
Atoll as a missile testing facility, alongside controversies about the decline of chiefly polit-
ical authority, proved sufficiently polarising to, at least temporarily, bring about the
development of a two-party system.34
Across the equator to the south, the Kiribati two-round electoral system coupled
with a preferential ballot for the presidency was introduced to provide some choice
despite the absence of organised party politics.35 In the multi-member constituencies,
candidates are elected if they obtain the required threshold of valid votes. If not, run-off
elections are held for the top candidates.36 Political parties initially proved occasional
alliances of convenience between national politicians, lacking popular membership and
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regularly fading away.37 Only after elections, when MPs gather together on the island of
Tarawa did ‘the factions behave most like political parties’.38 Cleavages between
Catholics from the northern islands and Protestants from the south underpinned early
post-independence politics, but did not lead to the emergence of confessional parties.39
Towards the turn of the century, parties assumed greater institutional coherence,
adopting constitutions, establishing party offices, circulating newsletters and retaining a
membership outside Parliament.40
Nauru’s electoral system requires voters to rank all candidates in order of preference
in seven two-member constituencies and one four-member constituency, a system that
has been compared with that invented by 18th-century French mathematician Jean-
Charles de Borda.41 Voters’ first preferences are counted as one, second preferences as a
half-vote, third preferences as one-third of a vote, fourth preferences as one-quarter of a
vote and so on, dependent on the number of candidates, and all votes are instantly
summed with the victor being the candidate with the highest total. Unlike the Borda
system, Nauru unusually allots fractional votes even to a candidate who comes last (e.g.,
the loser in a constituency with eight contestants gets one-eighth of the vote) and voters
in multi-member constituencies only have a single vote. 
Nauru is most frequently classified as a ‘no-party’ system.42 After independence,
traditional leaders, led by Hammer DeRoburt, most of whom were formerly councillors
from the Nauru Local Government Council, were elected to the new Parliament, and
dominated the country’s politics for the next 20 years.43 After DeRoburt’s defeat in 1989,
Bernard Dowiyogo served for six terms, with several breaks, until he was replaced by
Rene Harris in March 2001. From then on, the once phosphate-rich territory experi-
enced mounting financial crises and repeated regime change. In 2002 alone, for example,
there were seven changes in the presidency. 
Against this backdrop, a group calling itself the ‘visionaries’ eventually toppled the
old guard politicians associated with Rene Harris in 2004, after a sequence of legal
confrontations and controversies surrounding the role of the Speaker of Parliament. At
the 2004 polls, there were few first-count leaders who were dislodged by the counting of
lower-order preferences, suggesting that a first-past-the-post system would have yielded
similar outcomes. Nauru’s electoral system has been described as ‘absurdly complex’ for
such a small country.44 Yet much of the discussion about the merits of Jean-Charles de
Borda’s proposed voting system concerns its application to committee elections.45 There
is no particular reason why small size should be a deterrent to usage of complex systems.
It is when they are applied to mass elections, or where the literacy is low, that elaborate
voting rules potentially become troublesome. 
Polynesia 
Plurality-based electoral systems also prevail across Polynesia, with the exception of the
French-controlled group towards the east. Largely block-vote-based systems exist in
Tonga and Tuvalu, whereas Sämoa has a majority of single-member first-past-the-post-
based districts with only a few multi-member constituencies.46 Tonga’s electoral system
entitles ‘commoners’ to elect only nine representatives on a universal franchise. Another
nine are returned by the holders of 33 noble titles,47 and 12 are nominated by the King.
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The King’s nominees to Cabinet sit in the Legislative Assembly, but the Executive is not
answerable to the Legislature. Contrary to popular belief, the prevailing seat distribution
is not entrenched in the country’s 1875 Constitution, and the balance between the
different categories of members has witnessed major changes, most notably in 1915
when a revision of the composition of the assembly was aimed at enhancing the power of
the monarch over that of the nobility.48 Since the 1980s, a pro-democracy movement has
emerged (lately calling itself the Human Rights and Democracy Movement). Pro-reform
candidates took eight of the nine universal franchise seats in 2005, and, for the first time,
two were allowed to join the Cabinet (and were required to forfeit their universal
franchise seats to do so. They instead appeared among the King’s nominees). 
In Tonga, as in Sämoa, the Cook Islands and Niue, overseas migration is a major
influence on domestic politics. About 50 per cent of Tongans and Sämoans reside outside
their country, as do the overwhelming majority of Cook Islanders and Niueans. Tiny
Niue has about 1,400 residents but about 18,477 migrants living in New Zealand who
are not entitled to vote. It has a 20-member Parliament, with 14 members returned from
single-member village constituencies and six ‘common roll’ MPs elected on an island-
wide block vote. Party labels designate loose assembly groupings, although these are
occasionally thought to be sufficiently robust for ‘party politics’ to be blamed for exacer-
bating social tensions.49
With a population of less than 10,000, Tuvalu has seven two-member constituen-
cies and one single-member constituency, all of which return members by plurality
voting (i.e., the block vote in the two-member districts).50 There are no political parties,
but both members from each of the seven dual-member constituencies tend to align
themselves on the same side during prime ministerial elections. Although close to one-
third of Tuvalu’s population lives on Funafuti, where the capital is, citizens are obliged to
vote on their home islands unless they own land or show evidence of five-years’ residence
elsewhere. Within Parliament, MPs frequently divide on north/south lines, with most
prime ministers coming from the southern part of the group (and most governor-
generals coming from the north).51 Despite the absence of a party system, Tuvalu’s
Parliament has been finely balanced between pro- and anti-government MPs. Between
1999 and 2002, there were four different prime ministers, and parliamentary sessions
were frequently cancelled or curtailed to avoid the threat of no-confidence challenges.
That instability has generated local debate about introducing laws preventing MPs from
switching sides, which, given the absence of parties, would presumably entail members
sticking by whichever candidate they backed for the premiership after general elections.
The Cook Islands, with a plurality-based system, developed a two-party system
shortly after self-government in 1965. Albert Henry’s Cook Islands Party (CIP) controlled
government but, during the 1970s, was opposed by the minority Democratic Party, which
obtained office after a court ruling concerning electoral irregularities associated with using
government funds to finance fly-in migrant voters from New Zealand at the 1978 polls.
The CIP recaptured office in 1983, but defections and no-confidence challenges became
an increasingly regular feature, encouraged by difficulties in securing parliamentary
majorities after the emergence of a third party, the Alliance Party, in the 1990s.52 The
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major electoral system changes during this period were (i) the abolition of block voting in
multi-member districts in favour of single-member districts in 1981, a reform that has
been claimed to have encouraged ‘more parochial politicians’,53 and (ii) the introduction
(in 1981) and subsequent abolition (in 2004) of a special seat for overseas voters. Despite
having a party-based system, the Cook Islands suffers from the difficulties often attributed
to the absence of party politics elsewhere: regular changes of government, fluid allegiances
and parliamentary opposition groupings that are too preoccupied with overturning
incumbent governments to play much role in scrutinising legislation. 
Sämoa
After independence, Sämoa adopted a plurality-based system involving a mixture of
single-member and block-voting two-member constituencies.54 The country initially
witnessed high levels of MP turnover and no-party-based contests as in many parts of
Melanesia. The key difference was in the relationship between electoral processes and
customary leadership. In 1961, a popular referendum backed usage of an electoral system
in which only matai (chiefs) could vote and stand as candidates. In 1990, another
popular referendum supported the introduction of a universal franchise, but retention of
the matai-based qualification for candidates. Interestingly, the electoral system became
much more competitive and party-based even before the 1990 extension of the franchise.
Until the mid-1970s, large numbers of MPs were returned from non-contested
constituencies, often based on a rotational principle of villages taking it in turns to fill
seats. After the mid-1970s, the number of non-contested seats fell and the number of
candidates contesting elections rose rapidly. Similarly, in the initial post-independence
years, the premiership proved a unique preserve of tama-a-‘äiga titleholders from Sämoa’s
four leading dynasties, who were usually returned without contest in the 1960s. From
1976 onwards, prime ministers were all non-tama-a-‘äiga titleholders, and the position
tended to be filled by majority rule.55
After the 1979 polls, a party-based system emerged, first as a result of the rise to
power of the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), and then because the Opposition
also adopted party-style organisation. Despite the HRPP’s continuing hold on power
throughout the period from 1983 to the present (with a brief exception in 1986-87),
party allegiances remained fluid. In 1988, only the last-minute defection of an opposi-
tion MP enabled the HRPP to retain its hold on office. In general, the number of
successful candidates recorded as affiliated with the HRPP before prime ministerial
elections tends to be far lower than that recorded once a new government has been
formed. At that point, elected MPs gravitate towards the governing party in search of the
rewards attached to office-holding. This process was actively encouraged by the HRPP,
which increased the constitutionally allowed number of Cabinet portfolios from eight to
12 in 1991, introduced laws against party-hopping in 2005 and created new ‘undersecre-
tary’ positions for government backbenchers.56
French Polynesia
French Polynesia, which has a majority Polynesian population and an 11 per cent white
population, uses a list ticket system like that in New Caledonia, but in its present form it
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is deliberately not proportional. Gaston Flosse, an ally of French President Jacques
Chirac, led the Government from 1991 and, owing to the difficulty in sustaining
support for a French loyalist position in the predominantly Polynesian territory, favoured
enhanced local autonomy. In the elections of May 7, 2001, his Tahoeraa Huiraatira won
29 seats, whereas the pro-independence Tavini Huiraatira (Union for Democracy)
obtained 13 seats, resulting in Flosse serving his fifth term as President. In 2004, Flosse
increased the number of seats from 49 to 57, introduced a 3 per cent threshold, and
provided for a 30 per cent seat bonus for the party that received the most votes in each
of the six multi-member constituencies, claiming that this would increase the stability
of government.57
Believing that the new majoritarian electoral laws would enhance his majority,
Flosse persuaded President Chirac to dissolve the French Polynesian Territorial Assembly.
At the consequent elections, held in May 2004, Flosse again triumphed in the outer
islands, particularly the Marquesas and Gambier Islands and the Tuamoto Archipelago
— where Catholic allegiances and fears of Tahitian domination over an independent
nation encouraged French loyalist affinities. But Tahoeraa Huiraatira was narrowly
defeated in the large 37-member Windward Islands constituency by only 390 votes, thus
missing out on the critical associated seat bonus.58 Tahoeraa Huiraatira consequently
failed to secure an absolute majority. Longstanding independence leader Oscar Temaru
instead narrowly won the vote for the presidency. In the political battle that followed,
Temaru was controversially ousted after a single defection from his Union for
Democracy. Flosse regained the presidency, but tried to bolster his one-seat majority by
calling fresh elections in the 37-member Windward Islands constituency (after Paris
accepted his allegations of electoral irregularities in that constituency at the May 2004
polls). At a consequent by-election, held in February 2005, the Union for Democracy
acquired an increased share of the vote, leading to the restoration of the Temaru
Government.59 Political controversy in French Polynesia came to centre less on the
independence question (to be indefinitely postponed) and more on alleged corruption
and nepotism under the Flosse Administration. 
Ethnically bipolar configurations
Fiji
In Fiji, conflict between the 52 per cent indigenous Fijians and 44 per cent Indo-Fijians
has centred on electoral outcomes, with constitutional crises (in 1977) and coups (in
1987 and 2000) following the election of governments backed largely by Indo-Fijian
voters. Electoral reform has consequently been the most politically sensitive issue in the
country since independence.
After colonisation in 1874, ethnic Fijians, who were suffering a catastrophic decline
in population, were confined largely to their villages under a ‘Fijian administration’
governed by customary chiefs. From 1879, more than 60,000 labourers were brought
from India as indentured labourers to cut sugar cane. Many stayed, and, after indenture
ended in 1916, took up positions as tenant farmers supplying cane to the Colonial Sugar
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Refining Company. As free labourers, living standards steadily improved and Indian
population levels began to approach those of the Fijians. Demands for political rights led
the colonial authorities to concede Indian elected membership in the Legislative Council
in 1929, but from separate communal constituencies.60 Subsequent agitation for a
‘common roll’, closely linked to demands from London- and Kenyan-based Indian
organisations with regard to the East African situation, seemed in the Fiji context to
entail a bid for political power. In response, local Europeans and colonial officials increas-
ingly allied themselves with indigenous Fijians, an arrangement entrenched due to Fijian
military participation during World War II. Fijian population levels had begun to recover
from the early 1920s, and local Europeans and colonial officials in the postwar
Legislative Council reinvented their role as one of protecting ‘Fijian paramountcy’
(a doctrine also inspired by the 1920s East African situation). 
Only as the dismantling of the colonial order began were the issues of political insti-
tutions capable of enabling post-independence democracy addressed. In 1965, the
official majority was removed and a ‘cross-voting’ system was introduced. Registered
citizens had four votes each, one of which was in an ethnically reserved franchise
constituency for their own ‘Fijian’, ‘Indian’ or ‘general’ candidate. The other three were
for ‘Indian’, ‘Fijian’ or ‘general’ candidates, in common roll constituencies. The system
was aimed at stimulating the emergence of a centrist Malaysian-style Alliance Party with
strong roots in the different ethnic communities. It did not succeed in this objective. No
centrist party emerged able to capture substantial support in both communities. Voting
remained largely along ethnic lines. From 1970 to 1987, the consequence of having a
first-past-the-post system with an ethnically bipolar structure was to encourage forma-
tion and retention of single homogenous ethnic parties. As one commentator put it,
‘Political success in Fiji [became] … contingent upon maintaining solidarity in one’s own
ethnic community while actively promoting disunity among the opposition’s.’61
The largely Fijian- and European-backed Alliance Party retained control of govern-
ment throughout this period, with the exception of the two elections of April 1977 and
1987. The majoritarian electoral system ensured ‘winner-takes-all’ outcomes, which were
not conducive to power-sharing arrangements. In 1977, the newly emergent Fijian
Nationalist Party (FNP) acquired 25 per cent of the indigenous vote (in a manner that
was notably disobedient to first-past-the-post’s electoral incentives), and split the Alliance
Vote. The National Federation Party (NFP) narrowly scraped to victory, with 26 of the
52 seats. Instead of enabling the NFP to form a government, Governor-General Ratu Sir
Penaia Ganilau returned the defeated Prime Minister Ratu Mara to office at the head of a
minority administration pending fresh elections held in September 1977, which the
Alliance Party won. When, a decade later, a predominantly Indian-backed coalition
between the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) and NFP won the general elections of 1987, the
newly installed government was, within two weeks, dislodged by a military coup. 
Backed by the country’s Great Council of Chiefs, a new post-coup constitution was
introduced in 1990, which reserved the position of Prime Minister and President for
indigenous Fijians. The cross-voting (or national) seats were abolished in favour of a
wholly communal-based district system. Fijians were granted 37 seats and Indo-Fijians
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27 seats, provisions which, it was hoped, would guarantee Fijian ‘paramountcy’. In fact,
the electoral experience under the 1990 Constitution was a shift towards a multi-party
setting. The coalition between the FLP and NFP broke down, with both parties vigor-
ously competing for the Indian vote. Coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka’s Soqosoqo ni
Vakavulewa ni Taukei faced considerable internal party rivalry, and was challenged by
several new Fijian parties, including the Fijian Association Party and the All National
Congress as well as the earlier established FNP. Ironically, Rabuka found himself
dependent on FLP support to secure his majority after the 1992 polls.62 Domestic polit-
ical difficulties, as well as international pressures, encouraged the Rabuka Government to
embark on a mid-decade review of the 1990 Constitution.
As part of the new 1997 Constitution, Fiji introduced the alternative-vote system
(AV), along with provisions for mandatory power-sharing. As with PNG’s LPV system
(outlined above), voters rank candidates in order of preference and, during the count,
lowest-polling candidates are progressively eliminated until a victor is established. The
main differences are that (1) Fiji’s system requires voters who mark preferences to rank 75
per cent of candidates numerically to cast a valid ballot (whereas PNG’s system requires
only three candidates to be ranked)63 and (2) Fiji’s ballot papers have an ‘above-the-line’
section enabling voters to place a simple tick endorsing a political party, thereby
delegating decisions about subsequent preferences to that political party. More than 90
per cent of Fiji’s voters took the latter option in 1999 and 2001, giving party officials
extraordinary control over the reallocation of preference votes. The system was designed,
under the influence of questionable theories about the benefits of the AV system in
mitigating ethnic conflict, to encourage pre-election deals between political parties repre-
senting the ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. Local parliamentarians, however, were not
convinced that the AV system alone would ensure multi-ethnic government. As a result,
provisions were added for mandatory power-sharing. All parties with more than 10 per
cent of seats in the House were entitled to Cabinet portfolios. The widely expected result
was the re-election of Rabuka’s Government, but with Indo-Fijian Opposition Leader Jai
Ram Reddy’s NFP henceforth playing a junior role in Cabinet. 
Instead, the centrist Rabuka-Reddy coalition was defeated heavily at the May 1999
polls. The FLP, relying mainly on first-preference support from the 44 per cent Indo-
Fijian community combined with transfers of lower order ethnic Fijian preference votes
under the control of party officials, found itself with an absolute majority (despite
obtaining only 32.3 per cent of the nationwide first-preference vote). The country’s first
ever Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, took office, at the head of a
reformist coalition including several small Fijian-backed parties. Precisely one year later,
that government was overthrown in a coup perpetrated by indigenous Fijian extremists,
backed notably by many rank-and-file members and backbench MPs from parties whose
leaders had joined the Coalition Government.64
After the May 2000 coup, the Constitution was restored by Fiji’s Court of Appeal,
paving the way for fresh elections, again held under the alternative-vote system. At the
2001 polls, two exclusively ethnic Fijian-backed political parties, the Soqosoqo ni
Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) and the Conservative Alliance- Matanitu Vanua
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(CAMV), secured the largest number of seats, and formed a coalition government
(despite obtaining together only 35.7 per cent of the first-preference vote). A centrist
alliance that called itself the ‘Moderates Forum’ fared poorly. Moderate parties’ prefer-
ences served instead to elect the extremist Fijian parties in key marginal constituencies.65
The FLP, reliant almost exclusively on the Indo-Fijian vote (i.e., without the preference
transfers from its now largely defunct allied Fijian parties) was left with 27 seats. Unable
to form a government, it nevertheless insisted on its right to inclusion in Cabinet, based
on the constitutional provision entitling all parties with 10 per cent or more of parlia-
mentary seats to participate in Cabinet. The result was a succession of legal challenges to
the SDL-CAMV Government, with the courts in each case upholding the FLP’s right to
ministerial portfolios. The SDL responded by offering to incorporate the FLP by
increasing the size of Cabinet to 36 members, so as to avoid sacking CAMV ministers
and thus preserve intact its governing coalition. The FLP was to be awarded a host of
minor portfolios, with controversial figures such as party leader Mahendra Chaudhry
excluded from participation. Further court battles followed, culminating in the FLP
finally opting for a position on the Opposition benches as scheduled elections in 2006
loomed closer. 
New Caledonia
Like Fiji, New Caledonia is an ethnically bipolar society, but with a 34.1 per cent white
population and 44.1 per cent Melanesian population and a more substantial ‘other’
grouping comprising Wallisian (9 per cent), Indonesian (2.5 per cent) and French
Polynesian (2.6 per cent). Since the abolition of the Code de l’Indigénat in 1946, New
Caledonia has not had the rigid compartmentalisation by ethnic group characteristic of
Fiji. In 1951, the French National Assembly passed legislation resulting in the enfran-
chisement of close to 9,000 Melanesians. In response, conservatives briefly secured a
‘double electoral college’ system in 1952, with ethnically separate constituencies for the
80 per cent majority Kanak east coast, but this was soon abandoned. Also in 1952, the
two-round (or double-ballot) system was replaced with a list proportional representation
system with five electoral zones returning 25 members.66
For most of the postwar years, the New Caledonian Territorial Assembly was
dominated by the multi-ethnic and pro-autonomy Union Calédonien (UC), which was
able to secure Melanesian and liberal European support. Kanak calls for independence in
the late 1970s, influenced by the inability of the UC to achieve much in the way of 
self-government, led to the formation of a variety of breakaway socialist and pro-
independence parties. In 1977, the UC itself adopted a pro-independence position. Most
European UC members left the party during the 1970s, many joining the conservative
and anti-independence settler party, the Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la
Republique (RPCR).67 Electoral laws promulgated by conservatives in the late 1970s
raised the threshold required to secure seats in the Territorial Assembly to 7.5 per cent
and abolished proportional representation in the Governing Council. The objective was
to exclude smaller Melanesian parties such as Parti de Libération Kanak (Palika — with
6.5 per cent of the vote in 1977).68 Instead, it precipitated their unification: pro-
independence groups aligned themselves behind a newly formed Front Indépendantiste
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(FI), which obtained 14 seats compared with the RPCR’s 15 seats in the 1979 Regional
Aassembly (the FI was renamed Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste
[FLNKS] in 1984). During the 1980s, growing social conflict including land occupa-
tions, roadblocks, assassinations, industrial sabotage and electoral boycotts culminated in
the 1988 Ouvéa crisis, which resulted in the death of 19 pro-independence demonstra-
tors and four members of the government security forces and precipitated greater efforts
by political leaders on both sides to secure a negotiated settlement. 
The 1988 Matignon Accord, agreed between RPCR and FLNKS leaders, included
a 10-year ‘rebalancing’ program, entailing development projects for the majority Kanak
north and the Loyalty Islands, and promised a referendum on independence a decade
later. For electoral purposes, the territory was divided into three provinces, one each
covering the south and north of the Grand Terre (main island) and another covering the
Loyalty Islands. These returned, respectively, 32, 15 and seven members to the 54-
member New Caledonian Congress as well as electing members to separate provincial
assemblies. Indigenous Kanaks predominate both in the Northern Province and in the
Loyalty Islands, whereas all other ethnic groups reside largely in the more populous
Southern Province, which is also the most prosperous region and location of the capital,
Noumea.69 With substantial support from minority groups as well as European settlers
and some Melanesians, the RPCR was able to obtain the largest share of the vote in the
Southern Province (52.5 per cent in 1989, 46.4 per cent in 1995, 49.6 per cent in 1999),
and secured significant minority support in the Northern Province and even in the
overwhelmingly indigenous Loyalty Islands.70 It was able to retain control over Congress,
either alone or in coalition, through the 1990s.
The FLNKS, by contrast, saw its support decline in the Northern Province (62.7
per cent in 1989, 34.3 per cent in 1995 and 22.2 per cent in 1999), owing to internal
fissions centring on the coalition’s longstanding leftist orientation and collaboration of
senior leaders with the RPCR. The signing of the Noumea Accord in 1998 further accen-
tuated those divisions, with the breakaway Fédération des Comités de Co-ordination des
Indépendantistes (FCCI) coalescing with the RPCR to control the Congress. The
Noumea Accord put back the scheduled vote on independence for a further 15-20 years,
established a Senate for Kanak chiefs and provided for mandatory power-sharing, with all
parties receiving in excess of six seats in the 54-member Congress securing representation
in government.71 At the 2004 polls, 31 distinct lists were fielded in the three provinces,
with divisions becoming particularly acute among the Melanesian-backed parties.
Inability to agree on a unified list ensured that no Kanak party crossed the 5 per cent
electoral threshold in the Southern Province, and all six FLNKS senators in the south lost
their seats.72 Fragmentation was not confined to the Kanak parties. Jacques Lafleur’s
Rassemblement UMP (the renamed RPCR) saw its overall vote share fall from 38.8 per
cent to 24.4 per cent, and it lost eight of its 24 seats at the 2004 polls. The newly formed
centrist Avenir Ensemble secured 23.8 per cent of the overall vote (and 16 seats), and led
the post-election Government. Avenir, argues Nic Maclellan, is shifting the political
agenda away from divisive ethnic issues towards a greater concern with ‘issues of corrup-
tion, cronyism and gender politics’.73
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Repercussions of electoral laws
The contemporary political history of the Pacific is, as we have seen, littered with
misconceived electoral reform initiatives and institutional changes that had outcomes
that varied markedly from what was anticipated by their architects. In New Caledonia,
raising the threshold required for parties to secure representation in 1979 was intended
to disadvantage radical Kanak parties. Instead, it brought them together and enabled
them temporarily to enter the local government in the early 1980s. Gaston Flosse’s intro-
duction of a 30 per cent seat bonus for the winning party in French Polynesia was
devised to bolster the fortunes of his Tahoerra Huiraatira. Instead, it enabled his
archrival, Oscar Temaru, to take office in May 2004. Fiji’s 1965–87 cross-voting system
was intended to facilitate the emergence of a Malaysian-style Alliance Party. Instead, it
strengthened communal party machines, which became adept at finding puppet candi-
dates from the other ethnic group to field in the appropriate constituencies.74 The
post-coup 1990 constitution was intended to entrench indigenous Fijian ‘paramountcy’.
Instead, coup leader Rabuka soon found himself reliant on support from the largely
Indian-backed FLP to retain office. The alternative-vote system was intended to
encourage moderate candidates and coalitions based on policy agreements on ethnically
sensitive issues. Instead, it sent its centrist architects to a crashing defeat in May 1999,
and, in 2001, facilitated victory for an ethno-nationalist coalition that included
supporters of the failed coup of May 2000. 
The anticipated Duvergerian interrelation between the electoral system and party
polarisation did play some role in the political history of the bipolar countries, but,
everywhere, other factors were of primary significance. Vanuatu’s francophone/anglo-
phone divisions, and the indigenous/settler-descended cleavages in Fiji and New
Caledonia in the 1980s provided the critical impetus towards the formation of two-party
systems, not the logic of electoral laws. Even the no-party systems, whether or not they
used single-member districts, often witnessed loosely bipolar-style cleavages centred on
distinctions between those on the Government side or on the opposition benches (for
example, Tuvalu, Kiribati and Sämoa). Executive instability in such states was indicative
of a tendency for government to only just secure its majority in Parliament, providing
other members with the incentive to group together to plot the next no-confidence
challenge (a trend that can occur in any parliamentary system, whatever the electoral
system). In the bipolar and party-based territories, electoral systems worked their influ-
ence at the margin, facilitating multi-partyism in situations already prone to greater
political fragmentation or entrenching bipolarity in circumstances where political
allegiances were already such as to pit two sides against each other. 
Nevertheless, the marginal influence was important. Electoral arrangements that
served to break down polarised alignments in the political sphere eased the way to ethnic
accommodation. In Fiji, inter-ethnic electoral alliances, which had become possible due to
the introduction of the 25 new open or common roll constituencies in 1997, broke down
after the first election under the AV system, and were in ruins after the May 2000 coup.
The more centrist of the two largely Indian-backed parties, the NFP, did form a coalition
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with other ‘Moderates Forum’ parties in the run up to the 2001 polls, but it was emphati-
cally defeated, and left for a second time with no seats in Parliament.75 New Caledonia’s
political parties, including both conservatives (for most of the postwar years) and
Melanesian-backed pro-independence parties (from the 1970s) had a long history of
infighting and splintering. The impact of electoral incentives in promoting greater unity
among Melanesian parties was evident in 1979 when the threshold was raised to 7.5
per cent. As polarisation increased in the 1980s, elections served as referenda on the
independence issue, and the bipolar division became more entrenched. In the wake of the
Matignon and Noumea Accords, an increasing number of parties again emerged and, as
they did so, coalitions became increasingly unavoidable. Whereas Fiji, under AV, saw
increasing numbers of voters line up behind ethnic political parties, one representing Indo-
Fijians76 and the others representing ethnic Fijians,77 New Caledonia’s ethnic fissures have
become less marked in the wake of the electoral boycotts and violence of the mid-1980s,
with centrists securing control over Congress in a multi-party coalition in 2004.78
Other technical aspects of the electoral system also influenced Pacific party constel-
lations. Laws on party finances, crossing the floor and official designations on ballot
papers served to alter parliamentary balances between independents and party-aligned
MPs. Constitutional provisions for parliamentary offices for opposition or independent
leaders encouraged greater coherence among MPs not in government. French Polynesia’s
list proportional representation system, with its 37-member Windward Islands constituency,
did not encourage multi-partyism after the introduction of a 30 per cent majority seat
bonus (which turned the classic proportional representation system into its opposite).
Electoral thresholds in the French territories discouraged tiny parties. Split-format ballots
in Fiji gave party officials an extraordinary influence over the distribution of preference
votes. Mandatory power-sharing provisions regarding cabinet composition, if anticipated
in pre-election party alignments, discouraged smaller parties that might diminish broader
ethnic representation in cabinet. Only once all these influences are weighed up, together
with the extent of heterogeneity and the electoral laws, can one establish the likely reper-
cussions for party polarisation. 
A key issue in many of the Pacific countries is not whether the electoral system
encourages a two-party system or a multi-party constellation, but whether it encourages
any party system at all. Single-member districts might have eased the path to the reten-
tion of no-party systems, with MPs often selected, at least in rural areas, on the basis of
their position within local hierarchies or community standing.79 Yet such responses were
also evident in countries with multi-member districts,such as Nauru, Tuvalu or Kiribati.
The multi-member single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in Vanuatu initially coexisted
with what was probably the strongest party-based system in the post-colonial Pacific, but
as the independence issue faded parties splintered and independents proliferated. The
rise and fall of Vanuatu’s two-party-based system had little to do with the logic of
electoral laws, although SNTV might have encouraged feuding politicians to fall back on
regional fiefdoms. Where electoral laws had most impact in encouraging the formation
of political parties was in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, but here too other comple-
mentary influences were the inheritance of strong traditions of party politics from
mainland France and polarisation around the independence issue. 
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Leaving aside the ethnically bipolar states (which face distinctive problems),
contemporary reform objectives in most Pacific Island countries might focus on encour-
aging the emergence of party systems, but the primary objective is usually strengthening
executive authority. In this, Sämoa’s HRPP has proved most successful, having survived
in office, with only one brief exception, for more than one-quarter of a century. Sämoa
initially witnessed a high degree of incumbent turnover and, until 1979, had an
Assembly dominated by independents. The HRPP proved able to diminish scope for
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary challenges to its rule, by extending parliamentary
terms from three to five years, by expanding Cabinet size and, most controversially, by
use of the fruits and achievements of office to procure political support. Although the
Opposition also improved political party organisation from 1982 onwards, the itu Malo
(the Government or ‘victorious side’) triumphed over the itu Vaivai (‘losing side’). Sämoa
increasingly has a single executive party dominating a loosely party-aligned assembly with
many ‘independents’. After elections, the Government consolidates control over the
assembly, by drawing hitherto non-aligned or opposition MPs across the floor. The
system strengthens executive authority, but not to such a degree as to empower an
authoritarian regime (although some political controversy centres on this possibility).
Most importantly, the Sämoan party system was not a top-down creation of institutional
engineers, but a home-grown product of shifting political forces and the decline of tama-
a-‘äiga (ruling chiefly families) parliamentary authority during the 1970s. 
Party-centred political development is not an inevitable accompaniment of human
history. Pacific nations are sometimes compared with Greek city-states,80 but ancient
Athens, that ‘cradle of democracy’, did not have a party-based system. Many Pacific states
are similar in size to shire counties or town councils in metropolitan countries, which
often have more fluid and personalised alignments than national parliaments or lack
political parties altogether. Where domestic issues have emerged around which party
systems crystallise, as in the Marshall Islands or Sämoa, these on balance probably assist
effective government. But there seems to be little logic in forcing party organisation on
countries such as the FSM, Palau or Tuvalu on the dubious grounds that political parties
are indispensable for democracy or stability. Government instability in the Cook Islands,
despite the party-centred system, indicates that legislation aimed at obliging MPs to join
political parties is unlikely to be greatly effective. Where political parties are nothing
more than vehicles for ambitious leaders to capture power, they inevitably remain weak
and lack broad legitimacy. Elaborate institutional engineering projects are much more
likely to create these types of parties than genuine watchdog parties or truly hegemonic
governing parties. The notion that collective action and ideological affinity can be forced
top-downwards by statute is indicative of a topsy-turvy style of thinking. 
More effective reform proposals would aim instead at harnessing existing local
pressures for greater choice, enhancing direct popular controls over representatives and
governments, and experimenting with new checks and balances over executive authority.
A greater separation of executive and legislative powers, coupled with effective popular
recall systems and a strong judiciary, offers a better way of avoiding the problem of
hamstrung assemblies that serve only as arenas for the pursuit of personal ambition rather
than institutional experiments designed to conjure into being party-based systems. 
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While Fretilin, the main group to resist Indonesian dominance between 1975 and 1999,
still dominates Timor-Leste (earlier, East Timor) politics overwhelmingly, the transition
to democratic elections in 2001 under the authority of the United Nations Transitional
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) has witnessed the re-emergence of multi-party
politics. While Fretilin maintains hold of more than 60 per cent of the seats in the fledg-
ling legislature, representatives of the several minority parties also won seats. Of these,
most have their origins in the initial emergence of Timor-Leste from Portuguese control
in the 1970s, while others represent former factions of Fretilin. While Timor-Leste has
faced many hurdles in its attempts to install multi-partyism and functioning democracy,
not least from the spectre of a one-party state, the present composition of the National
Parliament reflects these various interests vying for national influence.
Timor-Leste gained full independence only in May 2002, nearly three years after
the overwhelming majority of Timor-Leste voted for independence in a UN referendum
held on August 30, 1999. The referendum was followed by the tragic destruction of the
country, inflicted by the Indonesian military and its supporters. In October 1999, UN
Security Council Resolution No. 1272/1999 established UNTAET to prepare Timor-
Leste for independence as well as to oversee reconstruction efforts. One of UNTAET’s
major tasks was to create the foundations for a democratic Timor-Leste.2 To assist in
achieving this goal, it organised elections for a Constituent Assembly, whose mandate
was to write the Constitution of Timor-Leste. 
Sixteen political parties registered to participate in the elections for the Constituent
Assembly on August 30, 2001. Twelve gained enough votes to be represented in the
Assembly. The clear winner was the Frente Revolucionaria Timor Leste Independente
(Fretilin), which won 55 of the 88 seats. With this majority, Fretilin formed the Second
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Transitional Administration and dominated the process of drafting a constitution for the
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 
This chapter examines the role political parties have played in promoting democ-
racy in Timor-Leste. First, it documents the emergence of political parties in Timor-Leste
since 1975. It then discusses the ideological spectrum and programs of the parties. This
section also analyses party representation and the question of what is an effective number
of parties in the new democracy. Next, the future of political parties in Timor-Leste is
considered by evaluating their current positions and the potential for opposition parties
to build coalitions. A conclusion is offered in the last section of the chapter. 
The emergence of political parties in Timor-Leste
The emergence of political parties in Timor-Leste dates back to April 1974, when a
military coup took place in Portugal. The coup leaders granted freedom to all Portuguese
colonies, including Timor-Leste. Now able to decide their own future, five political
parties emerged in Timor-Leste, namely Uniao Democratica de Timor (UDT);
Associacao Social Democratica de Timor (ASDT), which later transformed into Fretilin;
Associacao Popular Democratica de Timor (APODETI); Klibur Oan Timor Asuain
(KOTA); and Trabalhista (Labour).
UDT’s objective was to turn Timor-Leste into a federated state of Portugal with
independence to come later. Fretilin wanted immediate independence, while APODETI
aimed at integrating Timor-Leste into Indonesia as an autonomous state. KOTA and
Labour wanted to maintain strong ties with Portugal. 
The Portuguese Government planned to complete the decolonisation process in
1976, but UDT interrupted that timetable by staging a coup in August 1975. This was
followed by a counter coup. On November 28, 1975, Fretilin unilaterally proclaimed the
independence of Timor-Leste, precipitating the Indonesian invasion and occupation on
December 5, 1975. 
Under the dictatorship of Suharto, Indonesia ceased the activities of all Timor-
Leste-based political parties. The three Indonesian parties — Golkar, Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI) and United Development Party (PPP) — operated in the
province without a strong following, although the people of Timor-Leste were forced to
participate in the five-yearly election process, known in Indonesia as the ‘festival of
democracy’. 
Even during the occupation, new parties — Partido Nacionalista Timorense (PNT)
and Uniao Democratica Cristao (UDC) — did emerge in Timor-Leste and in exile,
especially in Portugal. Further, in the 1980s, Xanana Gusmao, the leader of the resistance
within Timor-Leste, established with another exiled resistance fighter, Jose Ramos-Horta,
the Concelho Nacional da Resistencia Nacional (CNRM) to accommodate groups other
than Fretilin who were resisting Indonesian rule. In 1998, CNRM was replaced by
Concelho Nacional da Resistencia de Timor (CNRT)3 as the umbrella organisation of
the resistance movement. CNRT gained large support internationally and domestically
and, in elections on August 30, 1999, it was the CNRT flag, not Fretilin’s, which was
used at the ballot box. 
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The Indonesian authorities, while not officially allowing the operation of parties
other than the three registered blocs, did allow PNT to be established in 1999. A coali-
tion of the UDC and Partido Democratico Crista (PDC) was established in Portugal in
1998 as a splinter of UDT. Subsequently, that coalition divided into two parties — UDC
representing the Catholic wing and PDC the Protestant one — in order to be able to
register separately to participate in the 2001 elections. Another party to emerge in the
1990s, during the Indonesian occupation, was Partido Socialista de Timor (PST). It
conducted its activities underground. 
It was when UNTAET began to organise the Constituent Assembly elections that
political parties in Timor-Leste were revived. Sixteen parties registered to participate in
that election (see Table 4.1). These included parties established during the Portuguese
period, namely Fretilin, KOTA, Trabalhista and UDT. APODETI did not register but a
breakaway faction, APODETI Pro-Referendum — founded in the 1990s to fight the
Indonesian occupation — did. In addition, Associacao Social Democratica de Timor
(ASDT) revived itself in 2001 and registered as a separate party from Fretilin with
Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the founding president of both parties leaving Fretilin to
resume his position as ASDT president.
Eight new parties emerged to participate in the 2001 elections. These were: the Liberal
Party, Partido Democratico (Democratic Party or PD), Partido Democratico Cristao (PDC),
Partido Povo Timor (PPT), Partido Social Democratica (PSD), Partido Democratico
Maubere (PDM), Parentil and Uniao Democratica Crista/Partido Democratico Cristao
(UDC/PDC). 
Of the 16 registered political parties that stood for election in 2001, only 12 won
enough votes to be represented in the Constituent Assembly (see Table 4.2). 
The ideology of political parties
The history of Timor-Leste has been shaped by colonialism and occupation. When the
elections were held, pro-independence parties attracted the support of the people, but
ideology per se was of less influence. This is reflected by the dominance of Fretilin in the
elections of 2001. With the independence issue resolved, however, a degree of ideological
difference is emerging, even if all parties still have similar platforms.
The narrow ideological divide among the parties might be attributed to the fact
that, with the exception of Fretilin, UDT and APODETI Pro-Referendum, all are
newcomers to politics, and might represent regional elites rather than contending ideolo-
gies.5 Given that the elections of September 2001 were based more on emotional issues
connected to the long Indonesian occupation and the suffering it caused and less on
ideology and programs or the ability to govern, the new parties are still in the process of
articulating their ideological positions. 
The established party, Fretilin, has changed from a radical, revolutionary and left-
wing party to a moderate one, with a less dogmatic ideology. Indeed, Fretilin might be
facing something of a crisis in ideology now that it has to cope with new domestic and
international circumstances. Its latest Political Manual6 strongly emphasises mainstream
economics and liberal democracy, including multi-partyism. On the other hand, conser-
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vative parties such as UDT have maintained their ideology largely consistently since the
1970s, paying more attention to the role of traditional authorities. 
If we place political parties in Timor-Leste along a left-right axis, we can identify
three groupings at the left, centre and right; and then three further parties (PDC, PNT
and PPT) without clear ideologies or stated platforms. The most left-wing party is the
Socialist Party of Timor (PST), which aims for a socialist and classless state. Other parties
ideologically close to PST are Fretilin and ASDT. 
Fretilin started out as a revolutionary movement that later became a political party
calling for radical changes in Timor-Leste society, although, as mentioned above, its
stance has been tempered by the realities of independence. Fretilin wants a free and
mandatory school system and, in regard to health policy, advocates the use of ‘green’
(traditional) medicine. It argues that Timor-Leste should become a member of the
International Socialist Organisation of centre-left parties around the world.
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Table 4.1: Political Parties in Timor-Leste, June 2004.
Party General Characteristics Year 
Vision/Objectives Origins established
ASDT Defence of independence, From ASDT to Fretilin 1974/2001
democracy and pluralism. then ASDT
Fretilin Independence and democracy From ASDT 1974/2001
based on social justice.
KOTA Defence of an independent, sovereign Strong ties with UDT 1974/2000
and stable state with balance of power.
Liberal Liberal and individual rights at centre. Youth movement 2001
PD Nation-building based on freedom, democracy Fretilin, Student and 
and a just society. youth movements 2001
PDC Build a society within peace, Splinter of 2000
democracy and justice. UDC/PDC
PNT Democracy. Splinter of Fretilin 1999/2001
PPT n.a. Several parties 2001
PSD Creating a state based on national Splinter of Fretilin 
unity and consensus. and UDT 2000
PST A socialist & classless state free from Splinter of Fretilin 2000
colonialism, imperialism and exploitation.
UDC Establishment of democratic system. Splinter of UDT 1998/2001
UDT Democracy and justice. First party in East Timor 1974/2001
Trabalhista Democracy to eliminate exploitation. 1974/2001
Povu Maubere n.a. APODETI 2001
Pro-Referendum
Parentil n.a. Splinter of Fretilin 2001
APODETI-Pro- Defence of democracy, tolerance Splinter of APODETI 2001
Referendum and non-violence.
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Table 4.2: Political Parties in Timor-Leste, May 2001.
Party Selected principles and policies Tendency President
ASDT Liberal politics and open market economics, Centre-left Francisco Xavier
attention to veterans of independence. do Amaral
Fretilin Revolutionary. Mandatory and free primary education, Left Francisco 
agriculture, cooperatives, literacy, natural resources and ‘Lu-Olo’ 
foreign investment. Membership in ASEAN and Guterres
South Pacific Forum. 
KOTA Promote culture and tradition, agriculture, tourism Right Leao dos reis 
and good relations with neighbouring countries. Amaral
Liberal Individual freedom, government should not intervene Extreme Armando
in economy, business and trade. right da Silva
PD Democracy, pluralism and individual rights. Market economy Centre Fernando
with selective intervention of the Government. Transparent ‘Lasama’ 
and responsible government. Membership in ASEAN and de Araujo
South Pacific Forum. Mandatory primary schooling, recognition 
of veterans, primary health care and standardisation of Tetum. 
Investment policy with attention to small and medium 
enterprises. Priority on agriculture, poverty reduction and 
elimination of famine. 
PDC Christian values. People-oriented economy and Unclear. Olinda
universal health policy. Seems to be Guterres
centre-left
PNT Investment and Bahasa Indonesia as official language. Unclear. Abilio
Seems to de Araujo
be centre-left
PPT Not available. Not available Jacob Xavier
PSD Minimum wage and state role in economic development. Centre-right Mario Viegas 
Prioritise education, health, housing and good governance. Carrascalao
Membership in ASEAN and South Pacific Forum. Oppose 
death penalty and abortion. 
PST Socialist and classless state. Compulsory education, Extreme-left Pedro Soares
development of Tetum, divorce legalised and equality 
between men and women, equal distribution of land, free 
and universal health system, against death penalty. 
UDC Establishment of democratic system and Christian  Right Vicente Guterres
humanism,market economy, basic education and free 
health care, and promotion of local culture. Membership 
of ASEAN, CPLP, and other democratic regimes. 
UDT Just distribution of income, centralised system of Right Joao Viegas
government, pensions for retired FALINTIL widows and Carrascalao
orphans, also for ex-Portuguese and Indonesian civil servants. 
Application of customary law and role of elders in 
solving problems.
Source: Political parties’ manuals, speeches of party leaders, and Walsh.4
    
ASDT has made a dramatic shift to the right. Its party manual states that, while still
a vanguard party, it values liberal politics and an open market economy. This is very
different from ASDT’s initial position in 1974 when it was established as a leftist party
(becoming further radicalised when it was absorbed into Fretilin). Now, ASDT is seeking
to establish itself as a centre-left party, which embraces mainstream political and
economic ideas. ADST’s leader is Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the man who founded the
party and then became President of Fretilin, until he was captured and imprisoned first
by antagonistic Fretilin cadres and then by the Indonesians. Unable to return to this
position after independence, he decided to revive ASDT as his personal political vehicle. 
The party most clearly on the right is the Liberal Party, which values individual
freedom and argues against any state intervention in the economy. Other parties appar-
ently tilting to the right — despite not yet fully defining their positions — are UDT,
UDC and KOTA. 
UDT was a large party in 1974, but, in 2001, was among the smaller ones, with its
leadership — made up of former bureaucrats who had worked for the Portuguese
Colonial Government and traditional village heads — having partly contributed to its
decline in support. Apart from having shifted from its original position that Timor-Leste
should be a federated state of Portugal to joining the CNRT in the 1990s, its ideological
stance is little changed. It is a strong proponent for the application of customary law and
of a significant role for elders in the nation’s governance. 
UDC and KOTA are both splinters from UDT. UDC talks about Christian
humanism, with an emphasis on democracy and justice. It is market oriented but, like
UDT and KOTA, defends local culture and tradition. KOTA is a strong proponent of
Timor-Leste as a federation of kingdoms. 
Two new parties — the Democratic Party (PD) and Social Democratic Party (PSD)
— seem to be placing themselves at the centre. PD was founded just two months before
the elections of September 2001. It was formed by former students, intellectuals and
clandestine activists who were disenchanted with Fretilin tactics and ideology:
There was resentment against the returned Fretilin exiles, such as the party’s secretary-
general, Mari Alkatiri, because they were perceived as arrogant, privileged, and
authoritarian … They were seen as marginalizing the younger generation who were
educated in Indonesian. They were also discounting the contribution of the student
movement and of urban East Timorese against Indonesian rule, e.g., the demonstra-
tions in 1991 that drew worldwide attention to human rights violations perpetrated
by the Indonesian army.7
The Democratic Party (PD) is also strengthened by intellectuals educated in the West,
especially in Australia, the US, UK, Portugal and Indonesia. Another major component
of PD are middle-level resistance figures, many of whom came from the clandestine
Internal Political Front (FPI) of the CNRT and had therefore held leadership positions at
district, subdistrict and village level. Many among this group were members of Fretilin
but opted for PD because of its spirit of national unity and inclusiveness.
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PD managed to attract the second-largest number of votes after Fretilin and is
currently the main opposition party in the Parliament, with seven seats. Although PD’s
ideas are still in the formative stages, its position tends towards left of centre. It supports
mandatory primary schooling and calls for assistance to veterans of war and war victims.
It is in favour of a market economy with selective intervention from government. In
his latest policy speech, the President of PD, Fernando ‘Lasamo’ de Araujo, stressed the
development of an investment climate that favoured small and medium enterprises
through tax incentives and less regulation.8 The PD, however, suffers from leadership
problems and lacks a systematic policy approach to managing the country. This might be
explained partly by the lack of experience of its leaders in governance matters, drawn as
they are from the ranks of political activists.
The Social Democratic Party (PSD) is also in the central grouping, although it is
still grappling with its precise orientation. It defends minimum-wage policy and state
intervention in economic development, and is against the death penalty and abortion.
Younger leaders have also been arguing that the PSD should approach the International
Socialist Organisation. It is interesting to note that the PSD has attracted supporters
from UDT, which might have reduced the latter’s votes in the 2001 elections. 
The remaining three parties in the National Parliament do not have clear positions
on socioeconomic matters. The Partido Povu Timor (PPT), whose supporters come
mainly from Hatudu, a subdistrict in Ainaro District, is sympathetic to a kingship model
of governance.
Religious orientation has not been a particularly influential factor in contemporary
Timor-Leste politics. Most parties, including the major ones such as Fretilin, PD, PSD
and ASDT, defend the idea of a secular state and the separation of church and state. Even
the parties that have adopted Christian references in their names — Uniao Democratica
Crista (UDC) and Partido Democratico Crista (PDC) — do not articulate their religious
beliefs strongly and have only three seats in the Parliament. 
Similarly, attachment to customary law and traditional kingdoms have so far been
peripheral election issues, though it remains to be seen if these will emerge as more signif-
icant matters in the future. At the moment, however, KOTA, with its platform based on
kingship, and UDT, which wants to see elders play a role in national affairs, have only
two seats each in the Parliament.
With regards to foreign policy, most parties view ASEAN favourably for security
and trade reasons. This represents a shift from the view in 1999, when Timor-Leste
leaders, especially Jose Ramos-Horta (at the time, the CNRT’s foreign spokesman),
stated that an independent Timor-Leste would become part of the South Pacific Forum.
Now, the PD has a firm position on joining ASEAN, and PSD has also indicated that
membership would be desirable. Fretilin still has reservations, given Indonesia’s promi-
nence in ASEAN. Nevertheless, the current Fretilin Government has developed a strong
relationship with Malaysia, which might facilitate entry into the grouping. 
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Fretilin dominance and the opposition of PD and PSD
Timor-Leste has a multi-party system with 12 parties represented in the National
Parliament. UNTAET Regulation 2001/01 determined a unicameral Constituent
Assembly (later called the National Parliament), with 88 seats, of which 75 were
contested through party lists, and the remaining 13 seats were allocated to the districts
and elected on the basis of proportional representation. 
The results of August 30, 2001, elections saw Fretilin emerge as the majority party
with 55 seats, while the rest of the seats were divided among 11 other parties (see Table
4.3), with the next largest party, the Democratic Party (PD), gaining seven seats,
followed by ASDT and PSD securing six seats each. 
Table 4.3: Timor-Leste: Parties in the National Parliament.
This figure shows the number of seats held by each party and their political orientation, from left to right.
PST Fretilin PNT ASDT PD PSD UDT KOTA PPT PDC UDC Liberal
1 55 2 6 7 6 2 2 2 2 1 1
Why did Fretilin gain such a majority? Several factors can explain the outcome. First, it is
the party that has consistently defended independence since 1974. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that people thought Fretilin should be rewarded for this position, although
people also encouraged their children to vote for other parties. This does not completely
explain Fretilin’s victory given that the party had experienced leadership problems and a
weakened organisational structure, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when it
suffered crushing military defeats against Indonesia. There were also atrocities associated
with Fretilin leaders during the same period, which reduced its influence. And then
Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta decided to form the CNRM to unify all resist-
ance forces fighting against Indonesia. In 1987, Xanana Gusmao went further by
declaring FALINTIL no longer a military wing of Fretilin but instead a nationalist force
fighting against Indonesia. The change in FALINTIL’s position was also a way to accom-
modate several guerrilla leaders who were not members of Fretilin. From the late 1980s,
the resistance movement was revitalised and attracted more popular and international
support compared with the exclusivity of Fretilin in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From
there, the face of resistance changed forever and Xanana Gusmao became a national not
just a party leader. 
And so, secondly, there was the Xanana factor. Many voters, especially in rural
areas, thought that Xanana was still the leader of Fretilin and that the elections were
about choosing Xanana to be president. In fact, leading up to the elections, Xanana had
stated that a big majority by Fretilin would not be healthy for democracy in Timor-
Leste.ix This stance might well have prevented Fretilin winning the 88 per cent of votes
predicted by the party’s leaders, Francisco Lu-Olo Guterres and Mari Alkatiri. 
Thirdly, there was, again particularly in rural areas, a fear of revenge if people did
not choose Fretilin. In late 2000 and early 2001, Fretilin activated its dormant member-
ship and completed a national registry of all militants and sympathisers. Some citizens
felt there was high degree of intimidation in this process.10
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At any rate, the results of the elections turned Fretilin into the dominant party in
the Constituent Assembly and later the National Parliament, with major influence over
the drafting of laws, including the Constitution. Fretilin’s strength in the Legislature was
further increased through its alliance with ASDT, PNT and PDC. 
As mentioned above, it is the Democratic Party (PD) that represents the major
opposition party in the Parliament. PD draws its support from the grassroots and the
middle class. Recently, a number of intellectuals and former guerrilla leaders also joined
the party. It is an open party that can accommodate people with different backgrounds
and, as such, has the potential to become a serious alternative to Fretilin in the next
election. A poll by the American-based International Republican Institute (IRI) in
200311 showed that PD has gained 4 per cent support since 2001, especially among the
youth and in the urban areas, despite not having staged any major activities since
September 2001. The same poll shows that Fretilin has lost almost 5 per cent of voters
and PSD has gained 2 per cent additional support. 
The Social Democrat Party (PSD) is the second opposition party with six seats in
the Parliament. Its leader, Mario V. Carrascalao, a former Portuguese official, Timor-
Leste Governor and ambassador under the Indonesian occupation, and Vice-President of
CNRT, is a competent technocrat who could easily lead Timor-Leste. In addition,
Carrascalao has a charismatic personality, which has been a major factor in attracting
followers. PSD draws support from former UDT members, Fretilin, some clandestine
and FALINTIL members and independents. The party could also emerge as a strong
alternative party if it can overcome its internal divisions.
It is conceivable that PD and PSD could form a centre-right coalition in order to
form a strong front against Fretilin and its allies. It was this idea that led both parties to
spearhead the National Unity Platform in 2003 comprising five parties, including ASDT,
a key Fretilin ally. Weighed down by conflicting agendas and personality politics, their
platform never became a serious threat to Fretilin’s dominance.
Fretilin and ASDT represent a centre-left coalition, although for the time being, as
the dominant party, Fretilin does not need to rely on coalitions to secure the passage of
any laws that require a simple majority. When it needs to get an absolute majority in the
National Parliament, it can look to ASDT, PNT and PDC for support. 
At present the alliances of political parties in the National Parliament are fluid.
While it might be expected that parties such as PST at the extreme left would vote with
parties of similar ideological persuasion — such as Fretilin and ASDT — in fact, PST
often votes with centre-right parties such as PD and PSD. Similarly, the Christian parties
do not always ally themselves with the centre-right parties. For example, PDC regularly
votes with Fretilin. The conclusion we can draw from this is that the party system in
Timor-Leste has not yet solidified along a left-right political spectrum. 
How many parties?
What is an ideal number of parties in Timor-Leste? While the presence of 12 parties in
the Parliament might appear excessive, four parties (Fretilin, PD, PSD, ASDT) control
84 per cent of the seats, with the remainder divided between eight minor parties.
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Interestingly, the Laakso/Taagepera Index, which measures the average number of parties
for comparative purposes, notes that Timor-Leste has 2.44 effective parties.12
The small number of effective political parties reinforces the notion that the party
system in Timor-Leste is not so fragmented as to cause serious problems of coordination.
As Haggard notes, policy coordination requires time and incentives and can be under-
mined if there are too many coalitions that need to be juggled.13 In the case of
Timor-Leste, a coalition system could be successful because there are only four effective
parties. But for the time being, the strength of the governing coalition is unmatched
because of Fretilin’s sizeable parliamentary majority (65 per cent). 
The future of political parties
What is the future of political parties in Timor-Leste? Fretilin’s current supremacy leads
some to argue that Timor-Leste could become a one-party state, similar to the situations
in Malaysia and Singapore, where the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)
and the People’s Action Party (PAP), respectively, are dominant. This is a distinct possi-
bility for the following reasons. 
First, the Opposition is being weakened through direct and indirect intimidation.
For example, civil servants who attended opposition party activities, especially those of
the Democratic Party, during holidays in Suai in March 2004, have been suspended. In
the same month, PSD activity in Uatu-Lari, Viqueque, was disbanded by local authori-
ties and police. In addition, when accusations of bribery were made about Prime
Minister Mari Alkatiri, the Government suggested the Opposition was behind the
claims. Similarly, when former Commander L-7, the alias of Cornelio Gama, a former
FALINTIL commander who fought against Indonesia for 24 years, staged a demonstra-
tion in July 2004, demanding wide-ranging reforms in the police and in the
Government, the Government’s response was to use force to disband the demonstration
and to claim that L-7 had been used by the Opposition — in particular, Mario
Carrascalao, head of the PSD and a Fretilin rival since the 1970s. In the words of Prime
Minister Alkatiri, ‘L-7 is not the culprit in this regard. It is the opposition who have used
him for political purposes. So we will take care of them.’14
Secondly, there has been persecution of the media: for example, when the Government
attempted to relocate the Suara Timor Lorosae newspaper from its current premises
because it was running stories critical of the Government. Individual journalists have also
been threatened. 
Thirdly, the current leadership of Fretilin is controlled by the Mozambican clique
led by Alkatiri. With few exceptions, this group has been exposed to the dictatorial
practices of the African continent of failed states and vast poverty. One of the frequent
explanations for sustained poverty in Africa is that despotic regimes run their countries
by stealing public wealth. The tendency towards working without consultation is demon-
strated by Fretilin’s refusal to take any constructive part in the CNRT after 2000. Fretilin
had always seen the CNRT as a threat to its power. The disbandment of the CNRT
therefore offers Fretilin further opportunity to forge itself into a dominant party. 
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There are, however, also reasons why Fretilin might not remain as powerful as it is
today. The electorate is already growing disenchanted. While the Fretilin Government
benefited from the unqualified support of the international community during the
reconstruction period, more recently there has been a decline in international aid and
economic growth, as well as increased unemployment. These trends are being reflected
in reduced support for the party, which, according to IRI polling in 2003, is about 50
per cent, down 7 per cent from the results of the 2001 elections. As noted above, that
support is being transferred to the Democratic and Social Democratic parties. Early
indications of the village head (chefi suco) elections in Maliana and Oe-Cusse districts
in December 2004 were that very few Fretilin candidates were elected as heads of
villages — this despite Fretilin often being the only party to put up candidates, because
other parties encountered bureaucratic obstacles to even registering to participate in
the poll. Thus, most of the other candidates were independents, possibly associated
with opposition parties.
Fretilin’s national leaders, especially Francisco Lu-Olo Guterres (the party’s presi-
dent as well as President of the National Parliament) and Mari Alkatiri (its secretary
-general and Prime Minister) are not popular. The IRI polling shows Lu-Olo’s popularity
rating at 64 percent, well below the 68 per cent for Mario Carrascalao (PSD President)
and also below other prominent political leaders such as Jose Ramos-Horta (Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Taur Matan Ruak (Commander of Armed Forces) and
Xanana Gusmao (Timor-Leste’s President). Mari Alkatiri’s rating is even worse, at less
than 50 per cent. Incumbency, lack of personal appeal and incompetence might have
contributed to the decline in popularity of these two leaders. After all, the dominance of
Fretilin in the last legislative elections is arguably less about the quality of its leaders and
more about the party’s long standing in the struggle for independence. 
Looking to the next parliamentary elections in 2006, it must be noted that the
Xanana factor, as at least an indirect vote-getter for Fretilin in 2001, will not exist. Even
in the presidential elections in April 2002, the differences between Fretilin and Xanana
Gusmao were obvious and became amplified when Fretilin leaders urged voters to vote
for both presidential candidates, namely Xanana Gusmao and Francisco Xavier do
Amaral. Mari Alkatiri went further, urging voters to destroy the ballot — a call that drew
criticism from observers.15 It is also to be hoped that the fear of not voting for Fretilin
will have dissipated. 
Finally, the 2001 elections were characterised by emotion. Campaigns were not
based on the quality of programs and candidates. People chose Fretilin reward it regard-
less of its leadership quality and is platform. In the next elections, the opposition,
especially PD and PSD, will be better organised. Both parties have been active in districts
across Timor-Leste. Recently, PD commemorated its third anniversary in Samaletek
(Ermera), a former Fretilin stronghold. Such activities will intensify as the election year
approaches. In addition, a new party, comprised of resistance veterans and intellectuals
educated in the West, might also emerge and appeal to voters, including those who voted
for Fretilin in the past. 
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Fretilin leaders are not popular, strong or capable enough to forge a single
dominant-party state as Lee Kuan Yew did in Singapore and Mahathir Mohamad and his
predecessors did in Malaysia. Indeed, without the UN presence in Timor-Leste during
the past three years, the Government of Fretilin might well have not survived, especially
after the riots of December 2002.
Fretilin might still win in 2006, albeit with the likelihood that its majority will be
reduced, however, should the party engage in tactics of intimidation, vote-rigging and
money politics in future campaigns, it might maintain its current levels of control,
although these strategies will necessarily challenge its legitimacy. Unfortunately, there is
already evidence of government intimidation as noted above. And Fretilin is building up
a war chest unmatched by opposition parties. Money alone, however, cannot buy votes.
This was demonstrated in the 1999 referendum, when Indonesia tried to buy voters but
failed. The people of Timor-Leste took the money but walked away by voting for
independence. 
Conclusion
Political parties in Timor-Leste emerged in response to the 1975 military coup in
Portugal, with domestic hopes for a democratically governed state for Timor-Leste. But
they had little opportunity to become established in the country, given that during the
Indonesian occupation, all the Timor-Leste-based political parties were disallowed. They
began to flourish only after UNTAET initiated the 2001 Constituent Assembly
elections. Those elections resulted in Fretilin becoming the government party, with 11
other parties represented in the Constituent Assembly. Later, the Constituent Assembly
transformed itself into the National Parliament. Thus, Timor-Leste now operates on a
multi-party system, albeit with only a small number of effective players. The ideology of
the political parties is informed primarily by socioeconomic issues, with positions held
across the left-right spectrum but with a convergence towards the centre.
As far as the future of political parties in Timor-Leste is concerned, it is likely that
Timor-Leste will not be a single-party state unless intimidation, vote-rigging and money
politics are used in the 2006 elections. Instead, it is to be hoped that the main opposition
parties can develop coherent party platforms that will be able to compete with those of
the Fretilin Government, especially now that the high emotions of newly and bloodily
acquired independence are replaced by a more sober mood in the electorate.
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5
POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
R. J. May
AT THE TIME of PNG’s independence in 1975, there was a small number of recently
established political parties. The Australian Colonial Administration had had some
doubts about encouraging the growth of parties in the emerging state, but, in the late
1960s, as parties spontaneously emerged, it extended its political education program to
cover them. There was a widespread expectation, at independence, that a two- or three-
dominant-party system would develop, in the context of a first-past-the-post electoral
system, though there were some who feared that PNG, like much of post-colonial Africa,
would succumb to military rule or a dominant one-party regime. In fact, as in a number
of post-colonial states, a coherent political party system has not taken root in PNG. This
is so despite the fact that elections have been held regularly and have produced orderly
changes of government, and that, despite some pre-independence predictions, the
country has maintained a democratic parliamentary system.
In a paper written in 1984, I questioned the apparently widespread assumption that
the ‘party system’ in PNG was in a state of transition from an ‘undeveloped’ to a ‘developed’
system (that is, essentially one like Australia, the UK, the US and some European
countries), and specifically challenged the view that the party system would solidify along
emergent social class lines.1 Some 20 years later, political party development in PNG — or
the lack of it — has tended to strengthen those convictions. This chapter, therefore,
attempts, after presenting a brief history of political parties, to examine the main features of
political parties in PNG, to look at attempts to strengthen the political party system
through legislation, to explain why parties have not developed as many predicted in the
1970s and 1980s, and, finally, to speculate on the future for political parties in the country.
A brief history of political parties2
In the lead-up to PNG’s independence, the Australian Administration progressively, if
perhaps somewhat belatedly, established the institutions of an essentially Westminster
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parliamentary democracy. A part-elected, part-appointed House of Assembly was created
in 1964, replacing an appointed Legislative Council, and further elections were held in
1968 and 1972, the latter producing the country’s first wholly elected Parliament.
Initially, there was little enthusiasm for political parties. As late as 1967, Australia’s
External Affairs Minister, Charles Barnes, suggested that ‘the Territory would be better
off without [political] parties’,3 and this view was shared by many field officers of the
Australian Administration, who tended to be wary of any indigenous political organisa-
tion and disparaging of attempts to establish political parties.4 Recalling his unsuccessful
electoral campaign in 1967, Albert Maori Kiki said:
Many people had told me that it was unwise to campaign on the Pangu platform, that
the administration had tried to discredit us and that it could be used against me. In
fact most of the Pangu candidates, even the ones from the inner circle, campaigned as
individuals in order not to expose themselves to this kind of attack.5
Even as the 1972 elections approached, some officials of the Australian Administration
‘foster[ed] the attitude that parties were detrimental to the country’.6
Despite this, political education material prepared by the Administration before the
elections of 1968 and 1972 commended political parties, specifically supporting the idea
of two or three parties over one or many,7 and, after a visiting UN mission in 1971 had
recommended that parties be promoted on a nationwide basis,8 the Administration
distributed a booklet on parties that contained the platforms of the three major parties at
that time. Indeed, by the early 1970s, it might be said that the Administration was
propagandising for the institution of political parties as some well-informed Papua New
Guineans were arguing against parties as being potentially disruptive.
Inhibiting factors aside, mass-based political movements did emerge in the pre-
independence period. Among the various political organisations to appear on the scene
vefore the elections for the second House of Assembly in 1968, two — the United
Christian Democratic Party (later United Democratic Party — UDP) and the Papua
New Guinea National Union (Pangu Pati) — might be described as the first indigenous,
mass-based parties. The UDP, an ideologically conservative party identified with the
Catholic mission, was established in the East Sepik Province in 1966, but proved to be
short-lived, fading away after a disappointing showing in the 1968 election. Pangu was
more successful: when the second House of Assembly sat in 1968, 10 of the 84 members
were Pangu members, and the party declared itself to be the ‘loyal opposition’ to the
Administration-dominated ‘government’. Nevertheless, a study of the 1968 election,
echoing Kiki’s comments, minimised the influence of parties in the election:
Outside a handful of towns, there was little sign of the ‘political parties’ so hastily
inaugurated during 1967 … At worst … it was an electoral liability for a candidate to
be publicly associated with them, and candidates … avoided or even denied such
association.9
And Ted Wolfers observed:
Political Parties in the Pacific84
  
Parties probably had a real impact at the popular level only in the East Sepik,
Bougainville and Morobe districts.10
Between 1968 and 1972, two other mass-based movements emerged, which were
described at the time as political parties.11 These were the Mataungan Association of East
New Britain and Napidakoe Navitu of the North Solomons. But though both movements
fielded candidates in the election of 1972 (and the Mataungans again in 1977), they were
not formed as political parties to contest elections.12 Before the end of the 1968–72
House of Assembly, three more political parties had emerged. The first of these, the
United Party, had its origins in an Independent Members’ Group (IMG) established in the
House in 1968 among a group of members brought together essentially by their opposi-
tion to Pangu’s demand for early independence. The group consisted largely of Highlands
members together with some of the more conservative expatriate members. In 1968–69,
attempts were made by members of the IMG to create local groups to support a political
party centred on the IMG and, in early 1970, the formation of a coordinating body,
Combined Political Associations (Compass), was announced. Its chairman and secretary
were both Highlanders. The next year, Compass changed its name to United Party (UP).
By mid 1971, UP claimed the backing of 45 parliamentary members. A second party also
emerged from within the IMG in 1970: the Business Services Group, under the leadership
of Julius Chan, comprised 10 members, mostly from the New Guinea Islands, who, it was
suggested ‘seemed to represent a regional distrust of the highlands leadership implicit in
Compass’.13 The Business Services Group subsequently founded the People’s Progress
Party (PPP). The association of Highlanders with a ‘go-slow’ attitude to independence,
which Compass represented, also prompted the formation among a group of generally
younger and more progressive Highlanders of the New Guinea National Party (NP),
which was generally regarded as ‘the highlands equivalent of Pangu.’14
The 1972 election was thus, for the first time, contested by parties. About 150 of
the 611 candidates who nominated were endorsed or selected and helped by parties,15
and in his overview of the election David Stone concluded that ‘Undoubtedly … what
marked the 1972 general election from its predecessors was the prominent and active
participation by political parties and associations’.16 Nevertheless, some candidates were
still hesitant about publicly admitting party membership, and party organisation was still
weak: as in 1968, a number of electorates fielded more than one candidate from the same
party, and no party had a nationwide organisation. In the event, no party emerged from
the 1972 elections with a clear majority and, notwithstanding the expectations of the UP
(which had anticipated up to 60 seats and in fact won about 37), after some intense
lobbying of members elected without formal party commitment, Pangu leader Michael
Somare was able to cobble together a National Coalition Government, which embraced
Pangu (with 18 endorsed candidates winning, and additional pro-Pangu members
bringing its numbers to 26), PPP (11), NP (eight), the Mataungan Association (three)
and eight independents. This post-election lobbying of apparently unattached members
set a precedent for all subsequent elections. The UP accepted the role of Opposition, and
this party alignment was broadly maintained during the life of the 1972–77 Parliament
(though in 1975 some UP members supported the Government on critical divisions).
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In 1972, a Constitutional Planning Committee was appointed to begin the process
of preparing a constitution for the independent state. Its Final Report (1974) contained
only a brief comment on political parties, proposing that parties be registered and
supporting the idea of public funding for parties. The Constitution subsequently
provided that organic laws would make provision to ensure the integrity of political
parties and candidates,17 but 25 years later this had not been done.
Between 1972 and the first post-independence election in 1977, there were several
significant developments in the incipient party system. One was the emergence of the
Nationalist Pressure Group (NPG) in 1974. The NPG represented a coalescence of
members who supported the proposals of the Constitutional Planning Committee
against modifications put forward by the Government.18 Although it voted as a cohesive
group on ‘national’ issues in 1974–75, the NPG specifically avoided the label ‘party’ and
its 18 core members — drawn from the four major parties plus the Mataungan
Association and a newly formed Country Party (whose members were recruited mostly
from the UP) — retained their party affiliations. Another development was the election,
in a by-election in 1976, of a second member representing the separatist Papua Besena
movement, whose leader, Josephine Abaijah, had been elected in 1972, and the subse-
quent announcement of a Papua Party.19 A third was the split and virtual collapse of the
NP in 1976, after Somare had dismissed from Cabinet its leader and deputy leader, and a
move by them to withdraw all NP members from the coalition failed. The NP split
provides an early example of the way in which parties have fractured when some party
members have jockeyed for a place in a new coalition while others have wanted to hold
on to ministerial portfolios. By the end of the 1972–77 Parliament, party allegiances, as
well as coalition ties, were looking fragile and there were calls for variously an all-party
system and a no-party system.
In 1977, the party mass organisations, which had generally atrophied since 1972,
were revived for the country’s fourth and inaugural post-independence election. This
time, of the 879 candidates who contested the 109 seats, 295 (30 per cent) were
endorsed by one, or more, of the three major parties.20 In addition, a number of Papuan
candidates stood for Papua Besena, which in 1977 appeared to have evolved from an ill-
defined separatist movement to a fully fledged political party. Observers of the 1977 poll
seem to have been generally agreed that political parties had a substantial impact on the
election,21 though in an interim report on the election Bill Standish concluded that
while in the towns, competition ‘was more in terms of modern associations’, in rural
areas ‘clan voting prevailed’.22 In 1977, as in 1972, uncertainties about the political
allegiances of some candidates resulted in intense post-election lobbying among those
who hoped to be able to put together a government. One proposal was for a ‘National
Alliance’ including UP, Papua Besena, the Country Party and NP. Another was for an
Islands-based Alliance for Progress and Regional Development, led by the two former
NPG spokesmen, John Momis and John Kaputin. In the event, the successful combina-
tion was a coalition of the enlarged Pangu and PPP membership (38 and 20 respectively)
with most of the Mataungan and North Solomons members and two UP defectors, led
by Somare. After several months of infighting within the Opposition, former NP
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minister Iambakey Okuk emerged as Opposition Leader. Having attempted unsuccess-
fully to bring together his Highlands supporters, Papua Besena members and some
others in a People’s United Front, Okuk revived the NP and, as its leader, waged an
aggressive campaign against the Coalition.
In November 1978, after a growing unease in the relationship between PPP and
Pangu (which had probably more to do with personalities and leadership styles than with
policies), PPP withdrew from the Coalition. Pangu was maintained in office by a split
within the UP, which brought about half of that party’s members across the floor to the
Government. In 1978–79, the Somare Government survived three no-confidence
motions initiated by Okuk, but in January 1980, after a Cabinet reshuffle, Momis and
Kaputin withdrew from the Coalition, forming a new party, the Melanesian Alliance
(MA), and, two months later, with their support, a no-confidence vote against the
Somare Government succeeded. Chan became Prime Minister as the head of a National
Alliance Government comprising PPP, NP, MA, Papua Besena and part of UP.
The Alliance was able to hold on to office until the scheduled elections of 1982, but
it was, to say the least, an improbable coalition. PPP and NP, broadly aligned in support
of capitalist development and foreign investment (though with little personal empathy
between Chan and Okuk23), were at one end of a political spectrum from the MA,
which regarded itself as being to the left of Pangu and whose leaders were strongly identi-
fied with economic nationalism and the aim of self-sufficiency; and Papua Besena, which
owed its origins in large part to fear and distrust of Highlanders,24 was a strange
bedfellow for a coalition in which Highlands members were a large component and
whose deputy leader (Okuk) was a staunch Highlands nationalist.
Between 1977 and 1981, extra-parliamentary party organisation, such as it was,
had again atrophied, but party organisations were resuscitated in the lead-up to the 1982
elections and several new groupings appeared. Indeed, in the 1982 elections, parties
seemed to be more salient than ever. Pangu, PPP, UP, NP, MA and Papua Besena/Papua
Party all fielded candidates, while two new groups — a Papua Action Party (which had
links with the NP) and a predominantly Papuan ‘Independent Group’ headed by former
Defence Force Commander Ted Diro — emerged as significant contenders. Some 59 per
cent of the 1,125 candidates who stood in 1982 were endorsed by one or more of these
eight parties.25 My own observation of the 1982 campaign in the East Sepik suggested
not only that nearly all candidates sought a party label (some, indeed, more than one)
but that a high proportion of voters could accurately attach party labels to most candi-
dates; nevertheless, ‘party organization was still fairly rudimentary and … local and kin
ties and exposure to the electorate were still critically important’.26
Notwithstanding this, party attachment for most candidates seemed still to be loose
and it was not rare for a candidate who failed to get endorsement or assistance from one
party to turn to another; for some parties and in some electorates, party attachment
meant little more than the use of a label. Further, in a number of instances, party
members stood against endorsed candidates of their own party against their party’s inter-
ests (though in some cases, parties — especially Pangu — supported more than one
candidate in order to split the local vote of opponents of their endorsed candidate).
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Overall, it seemed that although there was in 1982 some increase in party voting,
personal and local loyalties were still considerably more important for the majority of
voters.27
The outcome of the 1982 election was a victory for Pangu, which — apart from the
recently established MA — was the only party to increase its representation in the
Parliament. Somare was duly re-elected to the Prime Ministership, heading a government
comprising Pangu (with 50 members), UP (six) and a number of members who were
either elected as independents or switched from other parties after the election. Diro
emerged as Opposition Leader, and, surprisingly, Parliamentary Leader of the NP, after
Okuk had lost his seat in Simbu; but when, in 1983, Okuk was returned in a by-election,
Diro stepped down from both posts in Okuk’s favour. The MA aligned itself with the
NP/Independent Group and Papua Party in opposition, but the PPP for a while
occupied the middle benches.
In 1985–86, Pangu Pati suffered two splits. The first occurred when a group of 15
members led by Deputy Prime Minister Paias Wingti (a Highlander, who had been
elected as a UP candidate but switched to Pangu in 1977) left to form a new party, the
People’s Democratic Movement (PDM). The second came in early 1986 when a small
group of senior Pangu members, led by Somare’s Sepik colleague Anthony Siaguru,
formed a Pangu Independent Group (PIG). The PIG sought acceptance as an ‘affiliate’ of
Pangu, but when this was refused they broke away to form the League for National
Advancement. The Somare Government survived a vote of no confidence early in 1985
with support from the NP and MA, but in November a vote of no confidence went
against Somare, and Wingti became Prime Minister, leading a coalition consisting of
PDM, PPP, NP and some Pangu, UP and MA defectors. During 1986, there was tension
within the Coalition, particularly between Wingti, Okuk (until his death in late 1986)
and Chan, but the Coalition was still intact when Parliament rose for the 1987 election.
As the 1987 election approached, five new parties emerged, including the People’s
Action Party (PAP), a Papuan-based party led by Diro, which drew on the support for the
earlier Papuan Action Party and Diro’s Independent Group, and the Morobe Independent
Group (MIG) headed by former student leader and Morobe Premier, Utula Samana. This
gave a total of 15 parties. Despite the increased number of parties, the percentage of party-
endorsed candidates among the 1,513 candidates nominating dropped to 37, and
independents won 22 of the 109 seats. In a pre-election survey of voters conducted by Yaw
Saffu, to the question ‘What is it that you would look for in the candidate you will be
voting for?’, only 3.4 per cent of respondents answered ‘Party’.28 When votes were counted,
Pangu had 26 seats, PDM 17, NP 12, MA seven, PAP six, PPP five, MIG four, LNA three,
Papua Party three and UP one. Elections for the three remaining seats were postponed. It
was widely expected that Somare would be able to put together a winning coalition, but in
the event it was Wingti who was successful, emerging as the leader of what Somare
described as ‘a ramshackle gaggle of unruly independents’,29 which included the PPP and a
newly formed Papuan Bloc led by Diro, which included PP, PAP and some independents.
In the next months, the governing coalition came under severe strain. Diro, who
had served as Minister for Forests in the previous Wingti Government, had been named
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in an investigation into the forestry industry and faced a leadership tribunal as well as
perjury charges; it was also disclosed that he had received ‘campaign contributions’ of
almost $A180,000 from Indonesian Armed Forces Commander, Benny Murdani,
contrary to the provisions of PNG’s Constitution. Notwithstanding this, Diro continued
to press for appointment as Deputy Prime Minister and for more Cabinet posts for the
Papuan-dominated PAP, and failed to dissociate himself from rumours of an impending
coup, after Wingti had removed the commander of the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF)
and three colonels, all of whom were Papuans. Kaputin, who had been expelled from the
MA for joining the Wingti Coalition in 1985, initiated a meeting of New Guinea
Islands’ members (attended by 10 of the 17 Islands members), which called for ‘political
stability, social justice and a return to the principles of democracy’. And there were defec-
tions from the governing coalition, one member referring to the Government as ‘morally
corrupt’. Facing a vote of no confidence, the Government adjourned Parliament. During
the adjournment there were, first, moves for a ‘grand coalition’ including PDM, PPP and
Pangu, over which talks collapsed, and then the signing of an ‘irrevocable memorandum
of understanding’ for the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation,
embracing PDM, PPP, Pangu, PAP and Samana’s renamed Melanesian United Front
(MUF). But while Wingti was signing an agreement with Pangu, he was secretly negoti-
ating with the NP (then led by Wingti’s fellow Highlander Michael Mel), and, in a
Cabinet reshuffle in June 1988, NP was dealt in and Pangu excluded.
A motion of no confidence was foreshadowed as soon as Parliament met later that
month, and there was a spate of defections from PDM. The NP also split, again. In the
subsequent vote, a combination of Pangu (including a few members who defected back
to Pangu), most of the Papuan Bloc, the MA, LNA, a faction of NP and a few others
prevailed over Wingti’s leadership, and Rabbie Namaliu, who had replaced Somare as
Parliamentary Leader of Pangu in July 1988, became PNG’s fourth Prime Minister.
Despite the enlightened leadership of Namaliu, and the passage of a budget of
‘unity, reconciliation and reconstruction’, the period from mid-1988 to 1992, when the
next election took place, was turbulent. It saw the start of the Bougainville rebellion,
unrest within the PNGDF, economic downturn and escalating problems of law and
order. Several votes of no confidence were initiated, and Parliament was adjourned for
further long periods in 1989 and 1990. In 1991, the Constitution was amended to
extend the initial grace period for votes of no confidence from six months to 18. There
were several Cabinet reshuffles, which, among others, saw Diro eventually achieve the
position of Deputy Prime Minister, a position he held until April 1991, when he was
found guilty of 81 counts of misconduct under the Leadership Code. The decision of the
Leadership Tribunal in the Diro case precipitated a brief constitutional crisis when the
Governor-General, a Papuan and former president of the PAP, refused to sack Diro. The
tensions brought about by all this political activity saw a split in the PAP, defections from
PDM and PPP, and from Pangu, and several parties expelled rebellious MPs.
Commenting on Wingti’s political machinations in mid-1988, Saffu suggested that
‘Wingti’s modus operandi had helped to raise the levels of cynicism and deception in
PNG politics’.30 Indeed, the well-publicised comings and goings in the Parliament of
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1987–92 left many people cynical about political parties, and, although there was, once
more, something of a revival of extra-parliamentary party activity in the lead-up to the
1992 election, parties seem to have been less salient in 1992 than in the previous two or
three elections.31 Six of the parties that had contested in 1987 had disappeared
(including Samana’s MIG/MUF, Papua Besena and the Papua Party), and several new
parties emerged, including the People’s Solidarity Party (PSP), a breakaway from the PAP.
The PSP polled well (probably in part at the expense of the PAP), but failed to win a seat
and subsequently faded away.
In 1992, the fee for candidature was raised from K100 to K1,000 in an attempt to
counteract the growth in the number of candidates standing, but the number continued
to rise, to 1,655. Of these, 75 per cent chose to stand as independents. In 1987, the seven
major parties (Pangu, PPP, PDM, MA, PAP, LNA and NP) won 51 per cent of votes and
76 seats; in 1992, their share of the vote fell to 32 per cent and they won 68 seats.32
Pangu was the most successful party, but its percentage of the total vote fell from 34 to 9
per cent and seats won from 50 to 20. In the vote for Prime Minister, Wingti, in coali-
tion with the PPP, LNA and a group of independents, defeated Namaliu by a single vote.
As in every Parliament to date, there was a mid-term change of government in 1994
when, having resigned and been re-elected as Prime Minister in a move to avoid a vote of
no confidence, Wingti was removed after a Supreme Court ruling against his action. In
the reshuffling that followed, PPP leader Chan became Prime Minister, outvoting promi-
nent Port Moresby politician Bill Skate of the Papua New Guinea First Party (PNGFP);
Chan headed yet another coalition government, in partnership with Pangu. Chris
Haiveta, who had succeeded Namaliu as Pangu leader, became Deputy Prime Minister.
In 1997, there was a major political upheaval when the Chan Government, having
secretly negotiated a contract with ‘military consultants’ Sandline International to bring
an end to the Bougainville rebellion, was challenged by the Commander of the PNGDF,
Brigadier General Singirok. Singirok denounced the contract, detained the Sandline
mercenaries and called on Chan, Haiveta and the Defence Minister to stand down.
An inquiry was set up and a major crisis averted, but in the ensuing election Chan lost
his seat.
Once again, there was a proliferation of parties on the eve of the 1997 election.
New parties included the People’s National Congress (PNC), which replaced the PNGFP
as Skate’s Papuan-based party; the Movement for Greater Autonomy (MGA), a New
Guinea Islands-based party headed by former Manus Premier, Stephen Pokawin; and the
National Alliance (NAL). In 1995, Somare, then a member of the Chan Government,
had opposed legislation that fundamentally changed the country’s provincial government
system. As a result, he was dropped from Cabinet and became alienated from some of his
Pangu colleagues. He subsequently founded the NA as a new political grouping,
comprising the MA, the MGA (which also had its origins in the provincial government
debate), some Pangu supporters and progressive independents. Somare used the NA as
his electoral vehicle in 1997. Of the 2,372 candidates contesting, 712 were listed as
having party attachment, though parties in 1997 seemed to have fewer resources to offer
and party leaders seemed to be less active outside their own electorates. On these figures,
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the proportion of independents fell slightly, to 70 per cent, though the actual number
rose. PAP fielded the largest number of candidates; surprisingly, given its Papuan origins,
more than half of these were in Highlands electorates, where there were multiple PAP
candidates in a number of electorates.
When votes were counted, PPP (which had won eight seats in 1992 but had seen its
support grow to 32 before the parliamentary recession of 1997) had 16 seats; Pangu had
also lost ground, gaining 13 seats; the NA had 11 (including four MA seats); PDM nine;
NP seven; PNC six (all in Papuan electorates); PAP six, and there were 38 independents.
In the scramble for numbers prior to Parliament sitting, it looked as though Somare
would emerge on top. The NA-led coalition failed to get the numbers in Parliament
when Skate, who had promised support for Somare, took his PNC into a rival grouping
and was rewarded with the Prime Ministership.
The Skate Government faced several minor crises between 1997 and 1999 —
mostly self-made. In December 1998, there was another long adjournment of Parliament
designed to avoid a vote of no confidence (between July 1998 and June 1999, Parliament
met for only 17 days). Tensions had emerged between Skate and Haiveta, and when, in
1999, Skate dropped Haiveta from Cabinet, Pangu withdrew from the Coalition and
backed the PDM in a successful move to oust Skate. Wingti having lost his seat in 1997,
the leadership of PDM was assumed in 1998 by former Treasury Secretary and Central
Bank Governor, Sir Mekere Morauta, who had stood as an independent in 1997 and had
been a minister in the Skate Government before becoming one of 12 ministers sacked by
Skate. In the vote for Prime Minister, Morauta won by 99 votes to five — with Skate
voting for him! Morauta thus became PNG’s sixth Prime Minister. In 2001, a number of
members switched allegiance to the PDM, giving it for a while an absolute majority in
Parliament, but the 2002 elections saw a shift away from the party (see below).
Characteristics of political parties in PNG
It is impossible, within a short space, to detail the constant comings and goings of
members, defecting from one party and joining another, sometimes only temporarily,
and the constant wheeling and dealing among party leaders seeking to advance their
party’s interests or their own ministerial aspirations through the formation of new coali-
tions or the preservation of existing ones. The brief history above conveys something
of the flavour of party politics in PNG and provides a broad context within which some
of the particular characteristics of political parties and the ‘party system’ in PNG can
be highlighted.
Party organisation
Typically, political party organisation in PNG has been weak. Although, on paper, some of
the larger parties have had organisational structures based on party branches, most parties
have been essentially parliamentary alliances and have been dominated by prominent
parliamentary members (or, in a few cases — the PPP with Julius Chan and the PDM
with Paias Wingti — by former MPs who hoped to be re-elected). In between elections,
party organisations in the electorate, such as they exist, have tended to lie dormant. Even
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Pangu, which in the 1970s and 1980s probably came closest to maintaining an effective
organisation — at least in its strongholds of East Sepik and Morobe Provinces — found it
difficult to sustain popular support. 
As a result, the textbook functions of a political party in formulating policy options,
recruiting supporters and selecting candidates have seldom been fulfilled in PNG.
Indeed, rather than having party branches that select candidates from among their
numbers for the open and provincial electorates, in most parties it is the party leader who
seeks out and recruits likely candidates for party endorsement, frequently from outside
the party.
Lack of mass membership has also affected party finances. In the elections of 1968
to 1987, the larger parties were generally able to offer financial and logistical support
during election campaigns — financing candidate deposits and the printing of posters,
providing vehicles, boats or outboard motors for campaigning and sometimes providing
T-shirts or cash. Indeed, in the 1970s, several major parties had established ‘business
arms’ to generate campaign funds. In the 1990s, most business arms seem to have been
depleted and party funding for endorsed candidates seems to have substantially dried up.
When funds were forthcoming to support party candidates, party leaders seem to have
been the predominant source, strengthening the personalistic tendency in party identity. 
In Parliament, party discipline has generally been weak, the institution of party
whips not having become well entrenched, and, from an early stage, ‘party-hopping’ or
‘yoyo politics’ has been fairly commonplace.
Associated with the fluidity of party attachment has been a rise in the number of
candidates standing as independents. Often such ‘independents’ have known party
leanings and might have accepted campaign support from parties that might have
endorsed another candidate, but have left themselves relatively free so that, if elected,
they can ‘sell’ their parliamentary support to the party that makes the best offer. This has
given rise to a particularly Papua New Guinean practice: after the declaration of candi-
dates after elections, two or three camps are set up, generally well away from Port
Moresby (even as far as Australia), by powerbrokers for the major parties, and attempts
are made to physically assemble winning coalitions of elected members. Substantial
inducements might be offered to attract members to a coalition, and, on occasion, there
have been complaints that members have been held at such camps against their will
(hence the term sometimes used for such occasions — ‘lock-ups’).
Bases of party differentiation
The ease with which some MPs have changed party allegiance reflects partly a lack of
clear ideological (or other) differences between parties. In the period before independ-
ence, Pangu, together perhaps with the NP, was differentiated from the other parties
primarily by its critical attitude towards the Australian Administration and its demand
for early independence. The UP preferred a longer transition to independence, reflecting
the view of its predominantly Highlander membership that they needed more time to
‘catch up’ with the coastal people, who had had a longer period of contact with the
Colonial Administration and enjoyed higher levels of education and public sector
employment. With the achievement of independence in 1975, this ceased to be a point
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of differentiation. Otherwise, the UP and PPP were generally regarded as more ‘business’
oriented and more favourably disposed towards foreign participation in the economy
than Pangu, whose associations included trade unionists. But in practice the differences
were not substantial, as the record of the first coalition government (1972-77) demon-
strated. Indeed, on the one occasion that substantial differences on important policy
issues did arise — namely, during the constitutional debates of 1974–75, which gave rise
to the NPG — alignments cut across party lines. The nature of the coalition that
replaced Somare in 1980 (see above) suggested further that issues were secondary to
strategies for achieving parliamentary office, a view reinforced by the 1978 split in the
UP and demonstrated in political behaviour ever since.
Among later-established parties, the MA, under the leadership of former Catholic
priest John Momis and Bernard Narokobi, has been seen as a relatively socially progres-
sive party; there have been several ‘labour’ parties, the most recent, the Papua New
Guinea Labour Party, linked to the Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress; there was
a short-lived Socialist Democrat Party, ‘The True People’s Party’, established by former
student leader Gabriel Ramoi; a Christian Democratic Party was launched in 1995, ‘with
the vision to provide Christian Leadership in all levels of government’; and a United
Resources Party emerged during the 1997-2002 Parliament with a platform that empha-
sised equitable returns from resource development. But none of these has done much to
further the cause of issue-based politics. In the 1980s, there were suggestions that
emerging social class divisions might provide a basis for political party development, but
subsequent developments have not provided the evidence for such a view.
In the absence of class or ideological cleavages, ethnic or regional divisions seemed
to be a likely base for political aggregation. The visiting UN mission in 1971 expressed
concern at the regionalist tendencies in political party development,33 and the next year a
local scholar forecast that ‘it will not be ideology or class interests which separate the
parties — if there are more than one … regional interests are the most likely source from
which political parties will derive their mass base’.34 Commentaries on the 1977 election
tended to support this judgment: Hegarty observed that in the pre-election period
‘considerable social differentiation had become apparent’, but went on to conclude, ‘The
basic cleavages in PNG politics are not ideological or class based but regional’,35 and
Premdas and Steeves ventured the opinion, ‘It would be difficult for anything but an
ethnically-based party system to emerge.’36 By the 1980s, the regional concentration of
party support appeared to have been diluted somewhat,37 nevertheless, there was still
evidence of a regional element in party support: Pangu had its strongest support from the
East Sepik and Morobe Provinces (in the case of East Sepik, Pangu support merged with
loyalty to the provincial member, Pangu leader and ‘father of the nation’, Michael
Somare), though from 1982 it began gaining support in parts of the Highlands; PPP and
MA were strongest in the New Guinea Islands region; and UP, NP, Country Party, and
subsequently PDM were associated primarily with Highlands politicians. More specifi-
cally, a Morobe District People’s Association (MODIPE) had been established in 1973
with the objective of preventing people from outside Morobe Province becoming parlia-
mentary members for Morobe electorates (at this time, the Pangu member for Lae was a
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Papuan), and, in 1987, this sentiment was revived by former Morobe Premier, Utula
Samana, who launched a Morobe Independent Group (MIG) and led it successfully into
the election that year. A more substantial regional influence has been that exercised by
Papuans. This began with the election of Papua Besena leader, Josephine Abaijah, and the
formation of the Papua Party; it continued with the formation of the NP-associated
Papua Action Party and Diro’s Independent Group, and the subsequent emergence of a
Papuan Bloc in Parliament; these in turn provided the base of the PAP (initially a
Papuan-dominated party, though in recent years it has received substantial support from
the Highlands); after being elected in 1992 as an NP candidate, Skate formed the
PNGFP, a Papuan-based party, and, in 1997, as leader of the PNC — a party with six
Papuan MPs — he became the country’s first Papuan Prime Minister.
Longevity of parties
Not surprisingly, in this context, the majority of parties that have emerged over the years
has been short-lived. There has been a proliferation of parties at each election, but those
that do not achieve electoral success mostly disappear soon after the election. Many of
these are essentially one-person parties.
Of the parties currently represented in the National Parliament, Pangu has enjoyed a
continuous history as a major player since 1967, though it has suffered two major break-
aways and is currently (early 2005) split into two factions; PPP also has a continuous
record as a major party, though it too, is currently divided between two factions: UP and
NP have survived, but with periods of low activity and records of factionalism; the MA
has been a small but significant actor since its formation in 1980; and the PDM, PAP and
NA have now been around, if sometimes fractious, for several years. Beyond that, parties
have tended to come and go quite rapidly, mostly just before and just after elections.
The OLIPPC, LPV and parties since 2002
In the latter half of the 1990s, there was considerable dissatisfaction within PNG about
the country’s lack of social and economic progress and growing problems of lawlessness
and corruption, and growing criticism from outside. On becoming Prime Minister,
Morauta vowed to address these issues and ‘to restore integrity to our great institutions of
state’. A major plank in his government’s reform platform was an Organic Law on the
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPC). A secondary measure was an
amendment to the Organic Law on National and Local-level Government Elections to
change the electoral system from one of first-past-the-post voting to one of limited
preferential voting.38
In each national election in PNG since 1972, there has been a steady increase in the
number of candidates contesting, notwithstanding an increase in the required fee for
candidature in 1992, from K100 to K1,000 (then roughly equal to per capita GDP).
While some of these candidates might have been put up to split the local vote of a rival
candidate in another clan or another part of the electorate, with voter support being
localised there are often several candidates with a good chance of winning if they can
hold their support base together. There has also been a fairly steady increase in the
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proportion of candidates who have stood — at least overtly — as independents. These
developments have had at least two adverse effects on elections: first, with the number
required for victory sometimes relatively small in open electorates with many candidates,
holding one’s bloc together is critical, and this has encouraged voting irregularities and
violence in parts of the country, especially in the Highlands. In 2002, this caused the
declaration of failed elections in six of the nine electorates in the Southern Highlands.
Secondly, with many candidates competing, the percentage of the total vote that winning
candidates have obtained has been, on average, steadily falling. Concerns about these
issues lay behind the OLIPPC.
After widespread public consultation, organised through a Constitutional
Development Commission, and parliamentary debate, the OLIPPC and associated
constitutional amendments were passed in December 2000 and came into force in 2001,
in time for the country’s sixth post-independence elections. In a foreword to an explana-
tion of the proposed legislation by the CDC, Prime Minister Morauta described the
initiative as ‘the most important Constitutional change this country has made since
independence’.39 Its broad objectives were to strengthen the party system and help return
stability and integrity to politics.
The OLIPPC contains four main provisions.
Party registration
Political parties must be registered with the Registrar of Political Parties, an office
created under the OLIPPC and independent of the Electoral Commission. An unreg-
istered party cannot nominate candidates for election. Parties must submit details of
membership and a constitution, and provide financial returns on an annual basis.
Membership is not to be confined to people from a particular province, region or
group and the party must not encourage regionalism or secession.40 Party offices are
to be ‘elected in a democratic manner’ (spelled out in the legislation). Party members
must be paid-up, and a person cannot be a member of more than one party. Provision
is made for cancellation of registration (inter alia, if a party fails to file financial
returns for two consecutive years), for dissolution of a registered party (where a
majority of party members or 75 per cent of party MPs agree), and for amalgamation
of registered parties. In addition to the Registrar, the OLIPPC set up a Central Fund
Board of Management (renamed Commission on the Integrity of Political Parties
and Candidates), whose membership comprises the Registrar, the Electoral
Commissioner, the Clerk of the National Parliament, the chair of the National
Economic and Fiscal Commission, and church and women’s representatives. The
board appoints the Registrar and is responsible for dealing with registration applica-
tions and management of the Central Fund. By August 2001, 43 parties had
registered (though not all had supplied the necessary documentation).
Funding of parties and candidates
The OLIPPC established a Central Fund, from which parties receive public funding.
The sources of income available to the Central Fund comprise an annual appropria-
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tion from the national budget and (unlimited) contributions from citizens, interna-
tional organizations and non-citizens. The allocation to parties is on the basis of
K10,000 for each elected MP. In 2003, the Central Fund Board of Management
approved the distribution of K990,000 to 20 parties, at the same time complaining
that ‘The government has miserably failed to adequately fund the Board and its
Secretariate [sic]’.41
In addition, registered parties and candidates can receive contributions from citizens
and non-citizens of up to K500,000 in any financial year, in each case — a somewhat
generous provision, especially considering that the Constitution in 1975 precluded
non-citizen contributions, and the CDC initially recommended a limit of K100,000.
The donor and the recipient are required to provide details of such contributions to
the Registrar, though there have been complaints that the Registrar has not been fully
informed. Successful candidates are also required to submit a detailed financial state-
ment within three months of election.
Strengthening political parties in Parliament
Probably the most important provisions of the OLIPPC were those intended to
prevent ‘party-hopping’. Under the organic law, a Member of Parliament who was
elected as a party-endorsed candidate cannot withdraw or resign from that party
during the life of the Parliament (unless he/she can establish that the party or an
executive of the party has committed a serious breach of the party’s constitution or
that the party has been adjudged insolvent) and cannot vote against a resolution of the
party concerning a vote of no confidence, the election of a Prime Minister, approval of
the national budget or a constitutional amendment (a member can, however, abstain
from voting). Contravention of this provision is regarded as resignation from the
party and sets in motion a series of procedures that can culminate in the member
having to reimburse the party for all campaign and other expenses received from the
party, exclusion from appointment as a minister or committee chair, or dismissal from
Parliament. A member elected as an independent can join a party after the initial vote
for prime minister, and then incurs the same obligations to the party as a party-
endorsed candidate. A member elected as an independent who remains independent,
but who supported a particular candidate in the vote for prime minister, must not
vote against that candidate or his/her government in a subsequent vote of no confi-
dence, nor against a budget brought down by that government, nor against a
constitutional amendment proposed by that government.
These provisions were tested in December 2003, when the Somare Government,
already facing threats of a vote of no confidence, sought to extend, from 18 months to
36, the grace period within which an incoming government was free from a vote of no
confidence. The proposed constitutional amendment was defeated, but several parties
split over the issue. Some members who voted against their party leader defended
themselves by arguing that there had not been a formal party resolution on the issue.
The issue has not to date been resolved.
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The OLIPPC also provides that, after an election, the Head of State shall invite the
party with the greatest number of endorsed candidates elected to form a government
and to nominate a candidate for election by the Parliament as Prime Minister. This
was intended to minimise the post-election lobbying that had produced the ‘lock-ups’
after earlier elections.42 In 2002, this probably gave an advantage to Somare, as leader
of the NA, and Somare was duly elected Prime Minister, but it did not eliminate the
post-election machinations and it did not necessarily ensure a victory for Somare.
Incentives for female candidates
In an effort to address the massive under-representation of women as electoral candi-
dates and in the National Parliament, the OLIPPC provided that where a
party-endorsed female candidate received at least 10 per cent of the votes cast in her
electorate, the Central Fund would reimburse up to 75 per cent of the campaign
expenses outlaid on her by the party. In 2002, the number of female candidates
(mostly independents) rose from 45 to 74, but the number elected fell from two to
one, and only received 10 per cent of the vote.
Before the 2002 national elections, 43 parties had registered with the Registrar for polit-
ical parties, though many of these had very small membership and, on the eve of polling,
a number had not provided the Registrar with the required list of candidates. In the
event, with ‘failed elections’ declared in six seats in 2002, 24 parties were represented in
the new Parliament: the NA with 19 members, PDM 13, PPP eight, Pangu six, PAP five,
People’s Labour Party four, nine parties with two or three members and another nine
with one member each. Seventeen candidates were elected as independents. By
December 2003, the number of parties had been reduced, through amalgamations, to
18.43 As the leader of the party with the most winning candidates in 2002, Somare was
invited to form a government, and he was subsequently elected Prime Minister by a vote
of 89 to nil, with 14 members abstaining. The PDM, under Morauta, joined the small
Opposition group, subsequently changing its name to the Papua New Guinea Party
(PNGP). Wingti was re-elected in 2002, but he stood as an independent and did not
seek to regain leadership of the party he had established.
The shift from first-past-the-post voting to limited preferential voting (LPV) was
affected in the general belief that such a change would bring about greater cooperation
between candidates, reducing the number of candidates and lessening the violence associ-
ated with recent elections — though the rationalization of this belief has never been
made very clear.44 LPV came into effect after the supplementary elections in the
Southern Highlands in 2003. By December 2004, there had been six by-elections held
under LPV. All were fairly peaceful affairs, with fewer candidates than in the 2002
national elections, but since that is usual in by-elections it would be premature to take
these outcomes as a validation of this particular piece of social engineering.
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Why has a coherent party system failed to develop in PNG?
The question, why have parties not developed, implicitly assumes that political parties
are an inherent part of a parliamentary system. Certainly, the process of majority
decision-making encourages groups of like-minded members to come together to ensure
the numbers necessary to push legislative agendas, and when there are significant lines of
social cleavage — class, ideology, ethnicity, religion, region — and corresponding clearly
differentiated collective group interests, these might form a natural basis for party organ-
isation. This has been the history of political party development in most developed
nations. But it does not describe politics in PNG.
First, as Hegarty has argued, PNG lacked the galvanising influence on politics of an
independence struggle, through which parties have often been defined elsewhere,45 and,
after the early differences between Pangu-NP and UP over the speed of transition to
independence became irrelevant in 1975, party platforms, as we have seen, tended to
converge. Class has not emerged as a major social cleavage in a country where about 85
per cent of the population is at least partly involved in subsistence agriculture and even
the urban elite tend to retain their links with the village. Undoubtedly, there is a growing
gap between rich and poor, but Western class models are largely irrelevant in explaining
the dynamics of economic inequalities in PNG. Regionalism has had more impact on
PNG politics, especially in relation to a continuing Papuan identity, but it has not
provided a systematic basis for party organization. Indeed, to achieve office, all coalitions
need to put together a group representative of all four regions, and this to some extent
cuts across regionalism as a base for party organisation. In the absence of such social or
geographic cleavages, collectivities have developed primarily from personal networks.
Since politicians also compete for office, these personal networks are typically fragile,
especially among aspiring leaders.
Secondly, and not unrelated, politics in PNG remain essentially parochial. While
I have argued elsewhere that the view of electoral outcomes in PNG being determined by
clan or ‘tribal’ loyalties is an oversimplification, electoral success nevertheless seems to be
determined primarily by local factors: local reputation, local perceptions of a candidate’s
ability to deliver goods and services to his or her electorate and the effectiveness of
electoral campaigning. Successive studies of PNG national elections have provided little
evidence of a party vote – even of a strong Pangu vote in Pangu’s stronghold of East Sepik
— and only occasionally (as perhaps in the case of Sir Michael Somare, the country’s first
Prime Minister) has a national reputation translated into local votes. Added to this, a
high turnover of parliamentary members means that most MPs seek a quick return from
their period in office, and this places a premium on being in government, preferably with
a Cabinet portfolio. Indeed, MPs’ constituents generally expect their member to be in
government, regardless of party attachment. After several Opposition MPs defected to
governing coalition parties in 1990, they explained: ‘We are elected to Parliament to be
in government.’46
As a result, MPs are driven less by the desire to implement a particular policy
agenda than by the desire to maximise the returns, for themselves and their constituents,
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from being in office. And as every government since 1972 has been a coalition and, until
2002, no government has survived a full parliamentary term, with MPs hopping from
one party to another and parties shifting allegiance from one coalition to another, the
potential for individual interest outweighing party loyalty is substantial. This has been
reflected in the frequency of votes of no confidence. In such a volatile atmosphere, party
loyalties are difficult to sustain. OLIPPC sought to address this problem by strength-
ening parties, but developments since December 2003 have so far suggested that MPs are
not willing to accept the constraints of the OLIPPC and that the State is either incapable
of enforcing the provisions of the organic law or unwilling to pursue them. 
Prospects for future party development
If political parties in PNG could play a role in mobilising electors and defining issues
that cut across narrow clan or local identity interests, if they could play a role in selecting
capable and effective candidates to become MPs, if they could provide an organisation
and discipline to control the parliamentary behaviour of MPs — the functions tradition-
ally associated with parties in liberal democracies — they could make a substantial
contribution to the achievement of a less fractious political system, in which the
Legislature legislates and the Executive takes the lead in governing. There is no real
evidence that this happening, or, in the light of experience to date with OLIPPC, that it
will happen. As has been argued above, since the 1980s, political parties seem to have
become more, rather than less, fluid, weaker in terms of organisation and finance, and
have a shorter life expectancy. Those inside and outside PNG who argue, largely on the
basis of developed Western country experience, that parties will develop but that, as
in developed Western countries, the process ‘will take time’, have not produced a
convincing argument to support this social Darwinist assumption. Almost 30 years after
independence, political allegiances are still heavily personalised and significantly
localised, with a poorly developed sense of national identity. State institutions are mostly
weak, and, in the absence of the sort of major social cleavages that characterised political
party development in the West, there is no obvious reason why this should change.
Moreover, PNG is not unique: in many countries, mass-based political parties are weak
and play a secondary role to personalised parliamentary factions.
In 1970, a frustrated young political organiser, Michael Somare, observed: ‘The
administration is the giver of all things and people do not care so long as they are at the
receiving end. Our people are so accustomed to getting things for nothing that … they
do not see why they should organise as political groups.’47 Thirty years later, people were
not ‘so accustomed to getting things for nothing’, but they still tended to see the State as
the source of things, and getting access to the State meant getting their candidate elected.
Once in Parliament, MPs hope to improve their access to things by becoming part of
government, and, with weak party allegiance and discipline, parliamentary alliances are
constantly shifting. Institutional change, through the OLIPPC, has so far done little to
change this pattern. What is needed to bring about change is a fundamental shift
in behaviour, and, in the foreseeable future, it is not clear what could bring about such
a change.
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GOVERNANCE IN THE 
SOLOMON ISLANDS
Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka
IN LATE JUNE 2004, the then Opposition Leader in the Solomon Islands National
Parliament, John Martin Garo, announced that he was ‘crossing the floor’ to join the
Government.1 About a week later, on July 8, Garo was sworn in as Minister of State
assisting the Prime Minister and took his oath of allegiance to a government he had spent
the past year opposing.2
In many other parliamentary democracies, the defection of the Leader of the
Opposition to the Government side, and his immediate appointment as Cabinet
Minister, would have attracted widespread political debate. This was not the case in the
Solomon Islands, where the incident passed with just murmurings from a few disgrun-
tled politicians and citizens. Ironically, the most profound expressions of concern —
most of them not publicly expressed — came from government backbenchers who were
not keen on having a former Opposition Leader taking up a Cabinet position that they
would have wanted for themselves.3 For the rest of Parliament and the country, however,
the Opposition Leader’s defection was ‘politiks nomoa ia’ (just politics). Not long after-
wards, a new Leader of the Opposition, former Prime Minister Francis Billy Hilly, was
elected and parliamentary business continued largely as usual. 
The Opposition Leader’s defection did not raise many eyebrows in the Solomon
Islands because most Solomon Islanders are familiar with tactics like this. The previous
Leader of the Opposition, Patteson Oti, also resigned as Opposition Leader and leader of the
Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (SIAC) Party in May 2003 and later joined the
People’s Alliance Party (PAP) — the leading party in the ruling coalition. He was appointed
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Minister for Communication, Aviation and Meteorology.4 Garo was, therefore, simply
following his predecessor’s footprints across the floor of Parliament. This raises a number of
points. First, these events illustrate the porous nature of the boundary between the
Opposition and Government, and the fact that Solomon Islands politicians, generally, have
weak loyalty to parties. Second, it demonstrates the weakness of the country’s party system.
This is what Jeffrey Steeves referred to as an ‘unbounded’ political process in which parties
‘are not sufficiently strong in binding the loyalty of elected members to ensure that the party
controls their legislative behaviour’.5 Consequently, political allegiances change regularly and
political instability is endemic, making it difficult to make and implement medium- and
long-term policy and program plans. Because coalition governments are usually fragile, time
and effort are spent building and sustaining clientelistic relationships to ensure the mainte-
nance of power. This affects democratic efficiency and the effectiveness of governments.
To avert political instability and enhance democratic efficiency, it is often suggested
that countries such as the Solomon Islands need to politically engineer the development
of parties by instituting statutory mechanisms that would regulate their formation and
operation. Such political engineering, it is envisaged, could also transform the behaviour
of politicians and voters and create organised and broad-based parties that are effective in
structuring issues and aggregating and representing diverse interests. Further, it is argued
that political engineering could also make citizens more aware of the role of parties in the
political process. 
This chapter discusses how political engineering could strengthen parties and their
participation in the promotion of representative democracy in the Solomon Islands. It
examines, in particular, how the introduction of statutory mechanisms might affect not
only party developments but also governance processes and outcomes overall. First, the
chapter provides a brief history of the development of parties in the Solomon Islands and
how they have influenced the country’s political landscape and its governance processes
and outcomes. Second, it provides an overview of the experiences of some countries in
the Asia-Pacific. Third, it discusses some of the lessons that Solomon Islands could learn
from countries that have attempted to politically engineer the development of parties,
and some of the issues that need to be considered when introducing statutory mecha-
nisms to regulate political parties in the Solomon Islands. 
I agree that there is a need to politically engineer the development of parties in the
Solomon Islands. But, in establishing institutional means to strengthen parties and
enhance their participation in the political process, it is also important to note that insti-
tutional changes from above will not, by themselves, lead to political stability and
effective and efficient governance. Rather, there is also a need to link institutional
changes at the top to changes in political culture on the ground, and an enhancement of
the masses’ understanding of the democratic process and the role that parties play in it.
This is important because Solomon Island politicians are influenced not only by the
statutes that regulate parties, but by the local political cultures and the demands that
constituents place on them. Such societal changes will require mass education that
depends on the improvement of the standard and accessibility of education and the
development of mass-media communications. 
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Parties and governance in the Solomon Islands
Like other new democracies, Solomon Islands political parties are relatively new, and tend to
be small, organisationally thin, elite-based, highly personalised, and have few (if any) institu-
tional or ideological links to the electorate. Many parties are formed, or become active, only
before elections. After elections, most parties become quiescent or disappear completely
from the public arena. They function largely as institutions for recruiting candidates for
elections and for lobbying support for the formation of coalition governments and
maintaining power, and only second as vehicles for the electoral mobilisation of the masses,
or for structuring issues, aggregating, representing and articulating diverse interests, and
translating diverse public views into coherent public policies, for waging election campaigns,
forming and maintaining stable governments, and implementing policies. Many politicians,
in fact, declare their membership to a party after rather than before elections. 
There are a number of factors that influence the nature and development of parties
in the Solomon Islands and their participation in the political process. First, (as stated
above) parties are relatively new in the Solomon Islands and are still in their early evolu-
tionary stage. The first ‘political party’ — or, what closely resembled one — was formed
as recently as 1965. This development was associated with the Solomon Islands’ political
transformations to self-government, the introduction of elections and the inclusion of
indigenous Solomon Islanders in the political process. Sam Alasia provides an elaborate
account of the historical development of parties and how the introduction of elections
and the involvement of Solomon Islanders led to the emergence of parties.6 In 1960, the
Legislative Council was established to replace the former Advisory Council that had been
set up to advise the High Commissioner, who was the British colonial representative in
the country. The Legislative Council consisted of 21 members, six of whom were indige-
nous Solomon Islanders. Two of the Solomon Islanders were included in the
eight-member Executive Council. This was the first time that Solomon Islanders partici-
pated in the Colonial Government as policy-makers. In 1964, the first direct election was
introduced in Honiara to select a representative for the Legislative Council. Eric Lawson,
an expatriate, emerged as winner, and, in early 1965, in an attempt to lobby support to
form a government (the Executive), Lawson and the member for North Malaita,
Mariano Kelesi, formed the Democratic Party (DP). The party revolved around Lawson
and Kelesi, did not have a formal institutional set up and relevance beyond the
Legislative Council and was used primarily as an attempt to lobby for support in forming
a government. After the election of the Executive, the party ceased to exist because the
purpose for which it was set up had been achieved. 
After the 1967 election, however, Bill Ramsay, the man who replaced Lawson as
Member for Honiara, teamed up with David Kausimae, the Member for South Malaita,
and formed the Solomon Islands United National Party (SIUNP). Again, the function of
the party was primarily to lobby support for the formation of government. It was not
formally registered — because there were no statutory requirements for it to do so —
and, like the previous Democratic Party, it had no organisational structure beyond the
Legislative Council. 
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In 1973, the structure of government was further transformed when the High
Commissioner became Governor with only nominal power. The Executive power was
given to the newly established position of Chief Minister. In preparation for the 1973
general elections, two parties were formed: the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), led by
Solomon Mamaloni, and the United Solomon Islands Party (USIPA), led by Benedict
Kinika. After that election, no party had a clear majority and the two new parties had to
lobby for support from the independent members, led by Willie Betu, to form a coalition
government. Mamaloni was subsequently elected the country’s first Chief Minister, leading
a coalition government that consisted of the PPP and some independent members.
In January 1976, the Solomon Islands achieved self-government and in July that
year the last election of the colonial era was held. The two parties — PP and USIPA —
had disintegrated before the election and their members stood as independents. A new
party emerged when a recent graduate from the University of PNG (UPNG), and Union
leader, Bartholomew Ulufa’alu, formed the National Democratic Party (NADEPA). The
new party won eight of the 38 seats in the House and was able to act as the parliamentary
powerbroker. On July 14, 1976, Peter Kenilorea, then a relative newcomer to politics,
was elected as Chief Minister and led the country to independence. Ulufa’alu became the
Leader of Opposition, with his NADEPA members and some independents.7
Independent Members of Parliament have played crucial roles in Solomon Islands
politics. In most instances, they have held the balance of power in coalition governments,
and have, in some cases, caused the collapse of governments by withdrawing their
support. Independent members provide an interesting insight into the nature of
Solomon Islands (and Melanesian) politics where allegiance is given to individuals rather
than to parties. These independent members are attracted to and support individuals (big
men) whom they see as having the potential to assert their interests and those of their
constituents. They could withdraw their support when they see that another big man
could promote their interests much better. In preparation for the 1980 general elections,
for example, the Kausimae-led USIPA merged with the Mamaloni-led PPP and formed
the new PAP. Kenilorea formed the Solomon Islands United Party (SIUP). The SIUP
won 16 seats, the PAP 10, NADEPA two, and the independents 10. The independents
and NADEPA held the balance of power and a coalition was inevitable. The SIUP
attracted some independent members and formed the Government, and Kenilorea was
subsequently elected as Prime Minister. To strengthen the Coalition, the leader of the
independents, Francis Billy Hilly, was selected as Deputy Prime Minister. Mamaloni
became Leader of the Opposition.8
In these situations, the ability to form coalitions depends on the individual big
man, rather than on party policies or ideologies.9 In this case, Kenilorea was perceived as
a much better choice, however, Kenilorea’s Government did not stay in power for long.
In August 1981, after only 14 months, the Coalition collapsed. Differences between
leaders saw the withdrawal of the independents’ support. They realigned themselves with
the Opposition and Mamaloni took over as Prime Minister, forming a government that
consisted of the PAP, NADEPA and the independents. They stayed in power from 1981
to 1984. 
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Second, Solomon Islands political parties are largely elite-based. Bartholomew
Ulufa’alu, a former Prime Minister and veteran Solomon Islands politician, says that,
‘[t]he parties were divorced from the masses. The Solomon Islands elites were then [in the
early days of party development] paying more attention to trying to unseat their
colleagues, and looked for support upwards towards the colonial administration, rather
than outwards to the people.’10 Parties have not found a way to connect with the people.
This is partly because the parties are Honiara-based and oriented to middle-class Solomon
Islanders who live and work in Honiara. They do not have organisational links or
branches outside of the capital. 
Third, the absence of mass media communications makes it difficult to mobilise
rural constituents. The print media consists of only one daily newspaper (Solomon Star)
and one weekly newspaper (Solomons Express), which are circulated primarily in Honiara
and provincial towns such as Auki, Gizo, Lata and Buala. There is only one radio station
— the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC) — that broadcasts nation-
wide. Apart from this there are three FM radio stations that broadcast only in Honiara.
There is no local TV, although the Telekom relays the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) TV programs to Honiara
residences. Communications and transportation are also made difficult by the dispersed
nature of the country’s geography.
Parties’ abilities to reach the population are also limited by the fact that most do not
have the financial (and other) resources to undertake public relations campaigns. After
the 1980 general elections, NADEPA attempted to expand its power base beyond the
union movement to the rural areas by campaigning nationwide. Its popularity, however,
was affected by widespread misconceptions that it was a ‘communist’ party,11 and its
ability to reach out was limited by the lack of resources and the absence of a decentralised
organisational structure. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, many small, thinly organized and highly person-
alised parties emerged. These affected the ability of parties to establish support among
the masses. Just before the 1984 election, for example, a new party, the Solomone Ago
Sagefenua (SAS), was formed, increasing the number of parties competing in the election
to four: United Party (UP), PAP, NADEPA, SAS and the independents. 
In the 1989 general elections, the number of parties participating in the elections
further increased to six: PAP, UP, SAS, NADEPA (which had changed its name to the
Liberal Party), plus two new parties — the Nationalist Front for Progress (NFP), led by
Andrew Nori, and the Labor Party, led by Joses Tuhanuku. 
Most of these parties revolve around particular individuals, rather than certain
political ideologies. The UP, for example, was organised around Kenilorea, while PAP
was organised around Mamaloni, NADEPA around Ulufa’alu, NFP around Nori, and
the Labor Party around Joses Tuhanuku. There was no attempt to establish organisational
structures that would detach the parties from these individuals.
The 1989 election saw for the first time the emergence of one party, PAP, as the
winner of the majority of seats in Parliament. The party’s parliamentary leader,
Mamaloni, was subsequently elected as Prime Minister. Steeves attributes this to voters’
choice: ‘Solomon Islands voters opted for dramatic change, selecting the PAP partly on
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the basis of its emphasis of its established leadership, including former PM Solomon
Mamaloni.’12 I think, however, that PAP’s emergence as the majority party had little to
do with voters’ choice. Rather, it was more to do with the ability of the PAP leadership to
persuade elected Members of Parliament to join the party. Many of those who joined did
not have party affiliations during the election and only declared their membership to
PAP after. It was, therefore, a result of the political ingenuity of PAP leaders more than
the ability of the party to persuade voters. Yet, PAP’s parliamentary dominance was only
short-lived: in October 1990, barely a year into its term in office, the party’s hold on
government disintegrated during a no-confidence motion before the party’s national
executive, seeking Mamaloni’s removal as PAP’s parliamentary leader. For the first time, a
party showed enough internal organisation to challenge its own parliamentary leader.
Mamaloni was being challenged from within his own party rather than on the floor of
Parliament. Steeves describes what happened: 
The bonds of party unity, loyalty, and discipline were fractured for all to see. In a
dramatic and bold stroke, Mamaloni headed off the challenge by resigning from the
party and, using his power as prime minister, forming a ‘Government of National
Unity and Reconciliation’ (GNUR). Mamaloni displaced five members from his
cabinet including Deputy Prime Minister, Danny Philip, to make room in the minis-
terial ranks to build a new governing coalition.13
In the 1993 election, the number of parties that competed increased to eight: the PAP,
GNUR, UP, NFP, National Action Party of Solomon Islands (NAPSI), the Liberal Party
(formerly NADEPA), the Christian Leadership and Fellowship Group, and the Solomon
Islands Labor Party. The number of independent members was still significant and, after
the election, an independent, Francis Billy Hilly, was elected as Prime Minister, leading a
fragile collection of parties that formed the Coalition Government, referred to as the
National Coalition Partnership (NCP) Government. By the beginning of October 1994,
however, six Members of Parliament, including five ministers, had left the NCP
Government. In an attempt to stay in power while lobbying for support, and because of
fears that he might be voted out in a motion of no confidence, Hilly did not convene
Parliament. In October 1994, however, the then Governor-General, Moses Pitakaka,
convinced that Hilly no longer had the majority to rule, sacked him. In November 1994,
Parliament convened and elected Mamaloni as Prime Minister.14
The 1997 elections saw Ulufa’alu elected Prime Minister on August 27, leading a
coalition that called itself the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (SIAC) Government.
Ulufa’alu’s Government was shaken in mid-1998 with the defection of six MPs to the
Opposition after the dismissal of the Minister of Finance, Manasseh Sogavare, in July.
For the next two months, the Opposition, which now claimed to have a majority, pushed
for the convening of a special parliamentary session in order to introduce a vote of no
confidence in Ulufa’alu’s Government. The vote on September 18, 1998, resulted in a
tie, which, under parliamentary standing orders, meant that the motion was defeated and
Ulufa’alu narrowly survived. His SIAC Government’s term in office was, however, short-
lived, and he was ousted in a coup in 2000 after civil unrest on Guadalcanal. 
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Party fluidity
Parties in the Solomon Islands are very fluid and lack the organisational structures needed
to establish mass support and maintain stable governments. Steeves provides an elaborate
discussion of how the fluidity of parties has affected the nature of governance in the
Solomon Islands. Since independence, the country has predominantly had (except for a
brief period after the 1989 election) coalition governments that are generally unstable.
Politicians, because of their general lack of allegiance to political parties, tend to move from
one party to another causing an unstable political situation. Nearly every government since
independence has not served its full term in office, having been voted out in motions of no
confidence, or realignments causing a Prime Minister to alter his political affiliations in
order to continue in office. As discussed above, a case in point is when, in 1990, after the
resignation of his ministers, Mamaloni resigned from his PAP, pulled in members from
other political parties and continued as Prime Minister leading the GNUR.15
This is what Steeves referred to as ‘unbounded politics’. As a result, there is no
cohesion of the Cabinet or government regarding consensus, and little interest in policy-
making. This is because, in most cases, coalition governments are formed, posing
problems in agreeing on policy within the Cabinet and insecure parliamentary majorities
have made it difficult to steer legislation through the Legislature.
But, politicians’ political behaviour and the nature of their alliance to parties are
also influenced by the national and local political culture. Politicians are motivated
predominantly by local issues and the enhancement of cliental relationships that might
have little to do with parties and party policies. Much of what influences national politics
— including party politics — in the Solomon Islands are often local and parochial issues.
As Steeves notes, ‘elected members have to cultivate their community bases of support
very carefully’,16 because they depend on that to get into and stay in Parliament. To gain
community support, a Member of Parliament does not necessarily have to join a party.
Rather, he simply needs to build cliental relationships with big men in his constituency
and be perceived to be serving the community’s interests. 
The country’s ethnic and cultural diversity and lack of developed mass media
compound the problem further, making it difficult to develop common ideologies that
would sustain parties with a large popular base. This could, however, change as citizens
identify more with a common nationality and parties become more organised and are
able to use the mass media to construct and disseminate common ideologies, or at least,
inform electorates about how they would address issues of common concern.
Because parties are organisationally thin, and because candidates are influenced
largely by local (rather than national) issues, governments will continue to be built on
coalitions rather than single parties. While this might be perceived as a drawback for the
political stability necessary to implement development programs,17 it has also ensured
that no party or individual has become hegemonic or has monopolised power enough to
use the State to enhance particular interests and suppress others. This, however, also
means that effective and efficient governance is compromised because politicians are
often preoccupied with trying to stay in power, rather than with governing. 
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Engineering party developments in the Solomon Islands
To alleviate the problems of political instability (as discussed above) and improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of governments, the Solomon Islands could follow the
examples of other countries and politically engineer the development of parties. This
could be done by providing statutory mechanisms that would ensure that parties take
root, are mass based, have loyal membership and play a better role in structuring issues,
aggregating and representing diverse interests and translating diverse public views into
coherent public policies. 
At present, the Solomon Islands has no statutory mechanism for the establishment,
operation and development of parties. The country’s national Constitution makes only
brief reference to parties, under the provision on the protection of freedom of assembly
and association. It states that 
Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his
freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and
associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to political parties or to
form or belong to trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests.18
While this provides for the freedom to form or belong to parties, it does not provide for
the operation and development of parties. Nor does it dictate how parties should partici-
pate in the political process. Further, there are no statutory mechanisms that address
specific issues such as the definition of political parties (what constitutes a political
party?), what qualifies them to register as parties, how members should be disciplined if
they change party allegiance after being elected, how parties should participate in the
electoral process, how to ensure that there is a shift from elite-based to mass-based
parties, and how to strengthen the internal organisation of parties. 
Those parties that have been registered are incorporated as charitable trusts under
the Charitable Trusts Act (Cap. 55). While this enables them to exist and operate as legal
entities, it does not provide the kinds of guidelines as outlined above. Parties, therefore,
continue to exist and operate in largely the same undisciplined manner as they have since
they first came into being in the late 1960s.
The suggestion for the establishment of statutory mechanisms to regulate parties is
not new in the Solomon Islands. Many politicians and citizens have expressed similar
ideas, although none has provided an elaborate outline of the kinds of political and insti-
tutional framework that should be put in place. The Prime Minister, Allan Kemakeza, for
example, said that unless there was legislation to prohibit Members of Parliament from
switching political alliances, the Solomon Islands would continue to be politically
unstable.19 Kemakeza, however, did not elaborate on what exactly such a piece of legisla-
tion would address. It is here that the Solomon Islands could consider, draw on and learn
from the experiences of other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, as outlined by Ben
Reilly. The Solomon Islands could introduce statutory mechanisms similar to those that
Fiji, PNG, Thailand and Indonesia have done in an attempt to create stable, effective and
efficient governments. 
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In politically engineering the development of parties, there are a number of issues
that need to be considered. First, while statutory mechanisms for prohibiting ‘party-
hopping’ and regulating party developments within Parliament might produce relatively
stable parties, it would not necessarily address the fragility of coalition governments that
dominate Solomon Islands’ political landscape. PNG, for example, having introduced
the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPC), now has to
come to terms with the fragility of coalition governments. This is complicated by the
existence of independent Members of Parliament who have no party affiliations and can
join a coalition to serve particular interests. In the Solomon Islands (as in PNG),
independent members have, in the past, contributed to the instability of coalition
governments by shifting their support from one group to another. While the rights of
Members of Parliament to represent their constituencies in any way they want is recog-
nised, this is an issue the Solomon Islands must address in any political engineering
endeavour. As PNG scholar Henry Okole states, 
there is now ground to fear that Independent candidacy would be greatly abused in
the next general election. Something needs to be done before 2007 to address this
constitutional right with a view of protecting it. But, at the same time, the integrity of
Parliament should not be compromised by free-floating MPs with devious tactics.
Independents can unnecessarily sink or change a coalition formation by altering
numbers on both sides of Parliament.20
Hence, any institutional or political engineering of parties must address the stability of
coalitions. Nearly every Solomon Islands government since independence — except for a
brief period of PAP rule after the 1989 elections — has been based on coalitions. This is
likely to continue given the unlikelihood of a single party gaining power through
elections. It is, therefore, pertinent that discussions of party development must also
involve discussion about how to strengthen coalitions. 
Second, in discussing the engineering of party developments in the Solomon
Islands, it is important to note that while prohibiting elected members from ‘party-
hopping’ might positively influence the political behaviour of individual members, it
would not necessarily change the internal organisation of parties. How parties are institu-
tionally organised is vital to their development and their ability to attract and maintain
mass support as well as the ability to capture and manage power. All the parties in the
Solomon Islands, as mentioned above, are thinly organised and often have only nominal
existence outside Parliament. The only exception is the PAP, which is the only party that
has consciously maintained an organisational structure outside Parliament. Its relative
success in the 2001 election (and in leading the current coalition) was attributable to its
institutional development. 
In Indonesia, Thailand and PNG, there are statutory regulations that require parties
to demonstrate a certain level of institutional development before they can participate in
elections. In PNG, for example, parties are required to lodge an application for registra-
tion to the Registry of Political Parties, the body that approves the registration of parties.
This is part of an attempt to force parties to develop institutional structures and to
reduce the number of parties. 
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Fiji, despite changes to the electoral system, does not have such a regulation and
this has led to the mushrooming of many small and thinly organised parties that have
little (if any) capacity of attracting mass-based support, and gaining and maintaining
political power. Even parties such as the Alliance and NFP, which formerly had mass
support among indigenous and Indo-Fijian voters respectively, virtually disintegrated in
the late 1990s. The Fiji Labour Party has also broken up into two parties: the Fiji Labour
Party and the New Labour Unity Party (NLUP), led by Tupeni Baba. This is partly
because the 1997 Constitution, while addressing the stability of parties within
Parliament, does not dictate how parties are organised and registered outside Parliament. 
The Solomon Islands, therefore, might consider putting in place regulatory frame-
works that guide the institutional development of parties. This could prevent the
mushrooming of many small and thinly organised parties at election times. 
Third, parties could also be strengthened through electoral reforms. A form of
alternative voting system could be adopted to help strengthen the presence of parties in
different parts of the country and force voters to vote along party lines. Fiji’s case
shows, however, that such changes in the electoral system do not always produce the
desired outcome. 
Fourth, in attempting to engineer the development of parties, it must be noted that
such development and the effective and efficient participation of parties in the gover-
nance process cannot be addressed simply by changing statutory frameworks from above.
While that is important, we must also note that parties are influenced by the political
cultures of the societies in which they operate. Voters’ perceptions of the role of parties
and the nature of their relationship to Members of Parliament also influence how parties
are organised and how politicians relate to parties. Okole notes that in PNG (as in the
Solomon Islands) citizens often view the State as a bottomless reservoir of resources and
Members of Parliament as ‘literal deliverers of anything and at any cost’. This, in turn,
dictates how Members of Parliament relate to and use their parties. Similarly, Standish, in
discussing the introduction of OLIPPC in PNG, states, ‘Observers and advisers on these
remain sceptical of political engineering, the notion that the country’s entrenched polit-
ical culture of localized and personalized campaigning and fluid party allegiances can be
changed from above — in effect, by constitutional fiat.’21 Ron May, a senior ANU
academic, also states that in PNG clan-based voting will not be easily changed by polit-
ical engineering at the top.22
For parties to function well there is a need to educate citizens about the role of
parties and their importance in representative democracy. The development of parties,
therefore, depends not only on changes in the party structures, but on parallel improve-
ment in citizens’ awareness about parties. As Okole notes, in respect to PNG, there is a
need for transformation among the electorates and parliamentary members. This is a
long-term issue that will depend on the improvement of the country’s formal education
system, as well as development in institutions such as mass-media communications. As
stated above, the Solomon Islands media is still underdeveloped, making it difficult for
parties to reach out to the population. The development of parties in the Solomon
Islands will go hand-in-hand with the development of the mass media. This is vital, not
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only for the purposes of campaigning, but in educating the public (and hopefully
changing political culture). 
Civil unrest, federalism and political parties
There are two recent events in the Solomon Islands that have important implications for
the development of parties. The first was the civil unrest that started on the island of
Guadalcanal in late 1998 and resulted in an Australian-led Pacific Islands Forum regional
intervention force called the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
(RAMSI).23 The civil unrest was described widely by the media and international
commentators as an ‘ethnic conflict’ between the peoples of Malaita and Guadalcanal,
because much of the overt violence was between some people from these two islands. 
It is interesting, however, that despite the ethnic nature of the conflict, political
parties did not become ethnically based. This is unlike the case of Fiji, where parties are
generally ethnic-based. It was this (plus the coups of 1987) that led to the introduction of
statutory changes, such as the 1997 constitutional reform, that aimed to facilitate the
development of multi-party governments. Despite this, parties continued to be founded,
and draw support from, the two major ethnic groups — the indigenous Fijian and Indo-
Fijian. 
In the Solomon Islands, however, the civil unrest did not engender the develop-
ment of ethnic- or island- or provincial-based parties. Instead, many of the parties
continued to revolve around individual big men or Members of Parliament. Parties such
as the PAP, which have established formal structures, continue to maintain a multi-ethnic
and multi-provincial base.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, the country’s enormous ethnic and
linguistic diversity24 makes it difficult for any particular island or ethnic group to capture
and maintain political power. Unlike Fiji, where there are two major ethnic groups that
can be mobilised to compete for political control, Solomon Islands’ ethnic heterogeneity
makes it difficult for one or two groups to become dominant. 
Second, the civil unrest was primarily between some Guadalcanal and Malaita
people, and any parties that are based in these two provinces would not have been able to
capture power because collectively they have only 22 Members of Parliament — 14 for
Malaita and eight for Guadalcanal — in a 50-member House. Hence, individually, they
would not have the numbers to capture power, and it is unlikely that provincial-based
parties would be able to attract support from other provinces. 
Third, despite the seemingly ethnic nature of the civil unrest, there was widespread
recognition, at the community and national parliamentary levels, that the causes of the
civil unrest lay in broader socioeconomic and political issues that transcended provincial
and ethnic interests. Hence, it could be addressed through collective bipartisan efforts.
This is not to say that partisan provincial interests could not be articulated. Of course
they could, and this is manifested in the development of social movements such as the
Malaita Ma’asina Forum, formed in 2004 with the objective of mobilising Malaitans to
develop their province. It is, however, unlikely that such social movements will develop
into parties that attempt to capture political power at the national level. This is especially
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so if the proposed Constitution is adopted. This is because the proposed Federal
Constitution states that ‘A political party is not eligible for registration if that party is
founded purely on religious, linguistic, racial, ethnic, corporatist basis or seeks to engage
in propaganda based on those matters.’25
Fourth, because parliamentarians tend to gravitate around individuals rather than
parties and their policies, it is likely that they will form and maintain parties around
individuals rather than ethnic or provincial groups. With individuals, politicians have the
freedom to move around and take advantage of the power play more than they would
under a provincial-based party.
Although individually each of the above reasons might not have been sufficient to
prevent the formation of ethnic or provincial-based parties, collectively they made such
parties less attractive as vehicles for capturing and maintaining political power.
The second issue that has important implications for the development of parties in
the Solomon Islands is the proposal to change Solomon Islands’ system of government
from the current unitary system to a federal system.26 Federalism offers a more decen-
tralised system, which raises three important questions: would parties contest federal and
state elections? Would federalism see the emergence of state-based parties? If that
happens, would that result in political divisions along island and ethnic groups? 
The framework for the proposed federal system is provided for in the draft Federal
Constitution that is yet to pass through the National Parliament. Unlike the present
Constitution, the draft has a specific provision (Chapter Twenty, Part II, Sections
218–23) that addresses political parties in some detail. It provides for, not only the right
to form parties, but guidelines on registration and party discipline. A major provision is
that ‘A member of Parliament who resigns from the political party that sponsored the
member’s election or leaves the political party to join another or remains in Parliament as
an independent loses his or her seat.’ This is similar to the provisions of the 1997 Fiji
Constitution. 
It seems that under a federal system, while there will be parties that will compete at
the federal and state levels, there will be others that will be state-based. It is unlikely that
one or two parties will become dominant in the way that the Labor and Liberal Parties
have been able to do in Australia, or the Democrats and the Republicans in the US.
Whether the emergence of state-based parties will lead to disunity is difficult to say. I
suspect, however, that because of the increasing economic interdependence of the
provinces (or states-to-be), the existence of state-based parties will not necessarily lead to
disunity at the national level. 
Conclusion
The development of political parties is vital to advancing stable, effective and efficient
government in the Solomon Islands, as well as in other Melanesian countries. Parties play
an important role in representative democracy and are central to effective parliamentary
governance. This could be done by introducing statutory mechanisms that could regulate
the development of party institutions and the nature of their participation in the political
process. Several strategies have been employed in the Asia-Pacific region in an attempt to
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engineer the development of parties, and the Solomon Islands could learn from their
experiences. 
One thing is obvious: statutory reforms (the top-down approach) cannot, by
themselves, produce desired changes at the bottom. The introduction of statutory regula-
tions must accompany awareness programs that will inform citizens of the importance of
parties and their role in representative democracy. This means that in attempting to
engineer the development of parties we must also be aware of the nature of political
culture in the Solomon Islands. This will help us understand the factors that influence
the behaviour of politicians and voters, who are both important in the success of parties.
Any statutory reform must take into consideration the impact of political culture on
party institutions.
It is also important to note that parties will take time to develop in the Solomon
Islands. Political engineering could establish the frameworks for party developments. It
will, however, take many more years for parties to take root and become part of citizens’
political psyche. That will depend on the improvement of political education and mass-
media communications. 
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This chapter details the origins of Vanuatu’s political parties, their policy platforms,
parliamentary representation and core constituents, including the particular linguistic,
regional and religious biases of each party. In so doing, it charts the progressive fragmen-
tation of Vanuatu’s political parties since the late 1980s. At independence in 1980, party
politics were polarised largely between the monolithic anglophone Vanua’aku Pati (VP)
and an alliance of predominantly francophone opposition groups, the Union of
Moderate Parties (UMP). For almost a decade, the VP dominated the Parliament,
commanding a nearly two-thirds majority. After 1988, the VP splintered into progres-
sively smaller factions. The subsequent fragmentation of the UMP has created a
Parliament of shifting alliances and unstable coalitions. Encouraged by the peculiar polit-
ical culture of Vanuatu — in which the electoral system and the society in which it
operates present few disincentives for factionalisation — this has led to endemic political
instability, which has weakened the law-making and oversight functions of Vanuatu’s
Parliament and made marshalling the numbers to form government the principal task of
parliamentary parties. Across the spectrum of Vanuatu’s political parties, policy variations
have narrowed as the pragmatic considerations of establishing allegiances have brought
about the erosion of the distinct party platforms developed during the 1970s. National
politicians in Vanuatu now often appear motivated primarily by staying in power.2
This has created new challenges for Vanuatu’s MPs. Endemic political instability
precipitated the Comprehensive Reform Programme (CRP) and countering the conse-
quences of political instability has been the intention of several programs undertaken
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under the auspices of the CRP. The growing number of foreign advisers undertaking core
tasks of the CRP has reignited the issue of Vanuatu’s sovereignty and, consequently,
support — or otherwise — for the reform agenda has become a major point of differen-
tiation between Vanuatu’s political parties. 
Drawing these issues together, this chapter examines the coherence of contempo-
rary political groupings, the fragility of government coalitions, the impetuses for party
fragmentation, and makes comment on the long-term viability of Vanuatu’s current set
of parliamentary parties. It includes a review of parliamentary numbers since 1980 and it
will provide a prognosis of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system in
which they operate.
Background
Geographically, the Republic of Vanuatu comprises an archipelago of about 80 islands
and reefs, some 70 of which are inhabited. At the time of the 1999 census, its population
was 186,678, with almost 80 per cent of that number residing in the rural areas of Torba,
Sanma, Penama, Malampa, Shefa and Tafea Provinces.3 The urban population, however,
is expanding rapidly (4 per cent per annum), with more than twenty per cent of the
population now residing in Port Vila and Luganville.
Previously known as the New Hebrides, the republic, until 1980, was administered
jointly by France and Britain under the Anglo-French Condominium created in 1914,
bequeathing Vanuatu bifurcated educational, legal and administrative systems.4 At
independence, Vanuatu declared French, English and Bislama to be the official
languages. Given the strong colonial rivalries between the UK and France, the divisions
cleaved by colonialism were thought to have been replicated in the Melanesian societies
in the New Hebrides,5 and to have inflected the emergent political culture of the archi-
pelago, rendering political groups — somewhat unproblematically — as anglophone or
francophone.6 Such dichotomies simplify Vanuatu’s political landscape and sometimes
serve colonialist agendas, which subordinate local motivations in favour of colonial or
narrow nationalist purviews.7
The point is not to discredit the influence of the colonial powers on political mobil-
isation entirely, but to recognise the porous and shifting nature of political allegiances in
Vanuatu, to problematise ‘anglophone’ and ‘francophone’ as absolute political polarities.
Most of Vanuatu’s political parties share one of two common points of origin, emerging
either from the VP or the UMP, although former members of these parties might now be
unified in membership of one of Vanuatu’s newer parties. Given that the VP came to
support a one-language, anglophone education policy in the late 1970s and that much of
its elite emerged from Protestant, anglophone education, it has been characterised
accurately as an anglophone party. Included in the diverse camp of ‘francophone’ parties,
however, have been several arguably anglophone political groups, opposed ideologically
to the centralist, clergy-led nationalists of the VP. Natatok Efate, one such group, was the
VP’s main opponent on Efate in the inaugural national elections in 1979. The party
fielded only anglophone candidates, yet derived much of its electoral support from
francophone-dominated areas on the outskirts of Vila, particularly Montmartre and
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Figure 7.1: Vanuatu: SNTV multi-member constituencies
 
Erakor.8 Ideologically, Natatok Efate was closer to the Modérés than to the VP. The sweep
of French and British influence in Vanuatu should not be underdrawn. Given that the
French Administration appeared determined to thwart independence and actively
fomented rebellion, most opponents of the nationalist VP have been implicated in the
rebellion in one way or another.9 The perceived intervention of French colonial officers,
in particular, raised the ire of the nationalist VP, souring relationships between France
and Vanuatu after independence and unfairly tarring all francophone ni-Vanuatu with
the brush of sedition.10 The rebellion — and, to a lesser degree, the polarised political
landscape — was more than simply a French and francophone plot. Nagriamel, for
example, was multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-denominational in composition, its
eventual cooptation to French and other agenda notwithstanding. Today, anglophone,
Protestant communities in Ambae, Pentecost and Maewo support the UMP electorally
because of shared histories of involvement in the Nagriamel movement. Beneath the
veneer of the candidates and sitting members, it is much harder to delineate clearly
between anglophone and francophone camps.
What unified the UMP was its opposition to the VP’s rigid centralism. Indeed,
despite accepting some level of decentralisation into their platform in the late 1970s (largely
at the urging of French Minister for Overseas Territories [DOMTOM], Paul Dijoud11),
the VP was opposed to incorporating it fully on the grounds that it would make legitimate
the agendas of their federalist and secessionist political opponents. Although the VP
platform incorporated some level of decentralisation, in practice its policies were geared
towards strengthening the central authority of government and party apparatuses. The
UMP, in comparison, favoured greater regional autonomy, a policy born out of its
fragmented origins, and one that most of its breakaway factions have inherited. For the
first decade after independence, therefore, it would be equally meaningful to delineate
Vanuatu’s political blocs into federalist and centralist camps, in addition to the basic
francophone/anglophone divide, recognising also the slippages between these groupings.
The next section provides an overview of past and present parliamentary parties in
Vanuatu. Each entry offers historical data on party origins and the particular regional and
linguistic affiliations of each group. Where available, the distinct platforms and party
structures of the parties are also depicted.
The Vanua’aku Pati (VP), established in 1977 (1971)
Vanuatu’s first orthodox political party, the Vanua’aku Pati is also its most successful,
having governed for nearly 15 of the past 24 years. Originally named the New Hebrides
National Party (NHNP), it was formed in Santo in 1971 by members of the Anglican
and Presbyterian clergy, junior British Administration bureaucrats and teachers.12 In
1977, in line with its nationalist agenda, the NHNP was renamed the Vanua’aku Pati
(Our Land Party). Father Walter Lini, a Melanesian Mission priest based in Longana,
east Ambae, and teachers Peter Taurokoto and Donald Kalpokas, both Presbyterians,
constituted the party’s core leadership group.
After its formation, the party pressed for the rapid decolonisation of the New
Hebrides through a concerted program of demonstrations and political agitation.13
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While NHNP leaders often appeared impatient with the colonial powers, they were
broadly supportive of the institutions of state; their major grievances with the
Condominium stemmed from disagreements over the timetable for decolonisation.
Like nationalist parties elsewhere in the decolonising world, the VP was determined to
maintain the territorial integrity of the New Hebrides, post-colony, despite the
emergence of federalist movements in the southern and northern islands in the 1970s,
fomented largely by foreign agents.14 When the VP won the 1979 national elections,
fought over the issue of independence and who would lead the New Hebrides after-
wards, these groups attempted open secession. With support from PNG, Australia and
New Zealand, the Lini Administration suppressed the rebellion.15 Because many French
colons supported the revolts and because the French Metropolitan Government and
Colonial Administration were seen to be complicit in the rebellion’s planning, the VP
adopted an anti-French stance in the early 1980s, culminating in the expulsion of the
French Ambassador.16
Integral to the VP’s original platform was the return of alienated land, the develop-
ment of Vanuatu and respect for kastom. Initially, this was conceived under the rubric of
‘Melanesian socialism’, derived in part from the writings of African nationalists Julius
Nyerere (Tanzania) and Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), but sharing much with the emerging
discourse on ‘the Melanesian Way’ articulated most clearly by Bernard Narakobi.17 Its
foreign policy was based on its membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and
involved advocacy for the decolonisation of the remaining Melanesian colonies (West
Papua and New Caledonia) and a rejection of Cold War alliances. In practice, this policy
allowed it to play off one foreign power against another. In the decade after independ-
ence, Australian policy-makers perceived in the growth of relations between Vanuatu,
Cuba, Libya and the Soviet Union serious threats to ANZUS policy imperatives in the
South-West Pacific, which prompted periodic increases in Australian aid budgets to
Vanuatu.18 Such concerns subsided with the ending of the Cold War. Ever since, VP has
gravitated towards centrism.
Like most of Vanuatu’s parties, the VP still places a high emphasis on nationalism,
the maintenance of traditional culture, customs and national sovereignty. It is the only
party with detailed provisions for the empowerment of women built into its party
platform.19 In recent years, recognising Vanuatu’s dependency on foreign aid and precip-
itated by endemic political instability, the VP has become the party of institutional
reform, supporting the Asian Development Bank-sponsored CRP. In 2002, this became
fixed in the party platform: growing the economy and strengthening public administra-
tion.20 In light of attacks from within the party membership on the CRP as an
instrument of foreign domination, VP leaders have proposed a much shorter list of
achievable reform priorities and have posited a much greater emphasis on grassroots
support.21
Parallel with the increasing emphasis on reform was growing disenchantment
within the party about its direction and policies. The aspirations of a generation of
younger MPs have created splits within the party. Tension culminated in the early
months of 2004, when three senior Members of Parliament, including former Prime
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Minister Donald Kalpokas, formed a dissident group, termed the Vanua K Group by the
Vanuatu Electoral Commission to differentiate it from the other VP factions (see below).
Although their position within the party is yet to be determined by the deliberative
bodies of the VP, Vanua K members consider themselves to be core members of the VP
who maintain support from its rank and file. In terms of electoral returns, however, the
split allowed the defeat of senior VP candidates in heartland constituencies such as Tanna
and Tafea Outer Islands in the 2004 elections.
The VP is governed by the People’s Congress, constituted by delegates from
regional subcommittees, island delegates (where there are no subcommittees), members
of the commissars’ council and members of the National Executive Council.
Administrative functions are determined by the Central Administrative Council, which
includes the major office-bearers of the party (president, treasurer, secretary et al.),
women’s and young people’s delegates, provincial and municipal councillors and other
members as determined by the People’s Congress. 
The separation between the parliamentary, executive and administrative wings of
the party has eroded in recent years. The basic party functionaries are the Commissars
(Komisa), who are elected by regional subcommittees for two-year terms and who
must be residents of the area they represent. Commissars are responsible for long-term
party planning.
The Union of Moderate Parties (UMP), established in 1981 (1973)
The Union of Moderate Parties began its existence at independence as an amalgam of
groups opposed to the majority VP. Principal among its constituent groups were the
urban Union Communautes des Nouvelles Hebrides (UCNH) and the Mouvement
Autonomiste des Nouvelles-Hebrides (MANH), both formed in 1973. The party also
attracted support from the Tan Union on Pentecost, Namangki Aute from Malakula,
former Nagriamel supporters in Santo, Pentecost, Ambae and Maewo, and from Jon
Frum and other social movements in Tanna and the southern islands. Referred to before
independence as the Modérés, to distance themselves from the ‘young radicals’ in the VP,
the groups renamed themselves the UMP in 1981, arguably to distance themselves from
the stigma attached to the rebellion.22 The UMP draws electoral support from across
Vanuatu, concentrated in Sanma, Penama, Tafea and Shefa Provinces. Its support is
particularly pronounced in the urban constituencies of Port Vila and Luganville.
Central to the UMP’s policy platform is the fostering of economic activity in rural
areas through the maintenance of copra and kava prices at levels acceptable to farmers.
Under the leadership of Maxime Carlot Korman (1991–95), the UMP advocated the
private ownership of land, one of two parties to have done so (the other is Korman’s
current party, VRP). Currently, this policy has subsided in importance. The party is
currently led by Serge Vohor, MP for Santo Rural.
The principal deliberative body of the party is the national congress. Throughout
the 1990s, however, severe factional splits emerged within the party and the deliberations
of the congress became secondary to political brawling between factional leaders.
Decisions taken by the congress were subject to intensive judicial scrutiny.
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National United Party (NUP), established in 1991
Former Prime Minister Father Walter Lini and 21 dissident VP members founded the
National United Party in 1991, after Lini’s ouster from the presidency of the VP. Its
former president was Dinh Van Than, a naturalised Vietnamese citizen whose close
alliance with Lini precluded any rapprochement with the nationalist VP (who have long
considered Than an exploitative foreigner). The ouster of Than as president in favour of
Ham Lini, Walter Lini’s brother, allowed for its rapprochement with the VP. The party’s
strongholds are Penama and Torba in northern Vanuatu, but it has won seats in Tanna,
Luganville and Port Vila.
Like the VP, the NUP maintains a nationalist platform, seeking to ‘promote, to
preserve, to revive and to encourage Vanuatu Culture … and … [to encourage] a higher
standard of living and status for Ni-Vanuatu’.23 In recent years, it has campaigned against
the continuation of the CRP.
The NUP’s party structure is derived in large part from that of the VP, with party
authority emanating from the deliberative People’s Congress. Similarly, the Central
Administrative Council determines administrative functions.
People’s Democratic Party (PDP), established in 1994, ceased 1998
Four dissident members of the NUP formed the PDP in 1994 after they questioned the
influence of Dinh Van Than over party direction. Led by Pastor Sethy Regenvanu, the
MPs defied Lini to accept government positions after the NUP was expelled from a
UMP-led coalition government. Three out of the four PDP MPs were voted from office
in 1998. Onneyn Tahi, the fourth rebel MP, returned to the VP in 1997.24 He died in
a car crash on Ambae in the lead-up to the 1998 elections. The PDP no longer exists as
a parliamentary party.
Tan Union, established in 1977, ceased 2001
According to Vincent Boulekone, a founding member of the party, Tan Union was
formed in 1977 to provide an umbrella for all those groups opposed to the VP but
broadly supportive of independence.25 Unlike the VP, Tan Union advocated delayed
independence to allow for New Hebrides to develop more. New Hebrides’ second Chief
Minister, the late Père Gerard Leymang, was a Tan Union member. After the formation
of the UMP in 1981, Tan Union formally merged with the new party, with Vincent
Boulekone becoming its first president. 
Serge Vohor sacked Boulekone from the party in 2000, along with three other
senior MPs. The next year, the Tan Union formally merged with the Grin Pati (see
below).26 Boulekone did not contest the 2002 elections. Tan Union no longer exists as a
discreet parliamentary party.
Melanesian Progressive Party (MPP), established in 1988
The Melanesian Progressive Party was formed in 1988 after Barak Sope was expelled
from the VP and the National Parliament because of his role in inciting the Vila Land
Riots, sparked when the Government tried to dismantle the trust fund in which money
used to purchase Port Vila from its traditional landowners, including Sope’s home
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community Ifira, was held. Of all the parties, the MPP most closely follows the original
platform of the VP, advocating still for the decolonisation of West Papua and champi-
oning an autonomist foreign policy. In opposition, the MPP has campaigned against the
CRP as a vehicle of neo-colonialism and its members have openly attacked core projects
of the CRP and constitutional offices, such as the Ombudsman.27
MPP’s structure closely resembles that of the VP.
People’s Progressive Party (PPP), established in 2001
Sato Kilman, the former Deputy President of the Melanesian Progressive Party, formed
the People’s Progressive Party after a falling out with Barak Sope in 2001. Although its
headquarters are in Malakula, the party has fielded candidates in Torba and Tafea Outer
Islands electorates. The PPP emphasises the need for urgent agrarian reform and regional
development to encourage regional trade and commerce.28 It also stresses the need to
develop regional centres as hubs for economic activity.
People’s Action Party (PAP), established in 2001
Silas Hakwa, a long-standing VP supporter and former Attorney-General, formed the
PAP after his breakaway from the VP in 2001. Its major support base is west Ambae in
Penama Province.
Fren Melanesia Pati (FMP), established in 1975
Formerly known as Charlemagne, Fren Melanesia Pati was formed by Protestant
francophone Pisovuke Albert Ravutia in 1975.29 Its power base is in the northern
islands, particularly in southern Santo Rural constituency, Luganville, Malo/Aore and
Malakula. Ravutia was implicated in the rebellion in 1980 and served a term in prison
for his involvement.30 The party is one of the oldest minor parties and has traded well on
its small support base, and the popularity of its founder, winning seats in 1983–87 and
1991–2002.
Grin Pati (GP), established in 2000
Formed by the Tan Union’s Vincent Boulekone, Paul Telukluk and Père Gerard Leymang
in July 2000, the Grin Pati’s platform was initially to further sustainable development
with respect to custom and the environment, regional autonomy for each of Vanuatu’s
provinces and free enterprise and social welfare especially for elderly people and under-
privileged mothers. Currently, MP for Port Vila Urban, Hon. Moana Carcasses, leads
the GP. 
Although the party claims membership in the global green movement, in practice it
provides a parliamentary umbrella organisation for Ambrymese, Malakulan (Namangki
Aute) and Tannese (Jon Frum) social movements. While this is not antithetical to its
‘green’ policies, its environmental credentials have never been challenged.
The GP adheres to a strict delineation between elected members and party officials.
Serving MPs cannot hold offices within the party structure. Also included in the GP
structure are provisions for chiefs from the Malvatumauri (National Council of Chiefs)
to act as political appointees to government departments.
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Jon Frum (JF)
Until the mid-1990s a constituent of the UMP, the parliamentary wing of Jon Frum
constituted part of the Alliance for the Development of Vanuatu (ADV) and is now part
of the National Community Association (NCA). In the lead-up to independence,
members of the Jon Frum movement instigated an uprising in the southern islands,
which was suppressed by the British constabulary.31 In practice, JF MPs have been
enduring advocates of community development and religious freedom.32
Namangki Aute (NA), established in the 1970s
A breakaway faction of the MANH party, Namangki Aute was formed in the late 1970s
by Aimé Maléré and contested Vanuatu’s first election in November 1979. Principally a
Malakula-based party, NA constitutes part of the Alliance for the Development of
Vanuatu (ADV) and is a core group of the GP. Central to its party platform is the devel-
opment of Malakula as part of a confederation of provinces, a policy that dates to its early
resistance to the VP in the 1970s. Included in its policy platform are economic and
legislative decentralisation, including the development of urban zones in every province,
downsizing the Parliament from 52 to 39 seats (its original number), compulsory voting,
recognising the power of chiefs, reinvigorating agricultural cooperatives, alleviating the
Value Added Tax’s (VAT) effect on the people and recognising and protecting the role of
women in society (on the latter issue, the platform does not elaborate further).
Vanuatu Republican Party (VRP), established in 1998
Former Prime Minister Maxime Carlot Korman formed the Vanuatu Republican Party
in preparation for the 1998 elections after his toppling as leader of the UMP.33 Although
initially involving only Korman and his personal supporters, the party has since extended
its influence throughout the northern islands and now attracts strong electoral support in
Malampa Province, particularly Ambrym and Malakula. Although Korman is one of
Vanuatu’s longest-standing and most prominent ni-Vanuatu francophones, other
members of the party, such as Donna Brownie from Malekula, are anglophone. Korman
has been an enduring advocate of the private ownership of land
Nagriamel (NGM), established about 1967
Arguably Vanuatu’s first political party, the Nagriamel movement emerged on Espiritu
Santo in the mid-1960s in retaliation to the widespread alienation of ‘dark bush’ by
French ranchers. Very quickly after its formation, Nagriamel became the vehicle for
broad anti-colonial sentiments among local people in the northern New Hebrides and,
by the early 1970s, its leadership claimed 10-20,000 adherents spanning from Epi in the
central New Hebrides to the Banks and Torres Islands at the archipelago’s northerly
extension.34 From the 1960s until the rebellion in 1980, Nagriamel’s platform was anti-
state, anti-VP and anti-missionary. In the 1970s, the radical liberal ideology of the
Phoenix Foundation was incorporated into its ideology.35
Nagriamel’s influence emanates from Vanafo, north of Luganville, and extends into
several northern islands, particularly Pentecost and Ambae, but it is much reduced from
its peak in the early 1970s. Ostensibly, the chief ’s meeting house (nakamal) at Vanafo is
The Origins and Effects of Party Fragmentation in Vanuatu 125
           
Nagriamel’s supreme deliberative body. Its ideologies remain rooted in the expectation of
‘cargo’ arriving from America to emancipate the people. Despite its anti-statist ideologies,
Nagriamel has regularly fielded candidates in national elections. It last elected an MP —
its leader, Frankie Stephens — to Parliament in 1995. Stephens is the son of the founder
of Nagriamel, the late Jimmy Stephens.
Nevsem Nenparata, established in 2004
Nevsem Nenparata was first elected to Parliament in 2004, when Thomas Nentu won
the Tafea Outer Islands constituency. The party prioritises local development and
national unity and represents a local coalition between several of the federalist parties
mentioned above. In Erromangan language, nevsem nenparata means ‘to come together
in peace’.36 The party incorporates local supporters of the UMP, VRP, the Greens, MPP
and PPP, who have pooled their electoral resources. Much of the impetus to form the
party came from local chiefs who sought to end political infighting on Erromango and
who were dissatisfied with the existing party system and the lack of interaction between
MPs and their constituencies. In particular, the impetus for forming the party came from
the fear that the Government would potentially squander Erromomango’s natural
resources, including sandalwood, if there were no Erromangans in Parliament to protect
them. The party also benefited fortuitously from the factional split within the VP in the
Tafea Outer Island constituency.
Changing party numbers since 1980
Constituted by elections held in November 1979, Vanuatu’s first Parliament was
dominated by the VP, which commanded 26 of the 39 seats (see Table 7.1). Although the
VP is often credited with winning 26 seats, it in fact only won 25. Kalmer Vocor was
elected on the Natuitanno ticket, but voted with the Government consistently.
Natuitanno was eventually subsumed within the VP. Several members of the Modérés
elected to Parliament in the November 1979 elections never took their seats. Often
considered to have been the trigger for the formal declaration of the Santo and Tanna
rebellions, the 1979 elections augured a year of low-level violence, two attempted seces-
sions, the arrest of several MPs, the exile of some of that number and the killing of Jon
Frum MP for Tanna, Alexis Yolou. In the aftermath, the VP set about utilising its
absolute majority of the House to amend the Constitution and push through whatever
legislation it chose. 
In the 1983 elections, the VP’s majority fell to 24 seats. The VP maintained its
dominance of parliamentary proceedings during the second parliament (Table 7.2).
In the 1987 elections, which contested an expanded 46-seat house, the VP won 26
seats (Table 7.3). The UMP, however, consolidated its electoral support, increasing its vote
share and consequent representation in the House.37 In 1987, Walter Lini suffered a stroke
in the US. Increasingly under the influence of the Vietnamese-born businessman, Dinh
Van Than, Lini lost favour with his VP comrades — in particular, Secretary-General of the
VP, Barak Sope — who sought to marginalize him from the day-to-day operation of the
party. Several senior MPs, however, had misgivings about the advisability of Sope leading
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the parliamentary party. The VP was returned to power, but with a reduced majority. By
mid-1988, however, these tensions came to a head when the VP Minister of Lands decided
to dissolve the Luganville Land Corporation and Vila Urban Land Corporation
(VULCAN). The dissolution of the Luganville corporation passed with little protest but in
Vila, Barak Sope took the closure of VULCAN to be a reneging on the VP’s commitment
to customary landowners and an attack on his home community of Ifira (one of the tradi-
tional owners of Port Vila land) and on Sope’s personal prestige. Sope was eventually
demoted from the VP Cabinet. Rather than join the backbenches, he declared his intention
to mount a motion of no confidence in Lini, supported by the UMP and four dissident VP
members. However, without the support of Sope’s faction and with one VP member in the
Speaker’s chair, the Government had effectively lost control of the Parliament. Sope
mounted repeated attacks on Lini as an autocrat and on the VP as a cult of personality.
Trading on his public image as the father of independence, Lini resisted attempts to
wrest him of the party leadership and defected to form the NUP in 1991. Donald
Kalpokas replaced him as Prime Minister. In the aftermath of the consecutive splits, the
VP finally lost power in the 1991 elections. The NUP won 10 seats and formed govern-
ment with the Korman-led UMP. Barak Sope’s MPP absorbed the remainder of the VP’s
former vote pool and joined the Opposition bloc alongside the remnants of the VP.
Throughout the life of the Parliament constituted in 1991, tensions simmered within the
governing coalition and within the newly formed NUP. 
Several members were uncomfortable with the visible hand of Dinh Van Than in
NUP party direction and this erupted in 1993 into a public brawl between party
members about Than’s authority and Lini’s capacity to govern. NUP withdrew from the
Coalition Government in 1993. Monopolising on the split, the Korman Government
offered ministerial posts to the dissident NUP members, who entered government in
1994 as the People’s Democratic Party.
From the outset, the Parliament constituted in the 1995 elections was unstable (see
Table 7.4). Although the main parties each claimed that they would be able to constitute
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Fren Melanesia Pati 1
Total 39
           
government in their own right, the elections for the extended 50-seat Parliament resulted
in no clear majority. The party with the largest number of seats, the Unity Front, did not
form government, deferring that right to the next largest bloc, the UMP. The term of
Parliament was notable for the split that emerged within the UMP, with both factions
claiming to represent the party rank and file. The strength of the feud became clear after
the elections when the two UMP factions negotiated separately to form government.
One faction attempted to form government with the NUP. The other attempted to form
government with the Unity Front. The factional leaders of the UMP vied for the position
of Prime Minister. The ramifications were profound. The disintegration of the largest
party (UMP) within a Parliament in which no party could claim a majority in its own
right meant that even a minor shift in allegiance could — and did — effect a change in
government. Between 1995 and 1997, the Government changed three times via votes of
no confidence and there were eight major coalition changes.38 The period was notable
for the inactivity of government ministers: Minister of Finance, Barak Sope, failed to
table an Appropriation Bill for 1996–97. In 1996, frustrated by the failure of the
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Government to pay their salaries and allowances, the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF)
abducted the President to further their claims. In early 1997, government coffers were
empty, forcing the Vohor Government to accept the offer of a tied loan from the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), which paved the way for the CRP. In January 1998, disgrun-
tled former employees of the VNPF, supported by urban unemployed people, rioted after
an Ombudsman’s report implicated senior government officials in a preferential loans
deal. After three years of endemic political instability, Vanuatu appeared to be on the
brink of a serious breakdown of law and order.
Vanuatu underwent its sixth national election in March 1998 (see Table 7.5), in the
middle of the parliamentary term. Again, the size of Parliament was extended to 52 seats.
Called on the request of Prime Minister Serge Vohor in favour of facing a motion of no
confidence from within his own party, the elections resulted in a coalition government
between the VP and one of its breakaway factions, the National United Pati (NUP)
of Father Walter Lini. Running on a platform of government renewal and accountability,
the coalition sought to reverse the political fragmentation of the previous years.
It adopted, moreover, the rhetoric of institutional reform. Prime Minister Donald
Kalpokas stated:
The people of Vanuatu ... no longer trust the government ... to provide the services
that they need ... Investors and workers have lost confidence that it can implement its
policies to ensure that the economy grows and in the end raise the standards of living
of the people.39
While the VP/NUP Government raised hopes of a rapprochement between former
comrades, it was undermined eventually by the same problems of previous coalitions
governments — internal manoeuvring.
The implementation of the CRP dominated government business. On taking
office, it inherited many of the problems of the Vohor Government — particularly, a
deficit estimated to be four billion vatu ($A44 million). Vohor was reported to have
provided tax concessions to UMP allies and weak tax-enforcement capabilities. The
Kalpokas Government accepted a $A28.6 million tied loan from the ADB, earmarked
for the reduction of the bureaucracy and the implementation of guidelines for public
servants. Kalpokas, however, was criticised for the slow pace of reform and the lack of
visible indicators of economic growth. Rural constituents were concerned by the intro-
duction of the VAT, which they felt benefited urban dwellers and Chinese (sinois)
merchants more than them.
Opposition spokesmen criticised Kalpokas for being beholden to foreign interests
(see below) and, facing a motion of no confidence, he resigned, allowing Barak Sope to
take power. Despite commanding only four votes in the National Parliament, Sope was
able to take office because of a peculiarity of the Standing Orders of the Vanuatu
Parliament: rather than being the leader of the majority party, the Prime Minister must
be elected by all Members of Parliament.40
Between his accession in 1999 and his ouster in April 2001, Sope undertook several
perilous financial deals in the hope of pulling Vanuatu quickly from the brink of finan-
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cial disaster, rather than the lengthier and politically unpopular process of institutional
reform. The most prominent involved Amerendra Nath Ghosh, who arrived in Port Vila
in February 2000 with what was described as ‘possibly the world’s largest ruby’, which he
intended to ‘donate’ to the people of Vanuatu. Ghosh promised to initiate a project to
seal the road around Efate, build a walled complex for the Council of Ministers and
negotiate with foreign consortia to build a new international airport.41 In return for the
ruby, it was reported that Ghosh was to receive $A388 million in bearer bonds from the
Reserve Bank, equal to 140 per cent of Vanuatu’s gross domestic product. Had Sope
issued the bonds, Vanuatu’s total debt would have quadrupled.42 His record of financial
management was the trigger for a motion of no confidence in March 2001.43
Edward Natapei, the leader of the VP, then came to power as leader of a VP/UMP
government coalition, committed to following through with its reform agenda. The
continued survival of the VP/UMP Government Coalition brought respite from the
entrenched political instability of the 1990s, but key obstacles remained, principally poor
public opinion of the CRP. By following this course, Natapei signalled his intention to
stamp out the form of maverick leadership that Sope embodied, and hopefully to lessen
the potential for the economic mismanagement and corruption that Vanuatu had
witnessed in the past decade. Natapei’s Government included several MPs who had been
closely involved with financial scams and had poor records of economic management,
but the exigencies of Vanuatu’s Parliament meant that he had to ally with one of the
larger parties. UMP spokespeople reiterated their allegiance to the VP forcefully and
publicly, but key UMP MPs, including the Deputy Prime Minister, had been targeted by
the Ombudsman and police for investigation.44
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The 2002 elections were fought over the continuance of the ADB-sponsored
CRP.46 The NUP and MPP campaigned against the program, stating that it was neo-
colonial and designed to benefit Western powers to the detriment of grassroots
ni-Vanuatu. The VP regained power in Vanuatu’s seventh Parliament. Despite placing
second to the UMP in terms of members elected to Parliament, the VP was able to claim
the leadership in government by attracting two independents to join it before consti-
tuting the Coalition Government with the UMP. One of that number was Jackleen
Reuben Titeck, a VP member disendorsed as a candidate by his local committee, who
had won his seat nonetheless. 
The VP/UMP Coalition governed until November 2003, when, citing poor atten-
dance at Cabinet meetings and possible collusion with the Opposition, the UMP was
dumped. Key UMP MPs were also alleged to have misappropriated funds, although no
further action was taken. The UMP was replaced with the NUP, the People’s Progressive
Party and elements of the ADV, including former Prime Minister Maxime Carlot
Korman and Moana Carcasses. 
Throughout the term, the Government was criticised for its poor record of local
development. Projects were seen to stagnate as the Government prioritised stability and
financial accountability, resulting in pressure being exerted on government MPs for more
rural development projects. In early 2004, a factional split emerged within the VP,
prompted by the leadership aspirations of junior party members. The tension culminated
in the temporary split from the party elite of senior members Donald Kalpokas, Sela
Molisa, Joe Natuman and Jackleen Reuben Titeck. The term was ended prematurely after
the Speaker dissolved Parliament to pave the way for fresh elections. This was prompted
by the annulment of the candidacy for President of Alfred Maseng on the grounds that
he had a criminal record. Maseng won the Electoral College votes against the
Government-favoured candidate, triggering moves towards a motion of no confidence in
Prime Minister Natapei, supported by the dissident members of his own government. 
Constituted by snap elections called in 2004 after the dissolution of Parliament by
the Speaker, the 2004 elections resulted in one of Vanuatu’s most fragmented
Parliaments. Several senior parliamentarians — including several ministers and former
Prime Minister, Donald Kalpokas — were voted from office. In all, 23 sitting members
lost their seats. Despite the recognition of the dangers of political instability by the major
parties, the 2004 elections demonstrated the progressive Balkanisation of National
Parliaments and the possible death of big-issue politics, as voters appeared to favour
locally credible social movements, minor parties and independents. 
The elections were called to end political instability, but the major parties suffered
severe losses. As Table 7.8 demonstrates, parliamentary power is spread relatively evenly
between three medium-sized blocs, one with 10 members (NUP) and two with eight
members (VP and UMP). Independents or minor parties hold 26 seats in the
Parliament: a simple majority. The Parliament will therefore be less stable than any of its
predecessors. The Coalition Government formed by Serge Vohor is an unwieldy coali-
tion, incorporating five independents and 23 members of five parties.48 Although the
Coalition maintains a 28-seat majority at present, its sustainability is limited by its
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incredible fragmentation. A minor shift in the balance of power could result in the NUP,
the UMP or several smaller parties being dispensed with in favour of the VP.
A (more-or-less) stable Cabinet was formed in August 2004, referred to mislead-
ingly as a ‘government of national unity’. Despite threats from the Prime Minister, Serge
Vohor, that he would call a ‘state of emergency’, negotiations remained peaceful. Much
of the impetus for instability in the preceding few months had come from the elections
for President. In August, that position was filled by one of the frontrunners in the earlier
collegial run-offs, Kalkot Matas Kelekele, a member of the original independence
movement and a former VP and NUP stalwart.
Earlier that month, NUP had joined UMP in government, giving it two major
blocs of eight members each, and commensurate shares of Cabinet portfolios. The
remainder were divided between the minor members of the Coalition. Included in the
Cabinet was breakaway VP member for Tanna, Joe Natuman, a Vanua K MP, who holds
the Ministry of Education portfolio.49 Former Prime Minister Barak Sope was granted
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, possibly signalling a volte-face in Vanuatu’s diplomatic
relations with the regional powers, Australia and New Zealand. Accepting large soft loans
from the People’s Republic of China, the Vohor Government has become comfortable
resisting Australian policy imperatives, the good governance agenda and core programs
undertaken under the CRP, including strengthening Vanuatu’s legal frameworks. Indeed,
almost immediately after taking power, Vohor’s Cabinet mounted attacks on the high
number of foreign advisors in Vanuatu — prompting rebukes from the opposition VP —
and criticised Australia as racist for its resistance to Melanesian labourers working in
Australia.50 In the past few years, gaining access to the Australian labour market has
become popular political rhetoric. In early September 2004, the Government terminated
the appointments of two senior AusAID consultant lawyers working in the State Law
Office (Attorney-General’s Department) and expelled Australian Federal Police liaison
officers, although it later rescinded both decisions.
The SNTV electoral system
Vanuatu’s legislature consists of a unicameral Parliament containing 52 seats,51 elected
every four years, using a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system.52
Members of Parliament are elected on the basis of universal suffrage through an electoral
system that includes multi-member, SNTV constituencies to ‘ensure fair representation
of different political groups and opinions’.53
Constituencies vary in size depending on their social make-up, although there are
significant discrepancies between the number of people represented and the number of
seats in each constituency. At the time of the 2002 elections, constituencies varied in size
from seven-member to single-member constituencies. Generally speaking, representation
is geared in favour of rural constituencies. The largest constituency, Port Vila (with
18,978 registered voters) elects six members to Parliament. The three seven-member
constituencies are Tanna (17,212 registered voters), Malakula (15,789) and Santo Rural
(14,411). Rural Efate (15,556) elects only four members to Parliament despite being
larger than Santo Rural and only marginally smaller than Malakula. In comparison,
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Pentecost also elects four members to Parliament, despite having only 9,440 registered
voters. The smallest constituency is the Shepherds Group of Islands, with 940 registered
voters, who elect one member (see Figure 7.1).
The Anglo-French Condominium introduced the SNTV electoral system in prepa-
ration for the 1975 elections for the National Representative Assembly (NRA), the
precursor to Vanuatu’s National Parliament. It allowed the colonial powers to avoid the
involved and politically contentious process of setting up electoral wards and it kept the
electoral system as straightforward as possible, which was considered crucial to allow for
democracy to operate in a society with apparently limited literacy levels.54 Arguably, the
system was also devised with the intention of dispersing the absolute electoral dominance
of the VP in the lead-up to independence, ensuring some level of representation for the
VP’s diverse, but minority opposition and hopefully lessening the impetus for rebellion,
which was prevalent in the 1970s.55 It failed on both counts. The VP won the 1979
elections resoundingly, claiming an absolute majority in the National Parliament.
Sparked by their losses in the election, sections of the Modérés attempted secession. 
In practice, the element of proportional representation contained in the SNTV
system cemented the dominance of the majority parties (the VP and UMP) for the first
decade after independence while simultaneously allowing representation for smaller
parties, especially in larger multi-member constituencies. According to the Vanuatu
Electoral Commission, SNTV limits the incentive for party fragmentation contained in
other proportional representation systems.56 The benefits under the system for large
parties with concentrated voter support are that they are able to receive a substantial seat
bonus, such as the VP received between 1979 and 1987.57 Nonetheless, since the late
1980s, the majority parties have splintered and there has been an upsurge in the number
of independent candidates running for — and winning — office.
The system has inbuilt restrictions on overstocking electorates with candidates from
the one party. In multi-member constituencies, SNTV requires party organisers to
educate their electors to avoid popular candidates attracting overwhelming majorities,
while their less popular stablemates are unsuccessful, as occurred in the Malakula
constituency in 2002. Four UMP candidates attracted a total of 1,078 votes in the
Malakula electorate but none was elected, whereas Namangki Aute — the Malakulan
social movement — ran two candidates, who polled 978 votes collectively; both won
seats in the National Parliament. Enacting strategies to avoid such vote-splitting has
become a major preoccupation of Vanuatu’s political planners.
According to Howard van Trease, a major benefit of the system is that it ‘allows
minority cultures to be represented in the most culturally diverse country — with 100
languages for 200,000 people — in the world’.58 A consequence of this aspect of SNTV
is that levels of representation, quantified in terms of numbers of successful votes cast, are
decreasing.59 In turn, this allows members to be elected with minority shares of the vote.
For example, in 1998, UMP’s Henri Taga, one of the six MPs elected from the Port Vila
constituency, polled just 352 votes out of the nine thousand or so votes cast.60
Once the dominance of the major parties was broken in the 1990s, the propensity of
the SNTV system to reward smaller parties became obvious. Small parties with concen-
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trated localised voter bases stand to beat large parties with dispersed voter bases, allowing
Vanuatu’s provincial social movements such as the Jon Frum movement significant advan-
tages within the confines of its Tanna electorate given its large support base and limited
pool of eligible candidates. Small, locally credible parties that can mobilise concentrated
support have an excellent chance of electoral victory. Thus, while the VP, NUP and UMP
are able to command votes on a national scale, the increasing number of candidates
contesting each seat means that electoral results are increasingly difficult to predict and the
smallest of shifts in voter support can effect major changes in the number of members
elected to Parliament and the success or failure of the more established political parties. 
Bearing in mind these aspects of the SNTV system, the major parties have tailored
their electoral strategies accordingly, monitoring closely the number of candidates prese-
lected by their respective national committees in preparation for elections to avoid
overstocking electorates. Nonetheless, no strategies have been able to counter the
tendency for national elections to result in a high turnover of candidates. In the 2004
national elections, for example, 23 of the 52 Members of Parliament were not returned.
The VP, beset by internal struggles, lost six seats, not taking into account the eventual
political allegiances of the dissident Vanua K MPs. 
The major victors were the smaller regionally based parties. The system has allowed
for the proliferation of candidates, which propels political instability and is exacerbated
by it. As I argue below, given the high incidence of factional splits in Vanuatu, the predis-
position of the system to reward small groups makes unwieldy coalitions a necessity for
forming government. 
At present, little political will is directed towards reforming the electoral system.
The major parties, however, recognise that the system allows for the election of minor
parties relatively easily. Given the increasing swings against the major parties, it is likely
that some measures will be taken to secure governments in office, such as the organic law
reforms undertaken in PNG, or an alteration in the ways in which the Executive is
constituted; that is, reform to the SNTV electoral system.
Growing disenchantment
Another feature of Vanuatu’s electoral politics is the increasing disenchantment with the
system by local people. Since independence in 1980, voter turnout has declined steadily.
In 1979, 90.32 per cent of eligible voters went to the polls.61 In 1991, this number had
dropped to 71.3 per cent.62 In the 2002 elections, the overall turnout had stabilised at 63
per cent, although by-elections have attracted much lower turnouts: in the February
2001 by-election in Malekula, voter turnout was just 40 per cent of registered voters.63
These trends suggest widespread disenchantment with the electoral system.
Although civic education programs have targeted rural communities explicitly to educate
voters on the roles of Members of Parliament and public servants,64 significant confusion
about the role of parliamentarians exists in both rural and urban areas. Officers of the
Vanuatu Electoral Commission and its support organisations are abused routinely in
rural areas because they are confused with party campaigners. No continuing voter
education programs have been implemented and neither the Electoral Commission nor
the Parliament have the resources to support them.
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Key local leaders have argued that democratic government is leading Melanesian
people inexorably to calamity. The apparent creation of divisions through politics —
voiced in Bislama as politik — is seen by many ni-Vanuatu to augur the societal violence
witnessed in the Solomon Islands or PNG. A former member of the National Parliament
in Vanuatu and now a regional non-governmental organisation director, Hilda Lini,
attempted to capitalise on this belief when she called for the endorsement of a new, more
thoroughly indigenous form of governance in Vanuatu: ‘This outdated Western system
of democracy will continue to corrupt Melanesia, resulting in the continuous uncon-
trolled crime, violence and poverty [and] ongoing crisis.’65 An enduring irony of
Vanuatu politics is that while public criticisms of the fragmented National Parliament
and the apparent inertia of governments are commonplace, voters have discarded the
major parties in favour of locally credible independent candidates or members of smaller
parties. And it is the increasing presence of independents and smaller parties that motors
political instability. 
It is to the effects of the progressive disintegration of Vanuatu’s political parties in
the past eight national elections that we now turn.
The implications of political fragmentation
Historically, the major precipitants of party fragmentation have been leadership
challenges within the major parties, prompted by the highly personalised nature of
Vanuatu politics, in which MPs vie for factional and, ultimately, party dominance as a
matter of routine. The losers of such contests often form their own parties, attracting
factional supporters to their new banners and temporarily reducing the influence of the
original party. Such dynamics precipitated the factional splits within the VP in 1988 and
1991 and are a continuing irritant to party leaders. The VP’s increasing problems of
membership fidelity are impelled by the aspirations of younger politicians whose
patience for the party’s old guard — many of whom were architects of the independence
movement — has waned. Among these elder statesmen, there is the perception that the
younger aspirant MPs lack the ideological coherence of Vanuatu’s first generation of
political leaders. The thwarted ambitions of individual politicians seeking advancement
within party structures have provided the impetus for party splits. 
Political fragmentation is also often motivated at the grassroots level. Dissatisfaction
with the performance of political parties or the fear that politicians are subverting a
community’s interests to opportunistic ends motivates community leaders to break away
from larger political parties. Local community leaders (such as chiefs and pastors) play a
crucial role in the initial selection and endorsement of candidates and they continue to
exert influence throughout the incumbency of a member. This relationship is less
pronounced in senior politicians, but few are entrenched enough to completely ignore
their constituency lest their support be removed. The significant grassroots contribution
to these processes makes remedying the situation more difficult. Given that grassroots ni-
Vanuatu consider the establishment of new political parties to be a marker of leadership
skills, there are few visible institutional or social disincentives for politicians to maintain
party coherence rather than breakaway or stand as independents. This situation has
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created several parties whose platforms are very similar but whose leaders routinely
appear to be opposed, such as the VP, the MPP and NUP. 
Coalitions
Coalitions have been a regular, albeit transitory, feature of Vanuatu politics since the
formation of the Modérés grouping — the precursor to the UMP — in the mid-1970s.
After the fragmentation of the VP, coalitions became necessary vehicles for the formation
of government. Indeed, each government since the 1991 elections has been a coalition.
Such coalitions, however, have often proved precarious, being plagued by fierce
infighting and competition over ministerial posts. Coalition member parties engage in
frenetic efforts to progress upwardly within governments, mostly with the intention of
claiming the prized post of Prime Minister or one of the other preferred portfolios.
A particular responsibility of the Prime Minister since the late 1990s has been to mediate
these tensions; to ensure his position and the position of his party at the apex of the State
— and thereby ensure access to the resources and networks of distribution for their
constituents — with workable and more-or-less stable coalitions. These tensions must be
mediated through inducements (ministerial portfolios, the appointment of political
adherents and wantoks to party and bureaucratic positions) and sanctions (censure,
expulsion), the latter an absolute last resort because of its tendency to result in further
fragmentation. Largely, opposition members are denied access to government resources,
motoring their often-frantic attempts to rejoin the Government ranks. Fragile coalition
governments are often forced to ‘horse-trade’ to maintain their hold on power and
opposition parties readily accept ministerial posts, parliamentary committee positions or
parliamentary offices (such as Speaker) as inducements. Indeed, one of the major tasks of
opposition parties is to find their way into government, however they choose. 
Increasingly, opposition parties have also formed coalitions to present unified fronts
to incumbent administrations, although they have generally been short-lived. The first
major opposition coalition to be formed post-independence was the Unity Front —
incorporating the VP, Melanesian Progressive Party, Tan Union and Nagriamel — created
in 1995.66 The Unity Front was formally disbanded in mid-August 1996, when a new
grouping known as MTF,67 combining the Melanesian Progressive Party, Vincent
Bulekone’s Tan Union and the Fren Melanesia Pati of Albert Ravutia, emerged and
joined forces with a UMP faction and the NUP to topple the Korman Government.
Some coalitions are incredibly short-lived: the Opposition Tokemau Federation,
comprising the UMP, NUP, VRP and the MPP, existed only from April to May 2002. 
These tendencies necessarily propel political centrifugalism within the parliamen-
tary parties and, therefore, within the National Parliament. A situation has arisen in
which opposition and government coalitions are intrinsically frail. Failure to provide
desirable positions to coalition members can result in loss of government. Even the
slightest shift in power in Parliament can initiate a complete reorganisation of ruling
coalitions, such as occurred between 1995 and 1997, and present almost insurmountable
obstacles to policy-making and implementation.68
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The reform agenda
The major casualties of national political manoeuvring during the 1990s were parliamen-
tary oversight, law-making and durable policy formation and implementation, especially
with relation to macro-economic policy.69 In periods of intense political instability,
policy formulation, even at its most fundamental level, was subordinated to horse-
trading. For example, between his inauguration as Minister of Finance in February 1996
and his eventual dismissal from Cabinet in mid-1997, Barak Sope had failed to provide a
development budget or an annual budget for the previous two years.70 More recently, it
has become apparent that the regular incapacitation of parliamentary sessions in the
1990s contributed to the dominance of the Legislature by an unaccountable Executive.71
With public scrutiny diverted by a succession of political dramas, several short-lived
governments stripped state coffers and sold off state assets, often to themselves as private
citizens.72 During the mid-1990s, corruption became a primary means of advancement
for government MPs, particularly those who sought to augment their own wealth with
resources misappropriated from the State.
In early 1997, Vanuatu was virtually bankrupted and Serge Vohor — then UMP
Prime Minister — began the implementation of the CRP, supported by the ADB and
other foreign aid donors, citing the need for government renewal and the overhaul of
Vanuatu’s social, political and economic structures. According to its authors, the CRP
was the blueprint by which the ‘poor performance of the institutions of government’
would be rectified through the strengthening of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
enactment of a leadership code.73
The impact of the CRP on party policies has been indirect but nonetheless signifi-
cant. Fuelled by reports of the negative impact of structural adjustment programs in
PNG and the widespread pessimism about Westminster democracy in Vanuatu
mentioned above, the fear that the CRP might endanger the sovereignty of ni-Vanuatu
has been an enduring theme in political rhetoric since 1997. Increasingly, support or
otherwise for the CRP has been a point of differentiation between the parties. Barak
Sope, the leader of the MPP, has stated that the CRP would cause suffering to the people
of Vanuatu and ‘serves the interests of Australia and New Zealand’, although in office he
has been forced to grant the project tacit support.74 Conversely, the VP has supported
the program openly. 
Reforms enacted under the CRP have encouraged some level of political stability by
drawing attention to the weak state of Vanuatu’s economy and the potentially disastrous
effects of unaccountable governance. Furthermore, the ADB has started an institutional
strengthening project in the National Parliament to improve the support mechanisms
available to MPs and thereby foster improved national leadership.
Gender
Another casualty of political instability has been the inclusion of women in public
decision-making.75 Despite the involvement of several women in the early nationalist
movements and continuing programs supported by the UN to support women’s election
to public office, only four women have ever been elected to Vanuatu’s National
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Parliament.76 In addition to their poor representation in the National Parliament,
women represent only 9 per cent of the 300 or so decision-making positions in the
country’s 30 key government and private institutions, a situation that worsened during
the political instability of the 1990s when women were actively marginalised from
decision-making bodies.77 These statistics reflect broader issues of gender imbalance in
Vanuatu, where women’s roles in the public sphere are limited by significant cultural and
institutional constraints.78 Women’s right to participate in decision-making positions has
often been challenged by conservative institutions such as the Malvatumauri. In an
environment where references to kastom — practices believed by local people to be
indigenous — are prevalent in public life, women’s empowerment is often cast on the
side of Western, and therefore divisive, influences.
The UN Fund for Women (UNIFEM) supported the creation of the Vanuatu
Women in Politics (VANWIP) Project in 1995 to encourage women to run for public
office. In the 1995 and 1998 elections, the major parties were forced to deploy women
members to actively campaign against VANWIP candidates in their electorates. While
VANWIP was unsuccessful, each of the major parties consequently incorporated some
level of gender recognition into their respective platforms, recognising potential pay-offs
in the form of electoral support. The effects of this platform shift were limited. Only the
VP incorporated detailed strategies for women’s empowerment in its party platform in a
detailed manner, although most parties now have women representatives on their execu-
tives or support their election in principle. One effect of women’s poor representation in
Parliament is the relative ease with which male MPs derail legislation, such as the Family
Protection Bill (proposed anti-domestic violence legislation). The Family Protection Bill
was cleared by the VP/NUP Cabinet for tabling in Parliament in 1999 and again by the
VP/NUP Government in 2004, but was delayed by political instability or withdrawn by
less-sympathetic regimes such as Barak Sope’s Coalition (1999–2001). However, the
UMP led Government of Serge Vohor briefly championed the bill, recognising that the
VP failed to get it past the council of ministers. Vohor’s Government fell in 2004. The
Malvatumauri remains opposed to the involvement of women in public decision-
making, meaning that often, while paying lip service to gender empowerment, political
parties opt to incorporate chiefly representatives into their platforms — almost a manda-
tory strategy to legitimate electoral support — and marginalise women further. 
Given the efforts of UNIFEM and VANWIP mentioned above, it is ironic that the
two current serving women MPs — Isabelle Donald (VP) and Leinavao Tasso
(independent), both from Epi — won their seats on their longstanding commitment to
voluntary community service through local church organisations, rather than through
the networks of the VNCW, a major stakeholder in VANWIP. VNCW officials are often
considered by local women’s groups to be overpaid and inefficient, beset by the same
internal squabbling as the major political parties.
While they have had little success in winning election, from a gender perspective,
the preparedness of women to run for office is heartening. Whether they are more or less
susceptible to the centrifugal forces that their male counterparts are subjected to in office
remains to be seen.
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Conclusions and projections
Given the fragmentation of the VP and the further erosion of the major parties’ electoral
support in the snap election of 2004, it is likely that Vanuatu will undergo further polit-
ical instability in the coming parliamentary term. In an environment of such instability,
the formulation of policy will be subjected to further strains as the political manoeuvring
in Parliament is intensified by the reliance on numerous parties to form government, a
situation only intensified by the turn against the major parties. 
Should local stakeholders seek to arrest these developments, reform to the electoral
system will be necessary; removing the tendency of the SNTV system to reward smaller
local parties will remove one of the impetuses for political fragmentation. Already, local
strategies to combat political instability, based on local leadership, are increasingly visible.
The formation of the Nevsem Nenparata alliance offers a case in point. At the
movement’s foundation, its organiser, Chief Mike Yori, stated:
before Independence, the chiefs held power and everything worked correctly.
Immediately after Independence it was the VP which rules [sic]. Then the govern-
ment split and everything deteriorated. Unity doesn’t any longer seem possible with
politics. Now we must go back to the chiefs and enable them to sort out how we can
again find the pathway to unity.79
Indeed, inspired by widespread disillusionment with the Westminster-style system of
government, such sentiments will only rise with further political instability. Local strate-
gies such as Nevsem Nenparata, however, are unlikely to stabilise the National
Parliament. Given the geographic, ethnic and cultural diversity of Vanuatu, an increasing
emphasis on local networks and local knowledge will in all likelihood create an equally
diverse Parliament with no unifying ideologies, the implausibility of Vanuatu’s major
political parties disappearing overnight notwithstanding.
Vanuatu’s political culture offers some of the greatest obstacles to political stability.
Electoral results since 1980 demonstrate the subordination of national concerns to local
ones in Vanuatu politics and imply the shift from issues of national significance driving
politics (decolonisation, non-alignment) to issues of more local importance (local devel-
opment, responsive local representation, access to development funds), exemplified by
the increasing support for locally credible — perhaps parochial — candidates whose
major platforms are local development above all else. No MP can afford to ignore entirely
local demands in favour of the abstract principles of national development and good
governance. Unfulfilled promises to constituencies carry with them the threat of electoral
defeat for any MP. Nonetheless, little consideration is given in regional communities to
the relationship between national political instability and support for local independent
candidates or those from minor parties. Arguably, it is the focus on local concerns that
propels political instability, as the power of the established political parties is eroded by
increasing numbers of independents and minor parties in the National Parliament. It is
not simply that the SNTV system erodes the support bases of the established parties.
Their electoral attrition implies also their failure to satisfy local demands for reciprocity;
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local independents and minor local parties are seen to be less prone to the dictates of
centralised party executives and are plausibly more responsive to local demands. There
are several paradoxes contained within Vanuatu’s contemporary political culture. Larger
parties, less receptive to specific local demands, are nonetheless more likely to foster a
greater degree of political stability in the National Parliament simply because they can
sidestep the politically risky issue of maintaining a simple majority in Parliament by
allying themselves with a handful of independents and minor parties, whose allegiance
goes to the highest bidder. At present, however, electoral returns appear to favour smaller
parties and independents, and their presence in the Parliament will be a continuing
source of political instability. Vanuatu can ill afford to be subjected to renewed political
instability such as it experienced during the 1990s.
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New Caledonia has more than 50 years’ experience with party politics yet finds itself
today in a situation of party fragmentation that some consider disconcertingly similar to
that of neighbouring states with far less experience in party politics and Western political
institutions. The reason for this disarray is, at first blush, paradoxical. The two main
political groupings that either coalesced or were forged around the issue of independence
are now being destabilised by this very issue, at a time when both claim success in
relation to it. The anti-independence Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la
République (RPCR) and the pro-independence coalition Front de Liberation National
Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) both argue that the 1998 Noumea Accord — brokered
between them by the French State — set in train processes conducive to the realisation of
their vision for the future political status of New Caledonia. The RPCR seeks to
maintain New Caledonia in the French Republic while the FLNKS has long argued for
New Caledonian independence. The agreement indeed offers both possibilities. It
progressively transfers political powers to a New Caledonian government but stops short
of complete sovereignty pending one or more referenda on independence to be held
between 2013 and 2018. The RPCR’s wager is that greatly increased autonomy will
undercut the impetus for independence, while the FLNKS considers that a positive
experience of autonomy will render the next step of full independence relatively uncon-
troversial. Meanwhile, electoral support for both groups has slumped, suggesting the
difficulty of selling these interpretations. Doing well is the relatively new and more centrist
anti-independence party, L’Avenir Ensemble, as well as the more radical pro-independence
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Partie le Liberation Kanak (Palika). These successes tell us something of the shifting
ideological landscape in New Caledonia. They also reveal how party and movement
structures are increasingly unable to negotiate in a context where new issues have come to
the fore while the question of independence is once again on hold. Doumenge’s observa-
tions on the late 1970s, that a fragmentation of politics resulted from ‘the incapacity of
traditional formations to deal with the problems of the moment’, might well hold true
today.1 The reasons for this incapacity, and the consequent emergence of new political
forces, are discussed in this chapter.
The Matignon Accords
The Noumea Accord is not the first compromise agreement between the RPCR, the
FLNKS and the French State. In 1988, the Matignon Accords were signed on the heels
of several years of insurrectionary activity between pro- and anti-independence militants
that culminated in the Ouvéa crisis, in which four gendarmes and 19 Kanaks were killed.
The scale of this violence shocked all communities in the French territory and precipi-
tated crisis talks between the FLNKS, the RPCR and the newly elected French Socialist
Government under Prime Minister Michel Rocard. The agreement to emerge out of
these talks committed all parties to peaceful coexistence while the French State engaged
in a 10-year program of economic development, particularly in the relatively undevel-
oped rural regions of the north and the Loyalty Islands, where the population is primarily
Melanesian. This strategy, coined a ‘rebalancing’ of development, acknowledged the far
greater affluence of Noumea and its surrounding municipalities, where most Europeans
live, compared with that of the rest of the territory. The differential development plan
was attractive to FLNKS negotiators because it proposed strategies to pump prime
investment in Kanak regions,2 and was accompanied by new political structures, in
particular the dividing of the territory into three provinces — those of the South, North
and Loyalty Islands — which would ensure that Kanaks would have a significant
measure of political and economic control over the regions where they dominated. Also
crucial to their acceptance by FLNKS negotiators was the promise of a referendum on
independence in 10 years. Demands for a referendum had been a key pillar of the
FLNKS’ political strategy during the 1980s, bolstered by the reinsertion of New
Caledonia on the UN’s list of territories to be decolonised. At this time, the FLNKS
demanded an immediate referendum on independence. To the surprise of many, a delay
of 10 years was agreed to ‘with the understanding that it would enable a peaceful ten-year
transition to a successful vote for independence’.3 A key to this calculation was the agree-
ment that the electoral roll for voting in a referendum would be limited to those who
were resident in the territory in 1988, and their voting-age descendants. This acknowl-
edged an important factor in electoral politics in New Caledonia: although a majority of
Melanesians supported independence, Melanesians had become a minority in the terri-
tory in the 1960s4 as a result of migration by metropolitan French and other Pacific
Islanders, attracted by an economic boom in the territory brought on by strong world
demand for nickel. New Caledonia has the world’s third-largest deposits of nickel and it
is its major export. Restricting the electoral roll would limit the political impact of
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further migration to the territory and shift the electoral demographics in favour of
independence due to the higher birth rate among Melanesians. The decision to agree to a
referendum in 10 years was therefore a strategic response to the reality that an immediate
referendum would have resulted in a majority vote against independence.
In spite of this formula, the Matignon Accords met with considerable hostility
among Kanaks, many of whom viewed them as a sell-out of the hard-won political
impetus gained from years of insurrectionary struggle. A year after the signing of the
accords by FLNKS leader Jean-Marie Tjibaou, he and his deputy, Yeiwene Yeiwene, were
assassinated by a militant Kanak. For its part, the anti-independence community was less
than enamoured by the inclusion of a prospective referendum, evident in the fact that 67
per cent of voters in Noumea rejected acceptance of the accord.5
Much effort went into ‘selling’ the accord to RPCR and FLNKS constituencies, a
process that was actively engaged in by the local mainstream media.6 The wager was that
greater economic development for Kanak communities would reduce demands for
independence and produce more moderate Kanak leaders who were concerned with
issues of economic development rather than independence.7
Despite French promises during the Matignon years to pursue strategies to restrict
the electoral roll, as well as to promote local employment and encourage repatriation of
metropolitan French public servants,8 the proportion of Melanesians in the population
continued to decrease in relation to other communities, with the prospect for success in a
referendum becoming ever more diminished.9 By the mid-1990s, the prospect of an
imminent referendum was thrown further into doubt. RPCR leader, Jacques Lafleur,
had, in 1991, called for a postponement of the referendum for 30 years to allow the terri-
tory to attain a level of economic development and political self-sufficiency that would
enable a proper decision on its political future.10 Although initially rejected by the
FLNKS, it was not long before FLNKS President, François Burck, himself began to
publicly broach the prospect of another prolongation of a referendum.11 A major reason
why the FLNKS entertained such a prospect was that a vote, were it to happen, would
invariably result in a majority vote against independence. Despite the FLNKS’ earlier
calculation that a period of demonstrating responsible economic management would
show that the Kanak community was ready to assume full responsibility, the anti-
independence community had not been persuaded. Pushing the issue to a vote would
only further divide and polarise the community and result in the possibility of renewed
violence and political turmoil. By the mid-1990s, therefore, the major political parties
had agreed to a deferment of the referendum and instead accepted a negotiated settle-
ment, which would culminate in a vote on independence, this time in 15 to 20 years.12
Alban Bensa and Eric Wittersheim write that in the immediate aftermath of the
signing of the Noumea Accord there was general relief that a new pact would bring the
promise of 15 to 20 more years of relative peace. But this first reaction was also paradox-
ical, in that it was based on quite different convictions about the possible outcome of the
process. Anti-independence groups were generally pleased with the apparent softening of
pro-independence demands during the Matignon decade. They envisaged a further
cooption of the Kanak political bourgeoisie with an outcome of independence in associa-
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tion with France — a state of considerably devolved autonomy but without complete
sovereignty.13 This softening was evident in defections from the FLNKS, particularly to
the centrist Fédération des Comités de Co-ordination des Indépendantistes (FCCI),
established by once radical advocates for independence, and the alignment of the FCCI
with the RPCR in a ‘spirit of dialogue’. It was also apparent in the agreement of the
FLNKS to countenance a further prolongation of a referendum on independence. On
the other hand, pro-independence groups thought ‘that the road towards independence
[was] finally open’.14
This chapter argues that, on current reckoning, the anti-independence scenario is
most likely to eventuate, a fact reflected in writers now describing the current state of
affairs as one of decolonisation without any necessary prospect of independence.15 For
this to be a scenario acceptable to hitherto advocates of independence, there would need
to be the prospect of a genuine sharing of political power in the country between Kanak
and loyalist political parties. There would have to be, in other words, a situation of
considerably devolved autonomy in which all the major political groupings could
demonstrate an active and influential involvement in determinate political processes. It is
for this reason that the Noumea Accord established a collegial form of government
elected by proportional representation. The intention was that, within this structure,
there would emerge a multi-party Cabinet16 to ensure genuine power-sharing. Until very
recently, RPCR domination of New Caledonian politics has made a mockery of this
notion of collegiality, and has led pro-independence leaders to describe the accord as
being ‘hijacked’ by the RPCR.17 Bensa and Wittersheim query whether the new institu-
tional structures ‘allow the different communities to together build a nation’.18 The
major stumbling block to this outcome is the entrenched adversarial position of the
RPCR, as well as its custom of manipulating the levers of power through its dominant
personalities and their grip on the New Caledonian political economy. Ironically, while
the Matignon and Noumea Accords bear the imprint of RPCR demands, albeit in
compromise form, they establish expectations for a more consensual political culture to
which the RPCR is ill equipped to respond. History might not always be destiny, but in
the case of the RPCR it is a powerful factor in signalling the limits of RPCR capabilities. 
The RPCR in historical, sociological and political context
Local politics in New Caledonia has always been enacted in the context of a strong
French State that has maintained control over political and economic activity in the terri-
tory until very recently.19 This notion of control needs some explanation. In New
Caledonia as elsewhere in the colonial world, control over local activity was largely vested
in the Governor of the colony, and later the High Commissioner, but also in a local
comprador class that has acquired considerable wealth and influence throughout the
more than 150 years of French presence. This class has existed as the political bastion of
French power, but it has also had its squabbles with France. Indeed, early politics in the
colony was characterised by strident disagreements between local settlers who railed
against the power of the Governor and sought the establishment of democratic institu-
tions, including a free press, to counter this power, which was often exercised arbitrarily.20
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Moreover, as local settlers developed the economy, some became wealthy and found
themselves in competition with metropolitan economic interests in the colony. This was
particularly the case with the local mine owners, who today are among the richest
families in New Caledonia — the so-called 50 families21 — and who from the outset
complained about the French company Le Nickel’s domination of nickel mining and
smelting. While this comprador class generally understood that its dominance was
secured by its relationship with France, disagreements were often expressed through
demands for France to lessen its hold over local politics and the economy. They became
translated in the post-war period into calls for greater political autonomy.22
This at times ambivalent attitude towards France and the exercise of colonial power
was also manifest in the waxing and waning of relationships between French and local
political parties and movements. Early settlers looked to political processes and institu-
tions in metropolitan France to guide their demands for greater political freedoms from
France but, as Dornoy observed, conservative politicians have generally ‘always resented
the influence of metropolitan parties’.23 This resentment was part of the colonial experi-
ence of subordination, as well as recognition of the increasing cultural and sociological
differences that characterised New Caledonia from France. The view expressed by promi-
nent conservative politician Pierre Frogier in 1977,24 that metropolitan parties ‘did not
suit the mentality of Caledonians’,25 has dogged the relationship until this day. The
formation of the RPCR in 1978 out of existing fractured conservative parties might have
occurred at the behest of then Mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac during a visit to the territory,
but it was also very much a local initiative to unite disparate conservative parties in the
face of a formidable enemy — the official call by Melanesian politicians for independence.
Relationships between metropolitan political parties and local politics might be
described as somewhat opportunistic. During World War II, when the first political
parties were being conceived in New Caledonia, the local settler population rallied
behind De Gaulle’s Free France movement and the colony became an important staging
post for the US’s Pacific campaign. The strength of Gaullist influence was evident in
postwar politics, with De Gaulle consolidating ties with New Caledonian conservatives
when he visited the territory in 1956.26 As a result, local elections in 1958 witnessed the
emergence of a new conservative political force, the Rassemblement Calédonien, headed
by wealthy mine owner Henri Lafleur, which won 11 of 30 seats in the Territorial
Assembly.27 A year later, Lafleur was elected to the French Senate and supported the
metropolitan push to withdraw political powers from New Caledonia. By the late 1960s,
however, the Rassemblement Calédonien had changed its tune, turning against De
Gaulle to seek greater autonomy.28 Even the creation in 1977 of a local version of the
metropolitan French Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) and its decision to go
into alliance with other conservative groups reflected an ambivalence ‘necessary to keep
New Caledonia within France while retaining its personality’.29
Dornoy is correct when she writes that the main aim of conservative politics in New
Caledonia has been to conserve,30 although she might add that what is being conserved
is the relative privilege of the wealthy, along with a perception of relative privilege among
others, such as non-French migrants and resettled metropolitan French (Metros), who
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view greater autonomy or independence as threatening their prospects in the society.
What is at play in this notion of conservation is a complex and ever shifting analysis of
benefit and loss from the range of factors that impinge on local politics and the economy.
These include: changing metropolitan French policies toward New Caledonia and their
relative support from metropolitan political parties; the strength of local agitation for
change to the status quo by oppositional groups (in later years, the pro-independence
movement); and internal rivalries within the comprador class, which have often led to a
fracturing of conservative political energies.
There is also the reality of considerable class and ethnic difference within the
conservative movement. While the European community is in general aware of its
relative privilege, when compared with most Kanaks, there are great and palpable dispar-
ities in levels of wealth, status and class within the European community. New Caledonia
is unusual for having a white urban proletariat that is largely working class and works for
wealthy European-owned businesses, some of which are owned by locals.31 It also has
relatively poor rural Europeans — known as broussards — who work the land on
holdings that are small compared with those of wealthy absentee landlords. Broussards
‘have felt marginalized socially, economically, and politically by the RPCR’s Noumean
bias’.32 There is always therefore the possibility of dissatisfaction and a need to keep this
tension under wraps. This has generally been facilitated by the fact that these poor
Europeans are often reliant on patronage from wealthy businessmen for their livelihoods. 
The formation of the RPCR in the year that Kanaks called officially for independ-
ence meant that the party’s aim was always primarily to oppose the increasingly strident
moves made by pro-independence Kanaks, many of which took the Territory to the
brink of civil war, particularly in the period from 1984 to 1988. Before the RPCR’s
formation, the dominant political party in the territory was the Union Calédonien (UC),
which, since the time of its formation in 1951, had advocated for greater autonomy for
the territory.33 The UC’s slogan, ‘two colours, one people’, expressed its pluri-ethnic
emphasis and its incorporation of Kanak demands for greater political recognition and
social justice. By the mid-1970s, however, ferment in the UC over the question of
whether autonomy was sufficient for the realisation of Kanak aspirations, and the
ultimate call by the UC for a pluri-ethnic independence, led to a break-up of the party
and a mass exodus of Europeans, who eschewed the prospect of independence. Most
aligned themselves with the RPCR.
From 1978 to 2004, Jacques Lafleur was president of the RPCR and New
Caledonia’s Deputy in the French National Assembly. Lafleur is a member of one of New
Caledonia’s ‘50 families’, the members of whom
not only live affluently but also hold key positions in the territory’s economy and
administration, as well as important posts in the RPCR, forming a plutocracy of
considerable influence. They are popularly perceived as having traditionally held a
monopoly on New Caledonia’s socio-economic power.34
As the main political grouping advocating the maintenance of New Caledonia in the
French Republic, the RPCR has garnered about 40 to 50 per cent of the total vote in
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territorial elections until 1989,35 with the majority of its support in Noumea and the
surrounding municipalities.36 Its support base is dominated by Caledonians of European
descent and more recently arrived Metros, but it has also been the party most adhered to
by the range of migrant communities in the territory, including Wallisians and
Futunians, Polynesians, Indonesians, Vietnamese and ni-Vanuatu, who have felt threat-
ened by the prospect of a Kanak socialist independence. The RPCR also draws sizeable
Melanesian support. For example, in the 1989 provincial elections, the RPCR gained
33.9 per cent of the overall vote in the Loyalty Islands,37 and a small number of
Melanesians have gained considerable influence in the party. This composition enables
the RPCR to claim the status of multiracial or ‘pluri-ethnic’ party — indeed, the bearer
of the UC’s legacy of ‘two colours, one people’.
As mentioned earlier, the European constituency incorporates a wide range of
occupational and class groupings. This has been a source of friction within the party at
various times. In particular, the Noumea focus of the party has led to considerable
resentment from broussards who have been at the front-line of rural insurrectionary
activity and have felt abandoned by the party at various moments.38 Infamous spats
have occurred between party members. For example, when RPCR member of the
Territorial Congress Justin Guillemard spoke out about broussard feelings of personal
insecurity, describing RPCR leaders as ‘Noumean racketeers’, he was expelled for his
outburst.39 Guillemard maintained the rage, describing the Matignon Accords as
sharing ‘out political and economic power between the politico-racketeers on the one
hand, and the terrorist assassins on the other hand, supposedly for ten years, a time
lapse that will allow you to carry out some good and juicy deals’.40 Resentment of the
RPCR has also fermented in Noumea, particularly among small business owners who
‘at times harbor resentment about the RPCR leaders’ control of Noumea’s economy’,
and from the urban proletariat who find their job options at times circumscribed by
their divergence from the RPCR line.41 These sociological and politico-economic
factors behind RPCR malaise have been exacerbated by some RPCR decisions, in
particular Lafleur’s signing of the Matignon Accords. 
Voting statistics provide an indication of levels of support for RPCR policies. In
addition, the occasional public dispute between RPCR members delineates fault lines in
its constituency. But generally, the internal workings of the party remain secret, and this
might be explained by the relatively undemocratic nature of a party that has relied on
internal patronage for party mobility. This contrasts quite significantly with the modus
operandi of most pro-independence parties, which have generally held annual congresses
where decisions are taken by majority vote, if not consensus. It is difficult to know there-
fore what the policy debates are within the RPCR, or the extent to which policy options
are discussed openly within it. There is evidence that Lafleur had to work hard to steer
his party towards acceptance of the Matignon Accords.42 Later dissent within the RPCR
after Lafleur’s signing of the Noumea Accord crystallised around claims of a lack of
democracy within the party and the inordinate power of Lafleur (see section on centrist
politics below). There are strong reasons to believe that these have been central character-
istics of party operations for a very long time.
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Disagreement within the RPCR has precipitated the establishment of more right-
wing loyalist pressure groups and parties, in particular the Front Calédonien (FC) and
the New Caledonian chapter of the Front National (FN[NC]). The FC, formed in
1982, primarily gathered together disaffected broussards, and French migrants from
other French colonies, such as Algerian pieds-noirs. Its members were more likely to
initiate direct action in pursuit of its loyalist objectives. Infamously, the FC organised a
‘picnic’ in the southern town of Thio in 1985, resulting in armed clashes with FLNKS
militants and considerable publicity for the party, even in metropolitan France.43 The
FC lost its only two seats in the 1989 provincial elections, gaining only 4.1 per cent of
the vote in the south, the only region where it stood candidates.44 The FC’s vote
appears to have transferred largely to the FN(NC), which has increased its electoral
strength considerably since its formation in 1984. The FN(NC) is a subsidiary of the
metropolitan Front National and reports directly to it. The intimacy of this relationship
was experienced early in the party’s history when metropolitan FN leader, Jean-Marie Le
Pen, circulated a letter questioning the presence of a Melanesian, François Neoere, at
the head of the party, forcing his resignation in early 1986.45 The Front National’s
appeal in New Caledonia is its consistent and strident refusal to engage in negotiations
about the question of independence, a stance that obviously makes it distinct from the
RPCR. The FN(NC) described the Matignon Accords as an abdication to the
‘murderous folly of the FLNKS’,46 and called for the abrogation of the accords after the
high ‘no’ vote in the referendum in the greater Noumea region. A reduction in its
number of seats in the 1989 provincial elections led McCallum to suggest that the
FN(NC)’s influence as a loyalist force was waning.47 In the 1999 provincial elections,
however, the party regained its two lost seats in Congress, giving it a total of four, a
position it retained in the 2004 provincial elections. The electoral balance in the
Southern Province now affords the FN(NC) the balance of power, which it is more
likely to exercise in alliance with the RPCR if required, rather than with the more
reconciliatory Avenir Ensemble.48 Its influence is therefore becoming stronger and
reflects the fact that a small49 but resolute proportion of the population in the south
rejects countenancing any compromise over the question of independence.
Another leakage from the RPCR has been from its Wallisian constituency.
Wallisians are the third-largest ethnic group in New Caledonia, comprising about 10
per cent of the population on the main island.50 The community has tended to align
itself with the RPCR against calls for a Kanak socialist independence from which they
fear they will be excluded. During the 1980s, the RPCR employed a small group of
Wallisian bodyguards who made their presence felt at anti-independence demonstra-
tions and engaged in street fighting with independence supporters, activities that
generated much hostility towards this community from Kanaks.51 By the late 1980s,
however, Wallisians began to shift away from the RPCR. In 1989 Kalepo Muliava
formed the Union Oceanien (UO), criticising the RPCR for its opportunistic attitude
towards Wallisians and claiming that, under the RPCR, the Wallisian community
‘hasn’t advanced an inch in ten years. We are as marginalised as the Kanaks’.52
Moreover, Muliava held out an olive branch to Kanaks, acknowledging Wallisian
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‘cultural cousinage with Kanaks’.53 By 1994, a new islander party, the Rassemblement
Démocratique Océanien (RDO), was formed under the leadership of Aloisio Sako. It
declared support for an independent, democratic and multiracial nation.54 The RDO
was accepted into the FLNKS in 1998 and Sako was elected to Congress on the FLNKS
ticket in 1999 and again in 2004.55 Although most Wallisians continue to vote for the
RPCR, the significance of the RDO cannot be underestimated. The results of any refer-
endum on independence could be determined by the extent to which it is able to attract
the Wallisian vote. Relations between Kanaks and Wallisians remain rocky in some
communities and are getting worse in others. In late 2001, armed conflict erupted
between Kanaks and Wallisians in the St Louis community in Mont-Dore near
Noumea, resulting in three dead and several wounded.56 In addition, RDO President
Sako expressed frustration at the slowness of assistance to Wallisian communities under
the terms of the Noumea Accords, stating: ‘We have contributed to the wealth of this
country, we have worked hard … Yet today most of the aid measures and re-balancing
benefits Kanak not us.’57 There are clearly sizeable obstacles in the way of the further
alignment of Wallisians to the pro-independence cause.
After the 2004 RPCR election slump, Lafleur resigned from the position of presi-
dent, signalling the possibility that a new political emphasis might emerge within the
party. It is difficult to see, however, where the party can move, with the more reconcil-
iatory ground now being occupied by Avenir Ensemble and the intransigent position
by the FN(NC). It will maintain its symbolic status as signatory to the accords but
might see its political status further wane as a result of the new logic of compromise
that it introduced into the political equation in New Caledonia by the very act of
signing the accords.
Pro-independence political parties
Universal suffrage came to Melanesians only in 1957,58 however, a decision by the
French National Assembly in 1951 had conferred voting rights on almost half of eligible
Melanesians, marking the genesis of their political mobilisation within party structures.59
Until recently, the main pro-independence party in New Caledonia has been the
Union Calédonien (UC), and all but one FLNKS leader has been from the UC.60 It has
been widely accepted that the impetus behind the formation of the UC in the early
1950s came from the Protestant and Catholic Churches in the territory.61 More recently,
work by the New Caledonian historian Ismet Kurtovich has uncovered the extent to
which this agitation from the churches was itself a response to the popularity of the
communist movement within Melanesian communities. This movement was the first to
champion indigenous and migrant rights as central to the political project. The presence
among the organising group of two Melanesian chiefs encouraged other Melanesians to
identify with the sentiments expressed by this movement. Alarmed by its popularity, the
churches quickly agitated to set up alternative political structures that would redirect this
political impetus towards more contained ambitions.62 These efforts ultimately resulted
in the official formation in 1956 of the UC, which had existed successfully since 1951 as
a movement and had attained considerable electoral success, with the election of its
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leader, Maurice Lenormand, as Deputy to the French Assembly in 1951,63 and by
gaining a majority of seats in territorial elections in 1953, including its first Melanesian
members.64 Its slogan, ‘two colours, one people’ and program reflected the extent to
which indigenous advancement was at the core of the movement’s mission, although, as
Henningham notes, its style was somewhat paternalistic.65
By the mid-1950s, the UC had strengthened its social agenda and increased its
following among trade unions.66 This generated deep hostility from conservative forces,
which accused Lenormand of communist sympathies and of being anti-French. This
criticism continued despite Lenormand campaigning for the maintenance of New
Caledonia in the French Republic at the referendum of September 1958, initiated by De
Gaulle in all the overseas dependencies and giving each the possibility of independence.67
A further manifesto drawn up in 1967 once again rejected independence and requested
instead ‘a statute of self-government to implement decolonization in New Caledonia’68
— a position that seems similar to that adopted by the UC today.
Considerable radicalisation occurred among young Melanesians during the 1970s,
in part as a result of the participation of some in radical student politics in France during
the 1960s as well as because of the more general push for recognition of indigenous
rights in international forums. This radicalisation led to severe problems for the UC,
which opposed the option of independence. The first breakaway political group was the
Union Multiraciale de Nouvelle-Calédonie (UMNC), which split from the UC in 1970,
and which led calls for independence. It was the UMNC’s leader, Yann Celene Uregei,
who had returned home from an official visit to France to demand independence in the
Territorial Assembly for the first time. As a result of pressures from outside and within
the party, the UC Congress of 1977 adopted a position for independence. Speakers at
this congress once again voiced positions that are uncannily prescient today, particularly
the idea that internal self-government was the best way to move towards independence.69
Despite the mass exodus of European members, the UC has nonetheless remained the
largest pro-independence party in New Caledonia, with membership from Catholic and
Protestant communities spread across its regions. Henningham estimates that the UC is
supported by some 55 to 60 per cent of pro-independence Kanaks,70 a number that has
probably reduced as a result of the rise in popularity of Palika (discussed below).
Henningham’s description of the UC as ‘pragmatic’ and social democratic71 generally
holds today. These characteristics have led the UC and the FLNKS to agree to the
Matignon and Noumea Accords, decisions that, as mentioned above, have resulted in
considerable alienation from the UC’s constituency given the prospect of independence
is once again distant.
Another more radical pro-independence party, the Union Progressiste Multiraciale
(UPM), was formed in 1974 as a breakaway party of the UMNC (which became the
Front Uni de Liberation Kanak [FULK] in 1977), with the main aims of land reform
and the economic development of Melanesians.72 The party changed its name to the
Union Progressiste Melanesien (UPM) in 197773 and continues to the present. This
party has been concerned primarily with land reform and was at the forefront of land
occupations in the 1980s.74 Although in its early iterations it employed radical rhetoric
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and had links with the French Trotskyist Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire,75 in more
recent years it has tended to align with the UC on policy matters, putting into
contention Henningham’s description of the party as ‘radical’ and ‘Marxist’.76
In 1976, the Parti Socialiste Calédonien (PSC) was formed with the socialist princi-
ples of the nationalisation of territorial resources, particularly nickel mining, and the
advancement of working-class interests. Importantly, the PSC did not at this time
support independence, arguing that New Caledonia was too small a state to consider
such an option. Instead it supported greater autonomy.77 The party shifted to supporting
independence in the 1980s and is the only pro-independence party to include a predom-
inantly European membership, most of whom are trade unionists.78 Finally, in 1976,
various radical movements coalesced in the formation of the Parti de Liberation Kanak
(Palika), which advocated the demise of colonialism in New Caledonia through ‘revolu-
tionary Kanak Socialist Independence’.79 Although Palika advocated revolutionary
struggle to overthrow colonialism, it nonetheless participated in the 1977 territorial
elections, with a significant showing in each of the electoral regions, particularly the
Loyalties and the east.80 Palika argued that social reforms could be achieved via this
means and that parliamentary salaries would help the party progress its platform.81
This issue of parliamentary participation has been a dilemma within pro-independ-
ence political parties. The boycotting of elections has been a key strategy in parties’
armoury, yet there have also been times when they have contested elections individually
or collectively as part of a united movement. The decision to forge the type of alliances
that would ultimately result in the creation of the FLNKS was driven by new electoral
laws initiated in the late 1970s by conservatives in the French Parliament.82 These estab-
lished a minimum bar of 7.5 per cent of votes in order to gain a seat in the Territorial
Assembly.83 These measures were intended to thwart participation by the smaller pro-
independence groups but instead precipitated their fusion in the Front Independentiste
(FI),84 which successfully contested the 1979 elections, gaining 14 seats compared with
the RPCR’s 15, with a centrist FNSC holding the balance of power with seven seats.85
In 1981, after generally positive comments from the Socialist Party on the issue of
self-determination, the FI supported the Socialist candidate, François Mitterrand, in the
second round of the election. Nonetheless, the FI was suspicious of the Socialists, a view
that was borne out when no strong support for independence ensued from Mitterand’s
victory.86 However, a generally reformist climate and the knowledge of increased support
for Kanak aspirations within government in France led to pressure for political reform in
New Caledonia and to the circumstances in which the FI, in alliance with the centrist
FNSC, gained power, with UC leader, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, leading the Government.87
By this stage, Palika had excluded itself from the FI and therefore any chance of parlia-
mentary participation. This followed an internal split, which resulted in the formation of
a new political party based primarily in the Loyalty Islands, the Liberation Kanak
Socialiste (LKS).88 Internal tensions between FI parties led to leakages in various
electoral contests.89 Increasing disenchantment of pro-independence parties towards the
policies of the Socialist Government, particularly the Lemoine Statute, which eschewed
immediate independence in favour of greater autonomy and a referendum on independ-
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ence in 1989, produced increasing tensions, riots and direct action waged by Palika
militants — in other words, considerable instability. Meanwhile, the UC drew up its own
timetable for independence, which determined that a referendum in 1984 would result
in independence in 1985. Importantly, this plan presupposed electoral reforms that
limited voters to Kanaks and residents who had one parent born in the territory.90 The
‘pragmatic’ UC had for a long time known that a successful vote on independence could
occur only through limiting the electoral franchise.
All these tensions came to ahead in the 1984 territorial elections, which were
boycotted and obstructed by the FI (the LKS participated). The FI also withdrew all
members from government institutions and planned the establishment of the provisional
government of Kanaky, renaming itself the FLNKS. As Connell writes, through this
radicalisation, the FI ‘was coming much closer into line with the more militant and
socialist Palika, which had long argued that … independence will not fall from the sky
through the good will of Mitterrand, other Pacific countries, the United Nations or the
good God; it can only be achieved through the struggles of Kanaks and exploited
workers. Without a struggle there will be no independence.’91 The first Congress of the
FLNKS was attended by all pro-independence parties (the UC, Palika, UPM, PSK,
FULK), barring the LKS. Palika attended because it saw that the FLNKS had moved
towards its own more radical position in support of militancy and direct action.92
In the face of this crisis, a new plan was developed by a special envoy to the terri-
tory, Edgard Pisani, which advocated the solution of independence in association with
France, with a referendum in July 1985 and the possibility of independence in associa-
tion on January 1, 1986. Importantly, voting would be restricted to those who had lived
in the territory for at least three years. The FLNKS rejected this solution as neo-colonial,
with one FLNKS leader describing it as a ‘mutilated’ form of independence.93
Continued insurgency resulted in the development of a new plan by the French Prime
Minister, Laurent Fabius (herein after ‘the Fabius Plan”), which introduced one of the
key components of subsequent political compromises, the division of New Caledonia
into political regions, in this case four — the North, East, South and Loyalty regions —
and the devolution of powers to these regions. A referendum on self-determination was
proposed for 1987. This outcome was ultimately endorsed by the FLNKS at its 1985
Congress, albeit in a lukewarm manner.94 Significantly, the outcome of the elections was
a victory for the FLNKS in all regions bar the South, and it was UC militants who
acquired the role of President in the North, East and Loyalties.95 UC pre-eminence
reflected the numerical strength of the UC vis-à-vis other pro-independence parties, but
also the lead that the UC had taken in much of the militancy of 1984 and 1985. The UC
has paid a disproportionate price for this militancy with the assassination of a string of
leaders: first, UC Secretary-General Pierre Declercq in 1982, then UC leader Eloi
Machoro in 1985, followed by Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene in 1989.
The election of a conservative government in France in March 1986 produced a
blocking of funds to the regions and the development of a new statute, termed the Pons
Statute, which conceived of a division of the territory into four new regions, with the
north divided according to an east and west axis, a division that had been long opposed
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by the FLNKS.96 An acute level of frustration at the retraction of the meagre gains
constituted by the Fabius Plan led to the FLNKS boycotting the 1987 referendum and
the April 1988 regional elections.97 These boycotts were, for the first time, adhered to by
all pro-independence groups — the LKS had joined the FLNKS in the face of the deteri-
orating political circumstances. The political crisis served to focus energies on communal
goals and smooth over differences. This provisional solidarity was always going to be
sorely tested in less polarised political circumstances.
These indeed existed in the 1990s. As UC leader Roch Wamytan said in 1991,
‘Three years ago it was easy to be cohesive in the face of the active campaign against the
French; now the FLNKS needs to adjust to a new situation.’98 Internal tensions erupted
after the assassination of Tjibaou and Yeiwene by a militant pro-independence Kanak.
Much finger-pointing and recrimination ensued. At the same time the FLNKS had to
comport itself as a relatively united and responsible signatory to the Matignon Accords, a
juggling act that required much deft handling of discord.99
Since the signing of the Matignon Accords, compromise has continued to be the
Realpolitik of FLNKS policy, and this has led to further dissension among those who
perceive that little of substance has been done to improve Kanak economic and political
opportunities, let alone signal the possibility of independence. This has led the UC to lose
electoral support in favour of the less compromised Palika. Palika’s reputation as a more
militant party was strengthened in the 1990s as a result of tensions in the FLNKS between
UC leaders and the then FLNKS President, Palika’s Paul Neoutyne, who consistently
asserted demands for Kanak socialist independence in the face of equivocal comments on
the issue by UC leaders. In what amounted to an acknowledgment that such comments
had harmed the party, UC leader and Vice-President of the FLNKS, Roch Wamytan, said
that the party would channel its energies into winning support from other pro-independ-
ence parties, rather than becoming chummy with the RPCR.100 By 1995, relations
between Palika and the UC were not much better. After the Matignon Accords, senior
members of the UC broke away from the party and formed the Fédération des Comités
de Coordination d’Indépendence (FCCI).101 The FCCI claims to ‘cut across old
divisions’102 in its support of the accords, but its poor showing in the 2004 provincial
elections supports Connell’s earlier view that they are ‘perceived as having lost the support
of their constituencies’ and have joined ‘the line awaiting Lafleur’s powerful patronage’.103
Faced with the seeming obsequiousness of senior sections of the UC in the 1990s
and a Kanak electorate already suspicious of the Matignon Accords, the UC’s reputation
as leading party of the pro-independence cause has been seriously undermined. As one
Kanak commented in relation to the FLNKS, but also by implication the UC,
‘Challenge and distrust in the leadership come from the grassroots level, especially young
Kanak militants who have always felt betrayed by the signing of the Matignon Accords in
1988, sweeping away their dream to see a liberated Kanaky which many have died for
during the armed struggle against the French establishment in the early 1980s.’104
No unified FLNKS list could be agreed to in the lead up to the 1999 provincial
elections with various groupings contesting the three provinces. Fragmentation was even
more acute for the 2004 provincial elections, with 14 pro-independence lists in the
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Southern Province, nine in the north and eight in the Loyalty Islands.105 As a result, in
the Southern Province, no list received over the 5 per cent benchmark with the result that
six pro-independence seats were lost. The absence of any pro-independence voice in the
Southern Province creates a de facto form of partition in New Caledonia, which is, as
Maclellan notes, ‘in stark contrast to the spirit of partnership and “working together”
that the Noumea Accords encourages’.106 Fragmentation has led to voter support for
pro-independence parties (40 per cent) not being translated into seats in Congress (less
than one-third).107
Connell asks whether the unprecedented level of discord within the FLNKS
suggests that ‘FLNKS actually represents nothing more than an “imagined commu-
nity”’.108 Insofar as the independence imagination is fading within it, this might indeed
be the case. French Government policy has been very successful in reorienting independ-
ence energies towards more pragmatic questions of economic and social development,
with the result that the rage is no longer being maintained in many FLNKS quarters. But
there is a community that once belonged to the FLNKS that still imagines independ-
ence, and Palika appears to be one of its rising stars.109
Another is the militant Union Syndicalist des Travailleurs Kanak et Exploité
(USTKE). The USTKE was a founding member of the FLNKS and celebrated its 20th
anniversary in 2001, reaffirming ‘its goal of building a multiracial, independent
Kanaky’.110 It has been strongly critical of the Noumea Accord, in spite of being a party
to its negotiations.111 It is also the sole voice to demand an immediate accession to
independence on the grounds that any devolved process would result only in a country
dominated by loyalists.112 Perhaps because of its radicalism, the USTKE has been very
successful in the past 15 years in dominating unionism in New Caledonia. It has not
been shy about using confrontational strike action, winning significant gains for workers
in the process. This has further enhanced its appeal to workers of European, Melanesian
and, most importantly, Wallisian ethnicities, making it a genuinely multiracial organisa-
tion.113 The USTKE’s fusion of independence demands with militant unionism signals a
maturation of New Caledonian civil society. It recognises that colonial patronage has not
just affected the continuing political status of New Caledonia but has resulted in
endemic discriminatory economic relationships. Fighting for workers’ rights therefore
achieves not only purely economic goals but addresses underlying political inequities.114
Its multiracialism is also considered progressive in a context where race has often been the
fault-line of political divisiveness.
Centrist politics
Until recently, centrist politics have struggled to get a hold in New Caledonia. The
reasons for this are in part suggested by the analysis already undertaken: Kanak demands
for independence led to a polarisation of opinion and a political and ideological climate
that was far from conducive to moderation. This is not to say that attempts did not
occur, but the most successful of these were in the period before the eruption of
widespread violence in 1984 and subsequent to the enactment of the Matignon Accords,
which elevated moderation and compromise as a central dynamic of the political process.
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But there is another reason why centrist politics has had difficulty germinating.
This relates to the active efforts by conservative forces in the territory to stymie moderate
voices, be these political figures or the occasional forays into the media of centrist polit-
ical groups.115 The vilification throughout the 1960s of UC leader Maurice Lenormand
is a case in point. Despite his generally moderate views on promoting greater autonomy
in the territory, and his continued insistence that New Caledonia remain part of France,
he was subject to accusations of being a communist, to judicial prosecution on trumped-
up charges of being responsible for a bombing at the UC newspaper’s headquarters, as
well as having his house burnt.116 More generally, the UC’s political moderation before
their 1977 call for independence received little acknowledgment, let alone affirmation,
from conservative political groups.
One notable if short-lived exception was the prominence of the centrist FNSC
group, which did well in the 1979 territorial elections, gaining seven seats to the
RPCR’s 15 and the FI’s 14, and therefore holding the balance of power.117 FNSC
members had primarily been supporters of the UC in the period before its advocacy of
independence. They went into coalition with the FI in 1982 out of opposition to ‘the
RPCR’s inflexible response to the political demands of the FI’118 — a move that served
only to discredit them in the eyes of their supporters, with the result that the party
collapsed in 1984 and most supporters moved to the RPCR or even to the FN(NC).
The FNSC had tried to propagate more centrist views by establishing in 1981 a daily
newspaper, La Presse Calédonienne, in competition with the monopoly daily, Les
Nouvelles Calédoniennes, but the paper did not attract advertising revenue, largely as a
result of pressure from RPCR stalwarts on potential advertisers.119 This was not the first
time that such pressure tactics had been employed. Such practices are consistent with
Chappell’s observation that ‘Less respectful critics refer to Lafleur’s powerful political
and economic patronage system as a “mafia”’.120
The lack of success until recently of centrist political parties belies the fact that
centrist positions have a long heritage in New Caledonia and are rooted in important
sociological foundations. During the FNSC’s tenure, a conference organised by the
Socialist Government between the FI, the RPCR and the FNSC and held in France
acknowledged the place of Europeans of New Caledonian heritage, arguing that their
interests had often been forgotten in the polarisation around issues of independence, and
referring to this group as ‘victims of history’.121 These people have a long experience of
living alongside Melanesians, and their lifestyles evince considerable hybridity. In
addition, there is noticeable metissage within this community. They identify primarily as
Caledonian before being French, and have acquired the name Caldoche in recent years.
Although racism has tarnished their interactions with Melanesians, they are increasingly
aware of the need for mutual accommodation. Often they are people of modest means
who have difficulty identifying with the elitist politics of RPCR leaders. Their interests
were initially represented by the UC, which, as discussed above, advocated pluri-
ethnicity and championed various economic and social rights. The UC’s support for
political autonomy was consistent with this reformist agenda, but it was then always
a form of autonomy in association with France.
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It is the historical resonance of this position that enabled the Socialist Government
of François Mitterrand to propose in 1985 a compromise solution for the territory that
entailed a form of independence in association with France. While the proposal was
considered scandalous by pro- and anti-independence groups alike for giving away too
little or too much, it in fact advocated a position that had dominated postwar politics.
Doumenge notes that between 1953 and 1972, a majority of the electorate had favoured
‘internal autonomy’.122 Indeed, in the 1953 election for the Territorial Assembly, the UC
had advocated a form of autonomy with France retaining control only of foreign affairs,
defence and finance,123 a proposal that was uncannily similar to Pisani’s independence in
association. The UC again pushed for a similar statute in 1967.124
There is, therefore, considerable precedence to current decolonisation policies
enacted through the Matignon and Noumea Accords. Indeed, aside from the period of
acute polarisation over independence, all major political persuasions have at various
times called for a phased introduction of degrees of self-government in recognition of the
need to establish political institutions capable of assuming new responsibilities. Thus, the
UC’s reversion to a more centrist position in the 1990s is not only an acknowledgment of
its limited ability to continue an insurrectionary struggle, but also a reflection of genuine
ideological positions held within the party, particularly by its older leaders.
In addition to this historical resonance, the political impetus towards consensus and
conciliation promoted by the signing of the Matignon and Noumea Accords, as
discussed above, has undermined the ability of its signatories to assert extreme positions.
In the case of the FLNKS and the RPCR, the accords have largely undermined their
raison d’être. This is the context in which centrist political groups have acquired promi-
nence in the past 10 years. Their leaders in this period have been a handful of
well-known personalities in New Caledonia, foremost among them the businessman and
former Employers Federation head Didier Leroux. Leroux’s party, Une Nouvelle-
Calédonie Pour Tous (UNCT), formed in 1995, surprised most observers by winning
seven seats in the Southern Province and two in the Northern Province in elections held
that year. The UNCT’s success resulted in the RPCR losing its majority in the Territorial
Congress for the first time and precipitated new ‘unholy’ political alliances between
FLNKS members and the RPCR.125 In its election publicity, the UNCT voiced
positions that have come to characterise more centrist anti-independence politics. In
particular, the theme of promoting peace and toleration contrasted strongly with
Lafleur’s well-known assertion that the path towards peace was not through concessions
to the demands of the different communities in the territory but rather through
maintaining the strength of the European community in the face of these demands.
Rather, the UNCT considered New Caledonian ‘pluralism’ a positive characteristic not
“synonymous with division but … rather the expression of democracy’.126 Elsewhere
Leroux spoke of his desire for a society ‘where it is good to live together, and not in a
peace where the winner imposes itself on the loser’.127 In a direct swipe at Lafleur, the
UNCT called for more ethics in public life through avoiding ‘elected representatives
using their mandate in order to favour businesses in which they have interests in order to
enrich themselves personally’.128 At its first congress, the UNCT called for New
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Caledonia to remain linked to France through institutional, judicial and financial means,
but nonetheless advocated a large degree of political autonomy similar to that afforded
French Polynesia.129 By 2004, when Leroux was re-elected to Congress on the Avenir
Ensemble ticket, these political premises had permutated somewhat into a ‘deep convic-
tion that Caledonia can only remain in the Republic if it is able to construct a more just
and tolerant society’ through reducing ‘the political and social fractures that divide it’.130
Evidence that this desire was widespread came in the 2004 elections when Avenir
Ensemble gained a majority of seats in the Southern Province, displacing for the first
time the RPCR’s majority (19 to the RPCR’s 16). This resulted in Avenir Ensemble’s
Harold Martin replacing Jacques Lafleur as President. Martin had been one of several
prominent RPCR members (including Sonia Lagarde, Marie-Noëlle Thermereau and
Philippe Gomes) who had openly rebelled against Lafleur’s authority in the party during
the 2001 municipal elections by calling for greater democratisation and a greater adher-
ence to the consensual spirit of the Noumea Accords. Announcing his 2004 alliance with
Leroux, Martin stated that the goal of a ‘common destiny’ was not being pursued by the
RPCR, adding, ‘This agreement is supposed to help us build a common destiny,
whatever our political, ethnic differences are … But it certainly doesn’t look that way.’131
Martin was joined by Lagarde, Thermereau and Gomes on the Avenir Ensemble
ticket, and Thermereau was ultimately elected as President of the Government of New
Caledonia, signalling the demise of RPCR political authority and the emergence, as one
commentator put it, of a new form of stability in which ‘change has ceased to frighten’.132
When Themereau had resigned from the RPCR in 2001, she had done so denouncing
Lafleur’s ‘impressive drift towards greater and greater personal power’.133 Her election
was greeted with cheers from a packed gallery. Analogies were drawn with the fall of the
Berlin Wall and comments were made that people could now express themselves freely
without fear of reprisals, indicating how strong Lafleur’s personal power had been.134 But
Themereaux’s election was not just a beginning; it also signified a fruition of changes that
had been occurring during the 1990s. In the decade after the signing of the Matignon
Accords, various forums broached the issue of a New Caledonian identity that was not
racially delineated. Work done by scholars at the French University of the Pacific, as well
as by writers and journalists, has taken impetus from the sentiments of the accords to
advance a view of New Caledonian identity that dared speak in reconciliatory terms.135
Avenir Ensemble’s ascendancy in part reflects this work. FLNKS leader Roch Wamytan
was indeed correct when he commented that the Noumea Accord showed ‘mentalities
had evolved’.136 This evolution might result in a greater acknowledgment of the neces-
sity, and perhaps the benefits, of coexistence, but it suggests the need for independence. 
The extent to which the political question has now shifted away from that of
independence per se to one of coexistence is evident in the changing political discourse of
hitherto more radical politicians. Palika’s Déwé Gorodé was elected as Government Vice-
President in the 2004 elections. In a subsequent radio interview, she interpreted the new
citizenship called for in the Noumea Accord as involving Kanak acceptance of ‘those who
arrived in our country after us, to build the nation together’. Reflecting on the process
leading up to the Noumea Accord, she added, ‘It meant we had to talk with them, we
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had to work with them, and then we signed an agreement with them. We must convince
each other and work together to build this country.’137 Such conciliatory discourse is a
far cry from the radicalism of calls for Kanak socialist independence. It suggests that pro-
independence politics is also working to win over the expanding middle ground.138
Conclusion
It is broadly accepted that some of New Caledonia’s longstanding political structures —
particularly the RPCR and the FLNKS — are in disarray. These signatory parties to the
Matignon and Noumea Accords bear the responsibility for reorienting politics away from
acute physical confrontation towards more conciliatory processes. Perhaps ironically,
however, they have both demonstrated an inability to reorient their own modus operandi
towards this new political logic. 
I have argued that this political atmosphere has drawn out sentiments that have
always existed as undercurrents in New Caledonian society. These include acute racism,
divisive French policies towards the colony, a powerful comprador class that has stymied
equitable development and a period of heightened political tension precipitated by
demands for independence that banished any moderation from the political lexicon for a
very long time. The RPCR and the FLNKS signed up to the accords because, essentially,
they had little choice given the level of insurgency and the possibility of civil war. Perhaps
it is now fitting that the baton should be handed on to new, or fundamentally reworked,
political forces, which can bring a fresher eye to the formidable tasks ahead. For many,
this still involves achieving independence for New Caledonia. Loyalist politics have come
quite a way in countenancing this possibility, just as pro-independence politics have
muted the more radical calls for an independence determined by Kanaks alone. But the
centrist forces emerging at the moment are unlikely to trip the wire and support
independence in nine years. This will result in ever increasing numbers of disenfran-
chised Kanaks, and perhaps Wallisians, who cannot look to a future in which their
interests come to the fore. Lest we forget the lessons of the 1960s and 1970s, this is the
stuff from which radicalism is born.
Footnotes
1 Doumenge, Jean-Pierre. 1995. ‘L’Enracinement des mouvements politiques en Nouvelle-Calédonie:
Faits et Prospective’. Unpublished paper. p. 3.
2 The French Government is required to allocate three-quarters of its civil capital investment funds and
project subsidies to the northern and Islands Provinces. High Commission of the Republic in New
Caledonia. 1977. New Caledonia: The Matignon Accords, 1991 Progress Report. Noumea: Pacific
Compos. p. 8.
3 Wamytan Roch cited in Connell, John. 2003. ‘New Caledonia: An Infinite Pause in Decolonization?’
The Round Table, Vol. 368. pp. 125–43, at p. 130.
4 Connell, John. 1987. ‘New Caledonia or Kanaky? The political history of a French colony.’ Pacific
Research Monograph, No. 16, Canberra: National Development Studies Centre, ANU. p. 97.
Political Parties in the Pacific160
            
5 McCallum, Wayne. 1992. ‘European Loyalist and Polynesian Political Dissent in New Caledonia: The
Other Challenge to RPCR Orthodoxy.’ Pacific Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3. pp. 39–40.
6 Chanter, Alaine. 2002. ‘Postcolonial Politics and Colonial Media Representations in New Caledonia.’
Pacific Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3. pp. 17–36, at pp. 26–7. 
7 Connell, 2003, op. cit. p. 128.
8 Maclellan, Nic. 1999. ‘The Noumea Accord and Decolonisation in New Caledonia.’ The Journal of
Pacific History, Vol. 34, No. 3. pp. 245–52, at p. 249.
9 The population of Melanesians fell from 44.8 per cent in 1988 to 44.1 per cent in 1998. Maclellan,
ibid. p. 5.
10 Pacific Report, June 25, 1992.
11 Ibid.
12 Connell, 2003, op. cit. p. 130.
13 Bensa, Alban and Eric Wittersheim. 1998. ‘A la recherché d’un destin commun en Nouvelle-
Calédonie.’ Le Monde Diplomatique. Available at
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1998/07/BENSA/10658.html,
14 Ibid.
15 Chappell, David A. 1999. ‘The Noumea Accord: Decolonization Without Independence in New
Caledonia?’ Pacific Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2. pp. 373–91.
16 Maclellan, Nic. 2004. ‘From Eloi to Europe: Interactions with the ballot box in New Caledonia.’
Unpublished paper. p. 11.
17 Ibid. p. 12.
18 Bensa and Wittersheim, op. cit.
19 Chesneaux, Jean. 1988. ‘Kanak Political Culture and French Political Practice: Some Background
Reflections on the New Caledonian Crisis’. In Michael Spencer, Alan Ward and John Connell (eds),
New Caledonia: Essays in Nationalism and Dependency, St Lucia: Queensland University Press. pp.
56–80, at p. 68.
20 Chanter, Alaine. 1999. ‘Will There Be a Morning After? The Colonial History of the Media in New
Caledonia.’ The Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 91–108, at pp. 94–6. 
21 McCallum, op. cit. p. 33.
22 Henningham, Stephen. 1992. France and the South Pacific: A Contemporary History. North Sydney:
Allen & Unwin. p. 55.
23 Dornoy, Miriam. 1984. Politics in New Caledonia. Sydney: Sydney University Press. p. 197.
24 Frogier was elected President of New Caledonia’s Government Council in 2001. Chappell, David A.
2002. ‘New Caledonia — Political Review.’ The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 14, No. 2. pp. 446–55, at
448–9.
25 Dornoy, op. cit. p. 159.
26 Connell, 1987, op. cit. p. 248.
27 Ibid. pp. 249–50.
28 Ibid. p. 254.
29 Dornoy, op. cit. p. 199.
30 Ibid. pp. 260–1.
31 Henningham, op. cit. pp. 64–5.
32 McCallum, op. cit. p. 33.
33 Henningham, op. cit. pp. 49–56; Connell, 1987, op. cit. pp. 243–8.
34 McCallum, op. cit. p. 33.
35 Ibid. pp. 29–32; Doumenge, op. cit. p. 19.
36 McCallum, op. cit. pp. 28–9.
37 Ibid. p. 56.
38 Ibid. p. 33.
39 Ibid. p. 35.
40 Ibid. p. 39.
41 Ibid. p. 38.
42 Chanter, 2002, op. cit. pp. 26–7.
Parties and the New Political Logic in New Caledonia 161
                        
43 McCallum, op. cit. pp. 46–7.
44 Henningham, op. cit. p. 107.
45 McCallum, op. cit. p. 41.
46 Ibid. 44.
47 Ibid.
48 McCallum, ibid. pp. 43–4, notes that the FN(NC) has, on a couple of occasions, engaged in electoral
alliance with the RPCR in order to maximise the loyalist vote.
49 Ibid. pp. 44–5.
50 Chappell, 2002, op. cit. p. 449.
51 Connell, 2003, op. cit. p. 135.
52 McCallum, op. cit. p. 51.
53 Ibid.
54 Maclellan, 1999, op. cit. p. 248; Chappell, 1999, op. cit. p. 380.
55 Maclellan, ibid. p. 248.
56 Chappell, 2002, op. cit. pp. 449, 455.
57 Ibid. p. 455.
58 Dornoy, op. cit. pp. 166–167.
59 Ibid. p. 160.
60 The exception is Paul Neoutyne of Palika, who was FLNKS President in the mid-1990s.
61 Henningham, op. cit. pp. 49–50.
62 Kurtovich, Ismet. 2000. ‘A Communist Party in New Caledonia (1941–1948).’ The Journal of Pacific
History, Vol. 35, No. 2. pp. 163–79.
63 Dornoy, op. cit. p. 161.
64 Ibid. p. 164.
65 Henningham, op. cit. pp. 53–4.
66 Dornoy, op. cit. p. 165.
67 Ibid. p. 168.
68 Cited in Dornoy, Ibid. p. 170.
69 Connell, 1987, op. cit. pp. 262–8; Dornoy, op. cit. p. 177.
70 Henningham, op. cit. p. 77.
71 Ibid.
72 Connell, 1987, op. cit. pp. 262–8.
73 Dornoy, op. cit. p. 185.
74 Henningham, op. cit. p. 79.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Dornoy, op. cit. p. 187.
78 Ibid. p. 79.
79 Henningham, op. cit. p. 79.
80 Dornoy, op. cit. p. 249.
81 Ibid. p. 210.
82 Connell, 1987, op. cit. p. 278.
83 Ibid.
84 The FI consisted of the UC, Palika, FULK, UPM and the PSC (Connell, 1987, op cit. p. 278).
85 Ibid.
86 Connell, 1987, op. cit. pp. 286–8.
87 Ibid. pp. 299–304.
88 Ibid. p. 305.
89 Ibid. pp. 310–11.
90 Ibid. p. 311.
91 Cited in ibid. p. 316.
92 The founding parties of the FLNKS were the UC, Palika, UPM, PSK, FULK, the USTKE and the
Groupe des Femmes Kanakes Exloitées en Lutte (GFKEL).
93 Hnalaine Uregei cited in Connell, 1987, op. cit. p. 339.
Political Parties in the Pacific162
    
94 Connell, 1987, op. cit. p. 352.
95 Henningham, op. cit. pp. 99–102.
96 Ibid. pp. 100–1.
97 Ibid. p. 102.
98 Pacific Report, November 21, 1991.
99 There were suspicions that FULK had played a role in the plan to assassinate Tjibaou and Yeiwene.
100 Pacific Report, November 22, 1993.
101 Maclellan, 1999, op. cit. p. 247.
102 Connell, 2003, op. cit. p. 132.
103 Ibid. p. 132.
104 Cited in ibid. p.133.
105 Macllellan, 2004, op. cit. p. 11.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Connell, 2003, op. cit. p. 140.
109 Chappell, 2002, op. cit. p. 451.
110 Ibid. p. 454.
111 Pacific Report, February 28, 1998.
112 Bensa and Wittersheim, op. cit.
113 Chappell, 1999, op. cit. p. 381.
114 Hnalaine Uregei, personal correspondence, 1994.
115 Chanter, 1999, op. cit.
116 Henningham, op. cit. pp. 59–60.
117 Connell, 1987, op. cit. p. 279.
118 McCallum, op. cit. p. 36.
119 Chanter, 1999, op. cit. p. 101.
120 Chappell, 2002, op. cit. p. 452.
121 Henningham, op. cit. pp. 74–5; Barbançon, Louis-José. 1992. Le Pays du Non-Dit. Nouméa: Offset
Cinq Edition, p. 62.
122 Doumenge, op. cit. p. 1.
123 Connell, 1998, op. cit. p. 245.
124 Connell, 1987, op. cit. p. 253.
125 Pacific Report, July 31, 1995.
126 UNCT online. 1996. Available at www.UNCT@geocities.com,
127 L’Humanité online, October 26, 1996.
128 UNCT online, op. cit.
129 Pacific Report, November 1, 1996; L’Humanité online, op. cit.
130 Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie online. 2003.




134 ‘Political Quakes Shake French Pacific: The End of an Era?’ Oceania Flash online, June 7, 2004.
Available at http://www.asiapac.org.fj/cafepacific/resources/aspac/tahiti070604.html
135 Coulon, Marc (ed.) 1996. Ètre Caldoche aujourd’hui. Lifou: Ile de Lumière.
136 ‘Le oui l’emporte au référendum sur la Nouvelle-Calédonie.’ TF1 online, November 8, 1998.
137 ‘Building the nation in New Caledonia — Program Three Opinion by Déwé Gorodé.’ ABC online,
2004. Available at http://abc.net.au/timetotalk/english/opinion/TimeToTalkOpinion_440057.htm
138 Gorodé’s election means that the two highest positions in government are held by women. These were
the first provincial elections in which a new law required equal representation of women and men on
party tickets. The law came into effect in the French Pacific in 2000 and requires that ‘On each list, the
difference between the number of candidates of each sex can be no greater than one. Each list must be
composed alternatively [sic] by a candidate of each sex.’ Cited in Maclellan, 2004, op. cit. p. 4.
Parties and the New Political Logic in New Caledonia 163
                                

9




The Fiji Group consists of more than 300 islands, which were colonised by the British in
1874, a period concurrent with the expansive phase of industrial capitalist development
and commercial growth in Europe. Through colonisation, Fiji was absorbed into the
capitalist world economy, joining Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. Before colonisation,
indigenous Fijians believed that they had lived in Fiji since ‘time immemorial’, translated
in Fijian as ‘e na dua na gauna makawa sara’. The latest archaeological evidence of human
settlement in Fiji, estimated to be 3,000 years old, was discovered recently on the island
of Moturiki in the Lomaiviti Group.1
Indigenous Fijian sociopolitical and economic organisation in the pre-European era
was organised along relationships that emanated from sociopolitical structures such as
the ‘itokatoka’ (extended family), ‘mataqali’ (sub-clans), ‘yavusa’ (clans), ‘vanua’ and
‘matanitu’ which were both political constructs. Outside Fiji, regular contacts were
maintained with nearby neighbours, Tonga to the east and Samoa to the north-east. In
this context, and also because of its geographical location, Fiji has always been classified
by anthropologists and other scholars as comprising Polynesian and Melanesian charac-
teristics in terms of the physical features of the people as well as culture.
After colonisation on October 10, 1874, the Colonial Administration established
a complex system of indirect rule through the Native (later Fijian) Administration.
Similar to the model of a ‘state within a state’, the institution was to govern Fijians
through their chiefs.2 The institution, although restructured over the years, has been
maintained ever since. The arrival of Indian indentured labourers in 1879 and other
later immigrants did not affect the operation of the system of indirect rule. While later
immigrants were governed directly by the Colonial State, Fijians were administered
through the Native Administration.
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Party politics was introduced to Fiji in the 1960s, before political independence in
1970. It continued the Colonial Government’s system of representation through the
Executive and Legislative Councils. The membership system in the Legislative Council
was organised along ethnic lines according to the major ethnic groups in Fiji, namely
Fijians, Indo-Fijians and Europeans. This system of representation reflected colonial
compartmentalisation of races in Fiji. It was an administrative leadership strategy of
divide and rule, which was characteristic of leadership in the colonies of the British
Empire. The specifics of such political leadership depended on the nature of the society
in which colonisation was imposed. 
I have identified three major periods of active party formation in Fiji between 1970
and 2005. These are 1970 to 1987; 1990 to 2000; and 2001 and beyond. The period
between 1987 and 1990 saw military rule in Fiji after the execution of two military coup
d’etats by Major General Sitiveni Rabuka. These periods have also seen three different
constitutions: the 1970 Independence Constitution, the 1990 (post-1987 coups)
Constitution, and the 1997 Constitution. Fiji’s Independence Constitution introduced a
bicameral system of government based on the Westminster model, consisting of an Upper
and Lower House, or Senate and House of Representatives respectively. The Upper House
consisted of 22 nominated members, and the Lower House 52 elected members.3 The
1990 Constitution saw the Westminster bicameral system of government continue,
however, the allocation of seats in the Upper and Lower Houses changed to 34 and 70
members respectively.4 This altered again after the 1997 Constitution, whereby the Senate
had 32 nominated members, and the House of Representatives 71 elected members.5














































































































Figure  9.1: Fijian Islands
  
Two different electoral systems were adopted under the three constitutions in Fiji.
The ‘first-past-the-post’ system was used from the first elections in 1963 until the
elections of 1994 and the ‘alternative-vote system’, which was adopted from the
Australian electoral system for use in 1999, remains in place to this day. Since the begin-
ning of party politics in the 1960s, Fiji has had an ethnic voting system whereby citizens
vote under the three major ethnic categories, namely Fijian,6 Indo-Fijian7 and general
voters.8 The constitutionalisation of this ethnic voting system in 1970 re-enforced ethnic
politics in Fiji. 
Considering Fiji’s colonial background, it was inevitable that the ethnic nature of
political parties in Fiji emerged and prospered. In this sense, Fiji’s pioneering political
parties in the post-independent period reflected ethnic cleavages and formed a ‘natural’
extension of the different political demands during the period of colonisation, as Ali
makes clear:
As rulers, British officials had to satisfy simultaneously three divergent requests: to
safeguard Fijian paramountcy, to preserve the privileges of the European minority
resentful of any attempt to erode their special position, and to grant Indians political
rights which did not emphasize inequality and discrimination against them.9
In 1929, after the granting of franchise to Indians along racial lines, Vishnu Deo, the
Indian Member for the Southern Constituency, made further demands. He introduced a
motion into the Legislative Council that common franchise be granted to Indians similar
to that granted to other British subjects in the colony, as the communal franchise was
regarded by Indians as a direct contradiction of the Colonial Government’s undertaking
that Indians would be treated equally with other races in Fiji.10
Fijians by this time had not been granted the franchise. Their representatives to the
Legislative Council were nominated by the Governor through the Council of Chiefs.
Demands by Vishnu Deo for common franchise for Indians were interpreted by
European and Fijian members of the Legislative Council as an infringement of the
supremacy of Fijian rights in the Deed of Cession Charter. Furthermore, for Fijians, like
Europeans, a common roll implied Indian dominance so the proposal was rejected on
these grounds. Specifically, the Indian political demand for a common franchise threat-
ened the European politico-economic dominance in Fiji.11
By the 1950s, when the demand for a common roll had still not been granted,
Indo-Fijian leaders nevertheless pressed for a political system that enabled greater partici-
pation in decision-making by local people. Self-government rather than government by
colonial bureaucracy would have enabled greater participation and integration of Indo-
Fijians, they argued. This would have facilitated their acquisition of an indispensable
position in the colony.12
Fijian demands were influenced by the changes that were introduced mostly
through colonisation. According to Ali:
The realization that a community descended from immigrant labourers was likely to
outnumber them, perhaps permanently in their native land aroused deep emotions of
future uncertainty.13
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By 1960, 10 years before political independence, Fiji had emerged as a colony that was
beset by compartmentalised interests. No common ground had been forged by the three
major races as a basis for establishing the foundation of a nation-state. Different demands
emerged and shaped the nature of Fiji’s political parties in the period immediately before
and after political independence. 
Party politics in Fiji: a brief history
The practice of party politics among the different ethnic groups in Fiji was clearly influ-
enced by the historical experiences of each group. For indigenous Fijians, the first and
perhaps foremost influence was their culture. Specifically, traditional relations within
sociopolitical constructs such as the ‘itokatoka’, ‘mataqali’, ‘yavusa’, ‘vanua’ and ‘matanitu’ 14
influenced the structure and nature of Fijian political parties. In modern Fiji, relations
within these constructs are utilised to either solicit support or extend competition, rivalry
and dissent. Internal competition for power among the different vanua and matanitu
throughout Fiji explains regional cleavages in the formation of Fijian political parties. In
the first general elections in 1963, for instance, the two regions in Fiji in which political
parties were formed were eastern and western Viti Levu. In eastern Viti Levu, the Fijian
Association was dominated by eastern Fijian chiefs and elites, and it would go on to
become the Fijian arm of the Alliance Party (AP) when it formed in 1966, the other two
arms being the Indian Alliance and the General Electors. The Fijian Association was
formed in 1955 by high chiefs in the Fijian Affairs Board, the ruling body of the Fijian
Administration. To counter the formation of this chiefly organisation in eastern Fiji, in
western Viti Levu, two different parties came to prominence, namely the Western
Democratic Party (WDP) and the Fijian National Party (FNP), both of which were
formed by key Fijian political figures, Apisai Tora and Isikeli Nadalo respectively. 
Founder of the WDP, Apisai Tora, hails from the village of Natalau in the province
of Ba in western Viti Levu. His political career in Fiji has spanned a period of more than
four decades and he continues to serve as a Fijian Senator to this day. Along with the
WDP, he has been directly involved in the formation of three other Fijian political parties
in western Fiji, an accomplishment unmatched in the history of party politics in Fiji.
Similarly, the founder of the FNP, the late Isikeli Nadalo, came from the western
Viti Levu province of Nadroga/Navosa and was involved in Fiji’s party politics for more
than 20 years. Nadalo and Tora joined the Indian-dominated National Federation Party
(NFP) for a long period. Tora, however, joined the eastern Fijian-dominated AP in 1981
and remained in it until after the general elections of April 1987, when the AP lost to the
Fiji Labour Party (FLP)/NFP Coalition.
Such regional cleavage in the formation of Fijian political parties demonstrates the
complexity of power relations within Fijian society, as there was no overall Fijian chief
before colonisation by the British.
Even though Fijians have formed different political parties over the years, a second
major factor and common, uniting thread in this process has been the shared experience
of Fijians through colonisation, i.e., the threat of being politically marginalised by new
immigrants in their native land. Major Fijian political parties that have formed to
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promote and defend the supremacy of Fijian rights in Fiji include the Fiji Independent
Party (FIP), the Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP), the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
(SVT) Party and the Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) Party.
FIP was formed in 1971 and contested only the first post-independence general
election of 1972. Its first and only President was Viliame Savu. Most of its members were
active in the formation of the Fijian Chamber of Commerce before political independ-
ence, and many of them went on to join Sakeasi Butadroka’s15 FNP, which was formed
in 1974 and shared much of FIP’s political ideology, namely the promotion of indige-
nous Fijian rights over other ethnic groups in Fiji.16
The SVT Party was formed with the sanction of the ‘Bose Levu Vakaturaga’ or
Council of Chiefs after the 1987 military coups and the promulgation of the 1990
Constitution. Its aim was to replace the Fijian Association arm of the AP as the
mainstream Fijian political party. The SDL Party was formed in 2001 as a consequence
of George Speight’s coup in 2000. Like AP and the SVT Party, it emerged as an eastern
Fijian mainstream political party, aiming, perhaps, to capture the political power base of
both of its predecessors. It promotes the rights of indigenous Fijians and Rotumans
through its policies on affirmative action.
In essence, then, since the two military coups of 1987 and the re-enforcement of
ethnic politics through the 1990 Constitution, newly formed Fijian political parties have
tended towards an emphasis on ethnicity as the most important criterion in the forma-
tion of Fijian political parties. A promise to serve Fijian interests has been the most
common platform among Fijian political parties. While some parties, such as AP, have
attempted to present a broad platform for all Fijians, others, because of their regional or
ideological confinement, inevitably narrow their platform to their ‘home’ regions or to
certain groups of Fijians. Examples of regionally based political parties are the Party of
National Unity (PANU), the Bai Kei Viti (BKV) in western Viti Levu and the Matanitu
Vanua (MV) in Vanua Levu and northern Tailevu. Ideologically confined parties include
the Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito (VLV) or Christian Democrats17 and the
Nationalist Vanua Tako-Lavo Party (NVTLP).
Among Indo-Fijians, the major influence in the formation of political parties
reflected the nature of the economic exploitation they encountered during the colonial
era. On the one hand, were the demands of those who came to Fiji as indentured
labourers for the Australian-owned Colonial Sugar Refining (CSR) Company. On the
other, were the demands of those who had immigrated to Fiji as free settlers and estab-
lished their own businesses. Political demands initially reflected the different classes of
Indian immigrants. The political issues that arose from the core of the Indian middle
class expressed a demand for equality with European settlers in terms of the adoption of a
common roll electoral system. Further demands emerged in the mid-1930s on issues
relating to farmers’ leases after the abolition of the indenture system. In response to these
political demands, the Colonial Government attempted to encourage moderate leader-
ship among militant Indo-Fijians.18
Demands for a common roll were further kept at bay by the Colonial Administration
with consistent evocation of the Deed of Cession Charter, which stated that its foremost
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task was to safeguard the paramountcy of Fijian interests. Indians were seen by
Europeans and Fijians as a threat to their interests. For Europeans, political equality
implied a challenge to their political and economic monopoly in Fiji. For Fijians, it was a
direct challenge to their sociopolitical and economic rights as the indigenous people of
Fiji.19 If European colonisation was bad enough, being dominated by Indians in their
native land after colonisation was seen as even worse. The fear resulting from Indo-Fijian
political demands thus shaped the nature of party politics in Fiji.
Indo-Fijian political parties on the whole evolved through the contest for leadership
between those who lived in the cane-growing areas, especially in western Viti Levu, and
the urban middle class who lived mostly in Suva, in south-eastern Viti Levu. The more
militant leaders of the farmers’ unions in western Viti Levu went on to form the NFP in
1966 and the moderates in Suva formed the Indo-Fijian arm of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara’s
AP in 1966.20
Party politics between 1970 and 1987
The AP formed in 196621 and was multiracial, including members from all three major
ethnic groups — the Fijian Association, the Indian Alliance and the General Electors.22
Each party member joined the AP through one of the ethnic components of the party.
In this context, although AP was multiracial, it was dictated by the requirements of
ethnicity. Like a government within a government, each of the three arms of the party
was a separate entity within a whole. In reality, the party’s constitution and its manifestos
were interpreted in three different ways by AP members. An understanding of the party
and what it meant to members was viewed through an ethnic lens.
Members of the Fijian Association arm viewed the AP from the perspective of the
eastern Fijian sociopolitical hierarchy since the party was founded by eastern Fijian high
chiefs in the Fijian Administration, such as Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau and Ratu Sir
Penaia Ganilau. The political power base of the Fijian Association was derived from
grassroots village Fijians in the 14 provinces. This support was gained mainly out of
respect for chiefs in party politics. An understanding of the party and its complexities was
derived through its elite leadership. Leadership within the Fijian Association arm of the
AP followed traditional hierarchy and protocol.23 In this context, although the AP was
multiracial, its Fijian Association members regarded the party as the only party that
safeguarded the paramountcy of Fijian interests and should promote such interests first
and foremost. As such, being founded on a basis of unity of race and class, the AP was a
fragile political organisation. Durutalo makes the point that: 
The composition of the party was politically volatile because ethnic Fijian grass root
[sic] unity was used to support class interests.24
This further demonstrated that the multiracial union within the AP was inevitably an
‘unbalanced and an unequal one’. During the 1982 voter registration, out of a total of
14,304 registered AP voters, 10,503 (73 per cent) were Fijians, 2,104 (14.71 per cent)
were Indo-Fijians and 1,697 (11.86 per cent) were general electors.25 These figures
demonstrate the dominance of the Fijian Association arm in the ‘multiracial’ AP.
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Likewise, the other political parties that were formed by other ethnic groups were
dominated by those ethnic groups. The NFP, for instance, was almost a wholly Indo-
Fijian party, as seen in the results of voter registration before the 1982 general elections.
Out of a total of 9,799 registered voters, the NFP registered 9,406 Indo-Fijian (96 per
cent), 356 Fijians (3.6 per cent), and 37 General Electors (0.36 per cent).26
Unity among members of the Fijian Association arm of the AP was maintained
through patron-clientelism whereby the patrons or the political leaders maintained the
allegiance of their clients (voters) in a number of ways. Perhaps, first and foremost, was
the traditional allegiance of the clients to the patrons and vice versa. Most of the political
leaders in the Fijian Association were eastern Fijian chiefs so their traditional status was
used in a modern context to demarcate power bases.27 Before the beginning of party
politics, Fijians had never participated in modern elections in which they had to vote for
their leaders as individuals. Fijian membership of the Legislative Council until 1963 was
by way of the Governor’s nomination through the Council of Chiefs. 
The first general election after independence was in 1972. By this time, it was clear
that two major political parties dominated Fiji’s party politics. These were the AP and the
NFP. The general electors, who were the ‘non-Fijians’ and ‘non-Indo-Fijians’, in general
had always voted with the AP. 
Under the 1970 Constitution, there were 52 seats in Fiji’s House of Representatives
for which voting was conducted according to a ‘first-past-the-post’ system. Fiji was
demarcated into three different electoral boundaries to cater for the three ethnic voting
categories of Fijians, Indo-Fijians and the general electors, which were further divided
into communal and national seats. The results of the 1972 general election, as shown in
the table below, reflect the polarity of Fiji’s party politics and the general tendency of each
ethnic category to vote for its own party — Fijians for the AP and Indo-Fijians for the
NFP. General electors tended to vote with the AP throughout its 17 years of existence
between 1970 and 1987.
Table 9.1: Results of the 1972 General Elections.
Seats Alliance Party National Federation Party
Fijian communal 12 0
Indo-Fijian communal 0 12
General communal 3 0
Fijian national 7 3
Indo-Fijian national 7 3
General national 4 1
Total seats 33 19
(Source: Howard, M. C. 1991. p. 82.)
The dissenting tradition in Fijian party politics (1970–87)
Between the two major ethnic groups, Fijians and Indo-Fijians, the latter tended to
subscribe to the NFP, at least before the formation of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) in
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1985. Fijians, on the other hand, have always formed alternative political parties since
party politics began in the 1960s. 
Apart from the two major political parties — the AP and the NFP — a minor
Fijian political party that also contested the elections in 1972 was Viliame Savu’s Fiji
Independent Party (FIP). The FIP was formed by a group of Fijians who were dissatisfied
with the Fijian Association and also with the terms of Fiji’s Independence Constitution.
In my interview with Savu in 2002, he indicated that the chiefs who had negotiated Fiji’s
Independence Constitution had not done enough to secure a special place for indigenous
Fijians; in particular, they did not do enough to help Fijians in setting up businesses.
Their dissent was finally expressed in the formation of an alternative Fijian political
party.28 Fijian political parties in this perspective became an avenue for expressing dissent
within Fijian society. This opportunity was not open during the period of colonisation
when all citizens were united under the Colonial State and there were limited avenues for
redressing problems.29
There were other Fijians who joined non-Fijian political parties such as the NFP.
These included Apisai Tora and Isikeli Nadalo of western Viti Levu, Ratu Julian
Toganivalu, a chief of Bau, and Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, a high chief of Rewa. Tora and
Nadalo formed their political parties, the Western Democratic Party and the Fijian
National Party respectively, in the 1960s. They joined the NFP in 1972. In 1975, Sakeasi
Butadroka of Rewa joined the ranks of dissenting Fijians when he formed the FNP. As
discussed earlier, supporters of FIP supported Butadroka’s FNP after its formation.
Butadroka extended the FIP’s ‘Fijian marginalisation’ claim by accusing the AP
Government of not doing enough to help indigenous Fijians. He blamed Fijian
economic marginalisation on the prosperity of non-Fijians. Butadroka’s solution for this
problem was the repatriation of Indo-Fijians to India. His racial outburst in Parliament
cost him his AP parliamentary seat when he was dismissed by former AP Prime Minister,
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. 
Not all dissenting Fijians subscribed to Butadroka’s solution to Fijian economic
marginalisation. Each dissenting group from different regions of Fiji continued to form
their own parties or joined other political parties such as the NFP. Ratu Soso Katonivere,
a high chief from the Pprovince of Macuata in Vanua Levu, joined other dissenting
Fijians in the NFP. During the first elections of April 1977, Ratu Osea Gavidi of
Nadroga in western Viti Levu stood as an independent candidate at the request of the
Nadroga/Navosa chiefs and people. He won a seat in Parliament. Gavidi championed the
plight of the pine landowners in his province who were marginalised by the AP
Government’s policy on the development of the pine industry.30
Dissent among indigenous Fijians caused the first defeat of the AP at the polls in
April 1977. Butadroka’s FNP managed to gain 25 per cent of indigenous Fijian votes.
The FNP undercut the AP political power base, causing a victory for the rival NFP.
Other Fijians who stood as independents or joined other political parties such as the
NFP also won seats in Parliament. However, a leadership rift within the NFP after the
April 1977 general elections delayed their choice of a Prime Minister. This resulted in the
nomination of former AP Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, by the Governor-
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General, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, to lead a care taker government until elections were
held again in September 1977, which the AP won.31
The AP’s return to power created more challenges. By 1981, a new Fijian political
party, based in western Viti Levu, Ratu Osea Gavidi’s ‘Western United Front’ (WUF),
was formed. With the backing of western pine landowners, Gavidi won his seat in 1977
as an independent candidate. The pine landowners’ longstanding grievance against the
AP finally culminated in another Fijian political party. Lal explains that:
Western Fijians have long complained of regional discrimination and step-brotherly
treatment. In the 1960s and early 1970s, several attempts were made to re-assert a
distinct western identity, but the separatist tendencies were contained through tradi-
tional reconciliation ceremonies. The WUF is the latest and probably the most
ambitious attempt to articulate western grievances in some coherent political fashion.32
During the 1982 general elections, the AP managed to win 28 of the 52 seats in
Parliament, with the WUF winning two and the NFP 22.33 Opposition to AP rule
continued and, in 1985, the formation of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) posed the ultimate
challenge to the long reign of AP.
The Fiji Labour Party and the 1987 military coups
The most formidable opposition to the AP between 1970 and 1987 occurred with the
formation of the FLP in 1985. While Fiji’s political parties have always tended to be
ethnic in orientation, the FLP was the first attempt to form a large political party
through the trade unions. As I made clear in 2000,34
The formation of the party posed a long term challenge to ethnic politics in Fiji,
especially in an era of increasing globalisation. The specific impetus behind the forma-
tion of the party lay in the IMF-required austerity measures in 1984-85 which
recommended deregulation of the labour market, reduction in the size of government,
a freeze on the expansion of the civil service posts, a wage freeze, privatization of
parastatals, and removal of price controls and subsidies.
The door for political competition was opened wide after the formation of the FLP. The
party was not only well organised and supported locally by workers across the ethnic
divide, it had its international affiliations through global labour and trade union organ-
isations. The FLP’s multi-ethnic structure threatened a number of interests in Fiji, not
least the AP. While the AP was viewed broadly as an elite multiracial party, the FLP did
not have its ethnic compartmentalisation and people could become direct members.
The leadership of the FLP by Dr Timoci Bavadra, an indigenous western Fijian, posed a
direct threat to eastern Fijian chiefly elites who had assumed the leadership role in Fiji
since independence in 1970. The party also challenged class interests within Fiji’s polit-
ical economy.35 FLP’s coalition with the NFP finally sealed the fate of the AP in the
general elections of 1987, ending its 17-year rule. Exactly one month after Dr Bavadra’s
FLP/NFP Coalition Government formed, however, the first 1987 military coup d’etat
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was executed by Major General Sitiveni Rabuka. The coup overthrew Fiji’s 1970
Constitution together with its elected government.
Party politics under the 1990 Constitution (1990–2000)
Between the two coups of 1987 and 1990, Fiji was ruled by an interim military govern-
ment under the leadership of former AP Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. It was
during this period that the Fijian establishment through the Council of Chiefs attempted
to introduce a number of things. First was the promulgation of a new constitution for
Fiji in 1990. The Constitution and its electoral provisions were regarded as racist by non-
Fijians and also some Fijians. Second, in 1991, a new Fijian political party was launched
to replace the Alliance Party. The ‘Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei’ (SVT) Party was
formed with the blessing of the Council of Chiefs. Its new leader was coup chief, Major
General Sitiveni Rabuka. The Fijian establishment generally assumed that all indigenous
Fijians would rally behind the new constitution and the SVT Party. This did not happen,
however, as indigenous Fijians started forming alternative political parties even before the
launching of the SVT Party. Apisai Tora, for example, formed the All National Congress
(ANC) with other former AP members in the west in his home village in Natalau,
Sabeto, in 1991. 
Since the electoral provisions were drastically altered in the 1990 Constitution,
allowing for wider communal voting, it was inevitable that the SVT Party would win.
Thirty-two out of the 37 Fijian seats were derived from the 14 provinces and only five
seats were allocated to the urban dwellers.36 The SVT Party formed the first government
under the 1990 Constitution.
The FLP and the NFP contested the 1992 general elections separately. On the
whole, Fijian support for the FLP declined after the 1987 coup. Such political crises tend
to polarise people’s choices into ethnic categories.
The failure of the 1993 Budget led to another general election in 1994. Conflicts
leading to the failure of the SVT Government’s Budget emerged from within the ranks
of the SVT Party itself. Josevata Kamikamica led a breakaway group from the SVT
Party and formed a new Fijian political party called the Fijian Association Party (FAP).
This party was one of the six Fijian political parties that took part in the 1994 general
elections. Another group of Fijians stood as independents and another as candidates of
the FLP. The table below shows the percentage of votes polled by each of the eight
political parties in the Fijian provincial and urban constituencies during the 1994
general elections.
Seven political parties competed in the 1994 elections: the ‘Soqosoqo ni
Vakavulewa ni Taukei’ (SVT); the Fijian Association Party (FAP); the Fijian Nationalist
Party (FNP); the All National Congress (ANC); the Fiji Labour Party (FLP); the
‘Soqosoqo ni Taukei ni Vanua’ (STV); the National Democratic Party (NDP); along with
independent candidates (IND). The STV was another regional-based party, formed by
landowners in the Province of Nadroga/Navosa who were dissatisfied with the SVT as a
mainstream Fijian political party. The table generally indicates that while the SVT Party
emerged to replace the AP as a mainstream Fijian political party, it did not, however,
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deter the formation of alternative Fijian political parties in different regions. The move
by the Council of Chiefs and the Fijian establishment to unite Fijians under one political
party did not prevent the formation of specific regional parties such as the ANC, STV
and NDP. 
Regionalism in Fijian party politics was again demonstrated clearly in the results of
the 1999 general elections as shown in the next table. By 1999, the FNP had changed its
name to the Nationalist Vanua Tako-Lavo Party (NVTLP), and three new political
parties were formed before the 1999 elections. These were the ‘Veitokani ni Lewenivanua
Vakarisito’ (VLV), the Coalition of Independent Nationals (COIN) and the Party of
National Unity (PANU). The VLV was formed by a faction of the Methodist Church of
Fiji and COIN was formed by a group in the Province of Bua on Fiji’s second-largest
island of Vanua Levu. PANU was formed by the Ba Provincial Council in western Viti
Levu and continued the tradition of party formation in the western region of Fiji.
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Table 9.2: Votes Polled by Fijian Political Parties in the 1994 General Elections.
Fijian Provincial Valid SVT FAP FNP ANC FLP STV NDP IND
Constituencies votes % % % % % % % %
Ba 11,769 55.8 2.8 1.1 40.3 - - - -
Bua 4,428 88.2 2.8 1.2 - - - - 7.8
Cakaudrove 10,550 93.3 6.7 - - - - - -
Kadavu 3,855 96.9 2.2 0.9 - - - - -
Lau 4,957 41.9 57.8 0.4 - - - - -
Lomaiviti 4,815 84.6 2.8 4.1 - - - - 8.5
Macuata 5,283 91.2 6.2 2.5 - - - - -
Nadroga/Navosa 8,719 48.5 - - 13.9 - 37.5 - -
Naitasiri 6,866 40.0 52.8 7.2 - - - - -
Namosi 1,650 80.2 - 17.4 - - - - 2.3
Ra 5,392 24.9 2.6 18.2 - - 2.4 - 51.9
Serua 2,250 58.3 - 25.7 10.7 - - 0.97 4.3
Tailevu 9,879 48.1 29.1 18.9 0.8 - - - 3.1
Fijian Urban 
Constituencies
Suva city 8,085 72.1 21.6 3.9 2.4
Serua/Rewa west 3,441 68.0 23.9 4.0 2.6 - - - 1.4
Tailevu/Naitasiri 9,977 69.9 25.1 - 4.9 - - - -
Western urban 6,008 61.7 12.0 5.8 8.6 5.1 - - 6.9
Total 27,511 68.5 21.1 2.9 4.7 1.1 - - 1.7
Grand Total 111,540 63.4 15.3 6.3 8.0 0.2 2.8 0.02 4.0
(Source: Electoral Commission Report for January 1, 1994–December 31, 1996.)
        
Table 9.3: Votes Polled by Fijian Political parties in the 1999 General Elections.
Fijian Provincial Valid SVT FAP NVTLP VLV PANU FLP COIN IND
Constituencies votes % % % % % % % %
Bua 5,330 20.09 - 4.38 54.37 - - 20.77 -
Kadavu 4,987 83.40 9.81 - 6.80 - - - -
Lau 5,927 47.51 - - 50.82 - - - -
Lomaiviti 6,361 22.0 - - - - 23.4 - 54.6
Macuata 7,926 46.29 - - 53.71 - - - -
Nadroga/Navosa 13,071 41.05 50.65 - - - - - -
Naitasiri 8,992 - 71.21 28.79 - - - - -
Namosi 2,315 43.41 56.54 - - - - - -
Ra 7,811 - - 47.02 - 52.98 - - -
Rewa 5,193 - 59.70 40.30 - - - - -
Serua 3,345 37.28 - 62.72 - - - - -
Ba East 8,398 34.9 - 5.66 6.88 52.55 - - -
Ba West 10,052 34.47 - - - 63.53 - - -
Tailevu North 7,449 53.63 46.36 - - - - - -
Tailevu South 7,110 40.38 53.59 6.03 - - - - -
Cakaudrove East 6,582 78.01 - - 16.70
Cakaudrove West 7,920 68.94 6.94 - 24.1 - - - -
No. of seats won 4 5 1 3 3 - - 1
Fijian Urban 
Constituencies
North East 10,182 68.94 6.94 - 24.1 - - - -
North West 12,342 32.77 - - - 67.23
South West 9,475 43.24 56.76 - - - - - -
Suva city 9,191 42.22 57.78 - - - - - -
Tamavua/Laucala 10,014 45.19 54.81 - - - - - -
Nasinu 9,096 49.57 50.42 - - - - - -
No. of seats won 1 4 - - 1 - - -
Total No. of seats won 5 9 1 3 4 - - 1
(Source: Fiji Times, May 20, 1999)
The table shows that, by 1999, Fijians no longer favoured the Council of Chiefs and
Fijian establishment party, the SVT. The main reason for the drastic decline in support
for the party was Prime Minister Rabuka’s decision to review the 1990 Constitution,
which was formed as result of his two military coups in 1987. Rabuka’s ‘political eclipse’
did not augur well with the majority of indigenous Fijians who had enabled the success
of his coups through their support.37 The SVT’s rival, FAP, won more Fijian seats in the
1999 elections, which were won by the FLP, which then formed a coalition with FAP,
PANU and VLV. 
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The formation of a coalition to form a multi-party Cabinet is a provision in the
1997 Constitution. Specifically, the 1997 Constitution states that the Prime Minister
must form a multi-party Cabinet according to the relevant requirements of the
Constitution, which includes an obligation to the fair representation of all parties with
members in the House of Representatives. Such political parties are to be included in
Cabinet according to the proportion of their numbers in the House. If a party with more
than 10 per cent membership in the House of Representatives declines the offer from the
Prime Minister to join the Cabinet, then the seats allocated to it can be offered to
another party in proportion to its respective entitlement. In the case where all other
parties have declined the invitation to the coalition, the Prime Minister can look to his
own party or at a coalition of parties to fill the places in Cabinet. In selecting members
from other political parties for Cabinet positions under the 1997 Constitution, the
Prime Minister is required to consult with the leaders of the respective parties before
making appointments.38 In the case of the People’s Coalition Government, the invitation
that was extended to the SVT after the 1999 general elections was rejected by the FLP
because of the conditions the SVT wanted the FLP to fulfil.
On May 19, 2000, exactly a year into the rule of the FLP People’s Coalition
Government, Fiji underwent more political turmoil when George Speight attempted
another coup. Although the coup was unsuccessful, the FLP People’s Coalition Government
was not returned to power.39 An interim government under the leadership of Laisenia
Qarase took over the reigns until fresh elections were held in April 2001. 
Party Politics: 2001 and beyond
Before the 2001 elections, yet again a number of new Fijian political parties were formed.
These included Laisenia Qarase’s ‘Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua’ (SDL) and the
Matanitu Vanua (MV) Party. On the main island of Viti Levu, MV was formed by
supporters of the George Speight destabilisers of May 2000. In Vanua Levu, where the
idea of a new Fijian political party was first mooted, MV was formed to replace Rabuka’s
Council of Chiefs-sponsored SVT Party. The idea of a Matanitu Vanua party emerged
out of the Fijian political thought of founding a government out of the unity and
consensus of the vanua as a geopolitical entity. This party emerged initially from the
grassroots in the various vanua within the provinces of Cakaudrove, Bua and Macuata.40
During the 2001 general elections, the MV Party won all four Fijian communal
seats in the provinces of Cakaudrove, Bua and Macuata. The fifth Parliamentary seat for
the MV was won in George Speight’s stronghold of Tailevu North Fijian provincial
constituency on the island of Viti Levu. The spontaneous formation and success of the
MV has continued a long trend of dissent and alternative party formation within Fijian
society since the 1960s. It has partially demonstrated the dynamic nature of Fijian party
politics as it is interwoven with traditional politics. Fijian sociopolitical constructs such as
vanua and matanitu are entrenched permanently as bases of unity under political parties.
This feature of Fijian party politics evolves from the diverse and complex nature of tradi-
tional Fijian society itself. It also explains the constant rise and demise of Fijian political
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parties and the difficult attempt to unite all Fijians under one party. The table below
shows the number of Fijian political parties that contested the 2001 elections and the
percentage of votes polled by the parties.
Table 9.4: Percentage of Votes Polled by Fijian Political Parties in the 2001 General Elections.
Fijian 
Provincial Valid BKV FAP NVTLP VLV PANU FLP MV DN T NFP NLUP POTT SDL SVT IND
Constituencies votes % % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Bua 5,264 61.08 38.92
Kadavu 4,326 55.39 44.61
Lau 5,705 1.33 91.48 4.31 2.87
Lomaiviti 6,247 11.11 72.31 13.06 3.52
Macuata 6,640 61.34 38.66
Nadroga/
Navosa 11,719 9.13 20.21 12.94 4.51 53.22
Naitasiri 8,603 24.39 75.61
Namosi 2,224 1.12 1.35 12.05 85.48
Ra 7,613 16.59 32.17 51.23
Rewa 5,133 2.1 33.96 51.35 10.44 2.14
Serua 3,054 6.88 7.76 13.98 62.61 8.78
Ba East 7,846 41.35 58.65
Ba West 9,155 39.88 60.12
Tailevu North 6,791 51.38 5.27 36 7.35
Tailevu South 7,212 10.34 32.63 50.21 6.82
Cakaudrove East 5,844 56.09 14.1 29.81
Cakaudrove West 7,066 67.79 32.21
No. of seats won 5 12
Fijian Urban 
Constituencies
North-East 9,854 21.53 10.23 53.76 14.47
North-West 10,730 68.4 31.6
South-West 9,125 2.36 1.39 16.52 1.22 7.47 61.82 9.23
Suva city 8,742 1.44 10.42 0.88 12.67 55.75 18.14 0.69
Tamavua/
Laucala 9,495 2.94 2.36 3.77 12.56 10.42 61.16 6.79
Nasinu 8,329 1.39 1.36 14.85 7.26 2.64 65.73 5.11 1.66
No. of seats won 6
(Source: UNDP Project Fiji Elections 2001 web site: http://www.undp.org.fj/elections/ Accessed February 14, 2002.)
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During the 2001 elections, the Council of Chiefs sponsored-SVT Party was totally
defeated. The demise of its charismatic leader, former Prime Minister Sitiveni, Rabuka
spelled the end of the party. In its place emerged the SDL as the new mainstream Fijian
political party. The rise and demise of Fijian political parties in general demonstrates
internal rivalries, dissent and shifting alliances, common characteristics of traditional
Fijian politics.
The ruling SDL and MV Coalition still has to contend with rival Fijian political
parties in the elections of 2006. These will include those that competed in the 2001
general elections and those that were formed after the last elections in preparation for
the 2006 elections. Filipe Bole’s Fiji Democratic Party (FDP) was formed in 200241 and
Ratu Epeli Ganilau’s National Alliance Party was registered on January 18, 2005.42
These two new parties have merged as one under the banner of the National Alliance,
aiming to strengthen multiracialism from a Fijian perspective. Their attempt to
strengthen multiracialism through party politics is similar to the attempt by political
parties such as Dr Timoci Bavadra’s FLP, which was formed in 1985. While the FLP had
Fiji’s trade unions as its power base, the National Alliance Party still has to identify and
secure its power base. 
With the formation of yet new political parties in the period after the 2001
elections, the trend indicates that party formation will be a long-term trend within Fijian
society. For Indo-Fijians and general voters, under the United People’s Party (UPP),
stability in terms of supporting one or two political parties has been a long-term trend
since party politics started. This trend is likely to continue.
The future of Fiji’s party politics
After four decades of party politics in Fiji, a number of outstanding features have
emerged. Firstly, political parties have reflected the nature of pre-colonial and colonial
societies in Fiji. For indigenous Fijians, modern political parties have been more than
organisations for political representation in government; they have also been a means of
expressing dissent and independence, reflecting the nature of pre-colonial society.
Despite the attempt by the Fijian establishment to impose unity through party politics,
diversity has continuously been expressed through the formation of alternative political
parties in different regions since the 1960s. The military coups of 1987 exacerbated party
formation, fully exposing the diversity and complexity of Fijian culture and society.
Another outstanding characteristic of party formation in Fiji, which is generally
observable between 1970 and 2005, is the tendency for indigenous Fijians to be actively
involved in alternative party formation. Throughout the three major periods of active
party formation already identified, alternative Fijian political parties have emerged to
compete with the major and mainstream political parties such as the Alliance, the SVT
and currently the SDL Party. Furthermore, in the same period, dissenting Fijians have
also joined and won parliamentary seats in non-Fijian political parties. Two prominent
western Fijian pioneering politicians, Apisai Tora and Isikeli Nadalo, joined the NFP in
1972. Other eastern and northern chiefs, including Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, Ratu Soso
Katonivere, Ratu Julian Toganivalu and Ro Asesela Logavatu, joined later. While
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dissenting Fijians who refused to join mainstream political parties such as the AP and
later the SVT were easily dismissed by mainstream Fijian society as ‘rebels’ or at times
‘communists’, what has been overlooked by critics is that Fijians were never united polit-
ically before colonisation and the introduction of party politics. Such unity was realised
partially for the first time after colonisation and the establishment of the Colonial State.
This did not, however, eradicate the influence and authority of traditional institutions.
The coexistence of ‘traditional legitimacy’ and ‘legal rational legitimacy’ makes modern
party politics a complex issue indeed.
Since the military coups of 1987 and the demise of the AP, parties that emerged to
fill the vacuum, such as the SVT in 1991 and the SDL since 2001, have introduced
platforms that appear to capture the interest of Fijian voters first and foremost. The ruling
SDL, for instance, has included a Fijian ‘blueprint’ in their policy for the development of
indigenous Fijians and Rotumans. What the FIP initiated and the FNP followed with
regarding specific provisions for indigenous Fijians and Rotumans, the SDL is currently
turning into specific policies. With the 2006 elections approaching, Fijian voters might
once again be drawn to pragmatic politics as demonstrated by the SDL’s blueprint.
With globalisation and the strengthening of the ‘good governance’ agenda by inter-
national lending agencies, Fiji too is caught in such philosophy and rhetoric. In such a
situation the governing SDL/MV is caught in a complex internal dilemma. On one
hand, the Government is pursuing good governance, while on the other, it directly impli-
cates loyal supporters who took part in the 2000 coup and its ensuing mutiny. Trials of
those who were implicated in the 2000 crisis have continued, resulting in the imprison-
ment of a number of high chiefs from eastern and north-eastern Fiji. Bau high chief and
Deputy Vice-President of Fiji, Ratu Jope Seniloli, along with Natewa high chief and
former Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure were
imprisoned in 2004. Seniloli has since been released on medical grounds to serve his
sentence outside prison. Naitasiri high chief, the ‘Qaranivalu’, Ratu Inoke Takiveikata, is
still in prison for his role in the 2000 mutiny. Other high chiefs, including the ‘Tui
Cakau’ and high chief of the ‘Matanitu Tovata’, Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, Ratu Josefa
Dimuri, a high chief of Macuata, and two high chiefs from Cakaudrove, have also
received prison terms.43 Lalabalavu and Dimuri have been released to serve their terms
outside prison as well.
The 2000 coup has already had widespread consequences on Fijian society and
party politics. The fate of the ruling government therefore depends on its handling of the
crisis, given that its political power base is centred on the traditional areas of chiefs who
were implicated in the coup. This does not, however, imply that opposition Fijian parties
such as the National Alliance Party will automatically be voted into Parliament by
Fijians; for the crisis of 2000 might have been read by a number of indigenous Fijian
voters in a different light than the legal rational reasoning applied by the modern
judiciary system. Such circumstances throw up the complexity of modern party politics
as it blends with continuing ancient Fijian rivalries.
Between 1960 and 2005, allegiance to one or two political parties has been
common among Indo-Fijians and members of other ethnic groups. For these groups,
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party formation and choice has been consistent and stable in the four decades of party
politics. This can be explained partially through their common historical experience. For
Indo-Fijians, the NFP has been the longest existing party in Fiji since its formation in
1965. Its stability might also be explained in other ways. Firstly was the common experi-
ence of the majority of party members through the indenture system or through their
business activities, for those who migrated specifically to establish businesses. In this case,
economic experience necessitated the founding of a common platform. Secondly, the
party acts as a unifying force in an adopted country and has been successful in fulfilling
its objectives among its members through the requirements of a modern party system —
objectives such as the desire to attain political and economic rights. On the whole, the
success of a party depends on its members and what they make of it. 
The results of the 2006 elections for non-Fijian political parties are predictable
according to the long-term trend of party politics in Fiji. The triple overthrow of the FLP
has made the party resilient to political destabilisation. Hard-core supporters of the party
from across the ethnic spectrum remain committed. Added to this has been the support
of Indo-Fijians who, since the formation of the party in 1985, have regarded the FLP as
the best alternative to the NFP. By the elections of 1999, the FLP again emerged victo-
rious as the representative of Indo-Fijians as well as non-Indo-Fijian trade union
supporters. The biggest challenge for the FLP’s multi-ethnic trade union base has been
government restructuring and the weakening of union powers through new labour laws.
The FLP, however, remains a powerful force to be reckoned with in the 2006 elections.
Conclusion 
For as long as it is adopted as a modern means of political representation, party politics
in Fiji will continue to evolve according to the historical experiences of the different
societies. For indigenous Fijians, the continuation of one mainstream Fijian political
party and the consistent formation of many alternatives might yet be a long-term trend.
Regional cleavages in the formation of political parties have continued throughout the
more than four decades of party politics. In such circumstances, a coalition of parties
that have similar platforms and ideologies, such as that between the ruling parties, the
SDL and MV, becomes inevitable. The inclusion of the alternative-vote system with its
multi-party cabinet provision in the 1997 Constitution appears to be a pragmatic provi-
sion, given such circumstances. To explain such development to its logical conclusion,
this can also give rise to the long-term challenge of finding a common ground for the
formation of multiracial political parties and hence a common ground for building a
nation-state. There is a compartmentalisation of political views according to different
yavusa, vanua, matanitu or regions. On a positive note, such development can also be
a means of maintaining a ‘balance of power’ situation as each region checks the
dominance of another. 
A coalition of parties across the ethnic divide, however, remains a tough challenge
in a country where ethnic politics is constitutionalised and accepted as a ‘natural’ state.
The second overthrow of the FLP Coalition Government attests to this. In such a situa-
tion, the formation and evolution of an ‘ethnically balanced’ political party becomes
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critical as ethnicity is used constantly to marginalise the political rights of certain groups
and political parties. In the long term, Fiji still has to achieve the ideal situation for any
multi-ethnic and multicultural society, and that is to create multiracial political parties.
This does not imply the old AP model of multiracialism, whereby people became
members through their ethnic groups, but an open membership system in which there is
equality for all. Political parties, after all, are social constructions; they turn out according
to their intended structure and nature.
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When Sämoa gained independence in 1962, it was expected to adopt the Westminster
model of parliamentary democracy. Framers of Sämoa’s Constitution had, therefore,
always envisaged the formation of political parties in the nation, but it was 17 years after
independence before this vision became a reality. The consensus politics that dominated
the first two decades of independence were swiftly replaced by party politics after the
establishment of the first post-independence political party. Immediately thereafter, more
political parties were formed, giving rise to the party system Sämoa still has today, in
which the party in government is able to pass laws for the development of the country
that would have otherwise been impossible. The nature of Sämoan political parties —
their structures and the strategies they have adopted to keep their members tied to their
collective cause and to win support during election campaigns — is partly a reflection of
the political environment within which they operate. As the party system becomes
entrenched, however, it has become increasingly associated with a widespread feeling of
powerlessness and political paralysis among parliamentarians and the public generally.
Nevertheless, as this chapter argues, the Sämoan political parties are here to stay, albeit
with continuing piecemeal adjustments that are intended to consolidate the system.
Introduction
Sämoa gained independence on January 1, 1962, and its constitution1 provides for a
parliamentary democracy of the Westminster model. Until the 1993 enactment of the
1991 constitutional amendment2 that extended the parliamentary term from three to
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five years, general elections were held every three years to select representatives to
occupy the 49 seats of Parliament. There are 41 territorial constituencies, six of which
have two seats each because of their larger voter population. Upolu Island has four of
these seats and the larger island of Savai’i has the other two. Thus, of the 49 seats in
Parliament, 47 are occupied by representatives of the 41 territorial constituencies who
must hold matai (chiefly) titles.3 Representatives of individual voters fill the other two
seats. These are Sämoan citizens who have decided not to exercise any rights to Sämoan
customary land and matai titles, thereby opting out of the matai system and its associ-
ated privileges and rights. 
After confirmation of general election results and, in accordance with Section 52 of
the Constitution, the Head of State will convene Parliament to elect from their number a
Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House (Constitution, 4[1–2]). The Head of State will
also appoint a Member of Parliament who commands the confidence of a majority of
MPs as Prime Minister to preside over the Cabinet (Constitution, 32[2.a]). After the
establishment of political parties, this provision of the Constitution in reality means that
the leader of the political party with the majority of seats in Parliament becomes the
Prime Minister after their official election by Parliament to that position.
The political path to the establishment of the first political
party
Consensus politics dominated the first eight years of parliamentary proceedings.4
Sämoa’s first Prime Minister, Matä’afa Fiamë Faumuinä Mulinu’ü II, was elected
unopposed in 1961 (before Sämoa gained its independence), and again in 1964 and
1967. Parliamentary politics reflected the conservative nature of traditional politics. The
Matä’afa title that the first Prime Minister held was one of the four highest-ranking titles
in the country.5 To have one of the Tama-a-aiga (or Royal Sons) hold the office of Prime
Minister was in line with the feeling of the general public of the time. Although parlia-
mentary debates became increasingly critical and potentially divisive in those early years,
the general inclination was not to rock the boat too much. In other words, even though
there were opportune moments to move motions of no confidence against the Prime
Minister and his Cabinet, this did not occur during Matä’afa’s first eight years as Prime
Minister.6 The one attempt to move against Matä’afa and his government was later
withdrawn after the PM made it clear he would resign if the proposed Forest Bill was
passed. If passed that bill would have prevented the Government going ahead with its
plans for the establishment of a timber industry on Savai’i Island.
To contain criticism of his leadership and of government policies, Matä’afa made a
practice of appointing MPs who had been critical in previous Parliaments to his Cabinet.
This strategy contributed to the general nature of consensus politics in the early years of
Parliament after independence. But, from 1970 onwards, Matä’afa’s faced increasing
difficulties in his attempts to keep things under control.
The general election of 1970 and its immediate aftermath will go down as an
important moment in Sämoa’s political history. Before then, there had been only one
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tama-a-aiga in Parliament. That was Matä’afa, who had been Prime Minister since 1961.
In 1970, another tama-a-aiga was elected. He was Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV (hereafter
Tamasese), who was younger than Matä’afa and was a medical doctor by profession.
Tamasese was immediately identified by the newly elected MPs as an alternative to
Matä’afa’s conservative approach to politics. Thus, Tamasese became the representative of
a new political force in Parliament, comprising members who wanted changes in leader-
ship and government policies but who were still comfortable with a tama-a-aiga retaining
the leadership.
In the contest for the Prime Ministership, yet another political force emerged. It
was made up of younger, modern and educated MPs who did not mind doing away with
the traditional idea of having only tama-a-aiga as Prime Ministers. One of this younger
generation, Leota Itu’au, has described his involvement in the 1970 Prime Ministerial
election as follows:
In 1970, when I first entered Parliament, we young and new members in the like of
Le Tagaloa Pita (Leota then), A’e’au Täulupo’o, Leilua Manuao, Le’aumoana Fereti,
Tautï Fuatau and Tiatia Lokeni secretly met at the old Casino Hotel to back Tupuola
Efi for the top post.7
Leota Itu’au was one of the Sämoan students who had been sent to New Zealand for a
university education. Leota Pita, a university graduate also entering politics for the first
time, had been acting principal of the Alafua Agricultural Campus (in Sämoa) of the
University of the South Pacific (USP) before he entered politics.8 The Tupuola faction
therefore comprised mainly young matai, newly elected MPs and Sämoans with relatively
high levels of education. Tupuola himself had undertaken law studies at Victoria
University in Wellington, New Zealand, before returning to Sämoa on the death of his
father and late Joint Head of State, Tupua Tamasese Mea’ole, in April 1963.9 Tupuola Efi
was also a first cousin of Tamasese.
The three-way division of political orientation among the newly elected MPs was
reflected in the 1970 Prime Ministerial election. As expected, Matä’afa stood again for
the Prime Ministership. He won 19 votes. The newly elected and younger tama-a-aiga,
Tamasese, polled 17 votes. Tupuola Efi won 10 votes. A second ballot was therefore
required at which the two first cousins joined forces under the tama-a-aiga titleholder to
defeat Matä’afa. The result of the second ballot was a draw. Matä’afa and Tamasese each
polled 23 votes. The Speaker then adjourned Parliament until the next day and Tamasese
was eventually elected by 25 votes to Matä’afa’s 20.10 Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV
included Tupuola Efi in his Cabinet as Minster of Works.
Describing Tamasese’s new-look Cabinet, Davidson noted:
It is a relatively young government, a government of well-educated men, of men who
have travelled and lived abroad. Several of its members, including Tofa Fuimaono,11
have taken a leading part in the campaign to replace the restrictive matai suffrage by
universal suffrage … it looks like a government of reform — a government that will
accelerate the process of both political and economic modernization … 12
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But the Government’s accelerated rate of economic and political development proved
unacceptable to the majority of the public. The Tamasese Government’s liberalism (if
not radicalism) and its departure from consensus politics (in terms of no longer
allocating portfolios on the basis of districts from which ministers came) cost it the
1973 general elections.13
The first meeting of Parliament after the 1973 elections saw Matä’afa back at the
country’s political helm. He polled 23 votes against Tamasese’s nine and Tupuola Efi’s
13.14 As a gesture of traditional respect to the other tama-a-aiga MP, Tamasese (who had
regained his seat) was appointed to the cabinet. 
Matä’afa passed away unexpectedly nine months before the completion of his
fourth Prime Ministerial term. Given that Parliament was back to having only one tama-
a-aiga among its members, it was half-expected that Tamasese would succeed the late
Prime Minister. What was controversial was the manner in which the appointment was
made. Instead of Parliament making its choice on the basis of majority support
(Constitution, 32[2.a]), the Head of State invited Tamasese to see through Matä’afa’s
term.15 MPs who had rallied around Tupuola Efi as their informal leader were critical.
They argued that the Head of State was out of line with the provisions of the
Constitution. Outside Parliament, the scenario was interpreted as the tama-a-aiga
making sure they remained in the forefront of political leadership. Despite public and
parliamentary criticisms, however, the Head of State’s appointment was accepted,
although Parliament did become extra vigilant about preventing this sort of manoeuvre
in the future.16
The aftermath of the 1976 general elections saw yet more changes in the country’s
parliamentary scene. Matä’afa and Tamasese’s supporters now rallied around Tamasese,
wanting him to continue on as Prime Minister in the next Parliament. Their efforts were
in vain. The leader of the new political force in Parliament, Tupuola Efi, won the Prime
Ministerial office by a majority of 30 votes to Tamasese’s 16. This was the first time since
independence that a non-tama-a-aiga had held the office of Prime Minister. It repre-
sented another phase in the country’s transition from traditional politics to the
democratic ideals espoused in the country’s liberal democratic constitution. Understandably,
conservative elements within and outside Parliament argued strenuously against the new
development, convinced the world was suddenly being turned upside down by Tupuola
Efi and his power-hungry supporters. Backed by this conservative resentment, the
outgoing Prime Minister criticised the appointment. Speaking metaphorically, Tamasese
referred to the camel, which, after many years of trying, had now finally succeeded in
placing itself in its master’s tent.17 Although Tamasese never elaborated on his analogy,
both MPs and the public knew that he was referring to his first cousin, a non-tama-a-
aiga titleholder, eventually succeeding in placing himself in the tent (the office of Prime
Minister), which, to him and his supporters, was appropriate only for the master (the
tama-a-aiga).18
In response, the newly elected Prime Minister, Tupuola Efi, told Parliament that he
would make sure that Tamasese was given a special place befitting his status. That place
was on the Council of Deputies,19 which had been created in the Constitution to accom-
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modate the three tama-a-aiga other than the one holding the office of Head of State. At
the time Tupuola Efi won the Prime Ministership, the Council of Deputies was vacant.
The holders of the Tuimaleali’ifano and Matä’afa tama-a-aiga titles had passed away and
their titles were therefore vacant. The new Prime Minister’s gesture was culturally accept-
able as the outgoing Prime Minister was a tama-a-aiga titleholder. Interestingly though,
the outgoing Prime Minister had resigned the same position in late 1969 in order to
contest a seat in Parliament. In reality, therefore, Tamasese was being made to take a step
back to a position he had held before being involved in politics. In hindsight, perhaps,
Tupuola Efi was sending out the message to Tamasese and the public that tama-a-aiga
should confine themselves to ceremonial positions and not be involved in the politics of
the day. Interestingly, no other tama-a-aiga has held the Prime Ministership since
Tupuola Efi’s victory over his first cousin and tama-a-aiga titleholder: Tupuola ‘Efi was
Prime Minister for two consecutive terms from 1976 to 1982; Va’ai Kolone from 1982 to
late 1982; Tofilau Eti Alesana from 1983 to the defeat of his budget in his second term in
late 1985;, Va’ai Kolone again from 1986 to 1988; Tofilau Eti Alesana again from 1988
until his resignation in 1998; and Tuila’epa Sailele Malielegaoi from 1998 until the
present (2005).
In the time of Matä’afa’s consensus politics, once he had appointed his Cabinet, the
rest of Parliament effectively became the Opposition. By 1970, however, the tone of
parliamentary politics had changed. Factional politics had taken over. The Prime
Ministerial election of 1970 is proof of that. The three Prime Ministerial candidates
represented the three parliamentary factions that had emerged. As already noted, the
Tamasese and Tupuola Efi factions later joined forces against Matä’afa’s faction. The same
scenario was repeated in 1973 and 1976. In 1976, however, the number of visible parlia-
mentary factions was reduced from three to two after the unexpected death of Matä’afa
in May 1975. The events of 1979 were even more intense.
After the official confirmation of the general election results of 1979, the old rivals
of Tupuola Efi and their supporters among the newly elected MPs started organising
themselves against the declining but still powerful force of the incumbent Prime Minister
Tupuola Efi, and his followers. The intensity of parliamentary factions had stepped up to
another level. After a meeting at the place of one of their supporters, the anti-Tupuola
faction finally agreed on Va’ai Kolone, a seasoned politician, to be their Prime Ministerial
candidate when the new Parliament convened.20 On the day of the Prime Ministerial
election, Tupuola Efi snatched victory once again, only this time, his parliamentary
majority had been greatly reduced from his 1976 margin of seven seats to just one.21
Ironically, it was Va’ai Kolone’s younger brother and one of the ‘old hands’ in the Tupuola
camp that represented Tupuola’s majority. 
The new politics of democracy were being seen to have radical and unpleasant
implications for a family-oriented society such as Sämoa. Referring to his Prime
Ministerial defeat, Va’ai commented in Parliament: ‘the injury is inflicted by my own
brother.’22 To consolidate support and win more votes with an eye to the next Prime
Ministerial contest in three years, the anti-Tupuola faction established themselves as the
Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) in May of the same year. 
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Before turning to the establishment and growth of political parties in post-
independence Sämoa, I shall first reflect on the political developments that gave rise to
their establishment.
Political precursors to the establishment of political parties
As has been shown, the first Sämoan political party, HRPP, originated within Parliament.
Its primary objective was to defeat Tupuola Efi, thereby winning government.23 The
origin of Sämoan political parties is therefore true to von Beyme’s institutional theory
that associates the origin of political parties with the prior existence of Parliament.24 It is
also in line with Duverger’s claim that ‘first there is the creation of parliamentary groups,
then the appearance of electoral committees, and finally the establishment of a perma-
nent connection between these two elements’.25 Once Sämoan parties were formed, they
would try to keep winning government. As Macridis has noted, political parties, once
they are established, become the instrument to gain power and to govern.26 Moreover,
once in power, a political party will try to remain there.
Incentives are needed to maintain political support. People expect recognition for their
efforts in drumming up support and for toeing the party line. For example, in the combined
government of two factions under Tamasese’s Prime Ministership, the leader of the coalition
partner, Tupuola Efi, was rewarded by being appointed Minister of Public Works.27 This is
an important portfolio as it determines what public work will be undertaken, when the work
starts and where. Decisions made in this portfolio can win or lose elections. 
After his Prime Ministerial victory in 1970 but before he announced his Cabinet,
Tamasese admitted: ‘There are so many people who want to be ministers. This is a diffi-
cult task.’28 Commenting on the day the Cabinet was announced, on March 6, 1970,
the Sämoa Times said that the reading out of the names of ministers must be like the Day
of Judgment when people would be told whether to proceed to Heaven or Hell. When
Tamasese eventually announced his Cabinet, he told Parliament, ‘I rise with respect to
say that I cannot satisfy all Hon. Members of this House. However, I have made my
selection and it was … a very hard one.’29
Arguably, Tamasese’s appointment by Matä’afa to the latter’s 1973 Cabinet was for
a slightly different reason, that is, in order to strengthen Matä’afa’s leadership and his grip
on power within Parliament and nationally. Even though Tamasese was the leader of a
rival faction, he was nevertheless a tama-a-aiga like Matä’afa. In appointing his political
rival to his Cabinet, Matä’afa was making public his support and respect for the only
other tama-a-aiga MP. His gesture earned him approval from Tamasese’s traditional
families, the general public and other parliamentarians. Matä’afa was seen as a leader who
had great respect for custom and tradition. His gesture was probably also an attempt to
neutralise any political influence Tamasese had within Parliament, or better still, win
Tamasese supporters over to the Matä’afa camp.
Va’ai Kolone’s brother, Lesatele Rapi, who supported Tupuola Efi in the 1979 Prime
Ministerial contest, was later reappointed by Tupuola Efi to his Cabinet. Given that Rapi
was one of the ministers in the previous government, it is possible that he was promised
another cabinet portfolio if he stayed with the incumbent Prime Minister. It was no
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secret in the period leading up to the 1979 Prime Ministerial contest that Va’ai Kolone
and his supporters campaigned strongly to win Rapi over to their side, using the family
argument as their main trump card. In the end, it did not work. By then, Rapi had seen
the writing on the wall: were his brother at the helm, the chance of him getting a minis-
terial portfolio was probably nil. For, even though Sämoa has a strong family-oriented
culture, assuming that Va’ai Kolone defeated Tupuola Efi in the Prime Ministerial race, to
appoint his brother to Cabinet would have been seen by the public as nepotism. 
As Colin Aikman, one of the architects of Sämoa’s Constitution predicted, political
parties emerged due to differences in opinions and policies.30 The surfacing of these
differences can be explained by the theory that associates the emergence of political
parties with various aspects of modernisation.
LaPalombara and Weiner note at least two circumstances under which political
parties emerge.31 First, a change might already have taken place in the attitudes of
subjects or citizens toward authority. That is, individuals in the society might believe that
they have the right to influence the exercise of power. Tupuola Efi, the first non-tama-a-
aiga to hold the office of Prime Minister, told Parliament in his victory speech:
Please do not regard the result of the ballot this morning as an illustration of Sämoa
turning her back … [on] the the tama-a-aiga, neither is Sämoa losing due allegiance
to the apple of her eye. In simple terms actually Sämoa is searching for remedies to her
multi-problems while the dignity and sacredness of the tama-a-aiga have continued to
be jealously guarded, and the position of tama-a-aiga has continued to be given prece-
dence by the nation.32
Tupuola is clearly distiguishing between respect for tradition and the need to find
solutions to problems of modern times. It implies that those solutions could be found in
the talents of others, and not necessarily only with the tama-a-aiga leadership. Moreover,
it is clear from the same speech that other citizens of Sämoa besides the tama-a-aiga
wanted to exert their influence on the exercise of power.
Secondly, a section of the dominant political elite or an aspiring elite might seek to
gain public support so as to win or maintain power even though the public does not
actively participate in political life. As has already been seen with the rise of parliamen-
tary factions that eventually resulted in the establishment of political parties, the
dominant elite, after the enactment of the Constitution and the establishment of
Parliament, were the parliamentarians. They were the ones competing for power and
using their parliamentary support to achieve their objectives. Eventually, political parties
emerged as fully fledged organisations whose aim was to win the public’s support even
though the latter was not actively participating in political life. Thus, the process leading
to the establishment of Sämoan political parties accords with modernisation theory.
The change in the public attitudes whereby cultural and natural boundaries were
transcended can also be attributed to factors that collectively comprise modernisation,
among them the appearance of new social groups as a consequence of larger socioeco-
nomic changes; increases in the flow of information; expansion of internal markets and
transportation networks; growth in technology; and, above all, increases in spatial and
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social mobility. These aspects of modernisation seem to have profound effects on the
individual’s perception of himself in relation to authority. Access to a certain level of
communication makes it possible for people to band together in political organisations.
The secularising and individualistic effects of an educational system and the
homogenising effects often associated with urbanisation might also be stimulants to the
creation of political organisations, as is the shift from subsistence to a cash economy,
which often involves the destruction of patterns of local authority, and greater individu-
ality and independence in the marketplace.33
The establishment of the party system
The HRPP, established in 1979, tasted political success for the first time in the 1982
general elections, when Va’ai Kolone defeated the incumbent Prime Minister, Tupuola
Efi, by one vote. Tupuola’s faction became the parliamentary Opposition until Va’ai
Kolone lost his parliamentary seat in an election petition five months later.34 Exercising
his discretion under the Constitution, the Head of State invited Tupuola Efi once more
to form a government.35 But in December 1982, a by-election gave the HRPP an extra
seat36 just in time for the Budget sitting of Parliament. That one-seat majority was suffi-
cient for the HRRP to vote out Tupuola’s Budget. On December 30, Tofilau Eti Alesana
(who had taken over the HRPP leadership after his election to that position by his party
on October 6) was sworn in by the Head of State as the country’s next Prime Minister.
On January 9, 1983, Va’ai Kolone was returned to Parliament when he regained his seat
in a by-election. Va’ai Kolone, however, was confined to sitting out the present parlia-
mentary term as a backbencher while Tupuola Efi and his supporters had to wait until
the next elections for another chance to unseat the Government.
Two weeks before the general elections in February 1985, Tupuola Efi and his
supporters formed the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) to help them get organised for
the upcoming Prime Ministerial contest.37 Unfortunately for them, the HRPP’s success
in the poll three years’ earlier was improved further when it won 31 of the 47 seats in
Parliament.38 HRPP’s landslide victory, however, was maintained only until the end of
1985. Up to this point, HRPP’s unwritten policy had been that only after the general
election results were confirmed would its caucus decide its next leader. In their leadership
meeting after the general elections, four names were put forward.39 Eventually, Tofilau
Eti Alesana was given the nod to continue as leader although the vote resulting in that
outcome was not as straightforward as it might seem. Supporters of Va’ai Kolone,
Tofilau’s main rival in this leadership meeting, were not happy with what they saw as
manipulation in favour of Tofilau and his supporters. The events that unfolded after the
leadership meeting were testimony to those feelings.
Before the first meeting of Parliament to decide the next government, rumours
circulated that Va’ai Kolone and his supporters were breaking away from the HRPP.40
Another prominent HRPP MP, Le Tagaloa Leota Pita, and his wife, Ai’ono Fanaafi Le
Tagaloa Pita, who had won her constituency’s seat for the first time, had already left the
party.41 Nevertheless, Tofilau was elected unopposed to continue as Prime Minister for
another term.42 Rumours that the HRPP situation was unstable continued to make
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media headlines.43 These were reinforced when Tofilau’s Budget, tabled in December
1985, was defeated because 11 former HRPP MPs crossed the floor to join forces with
Tupuola Efi’s CDP. Tofilau Eti Alesana resigned the Prime Ministership on December
27, 1985.44 The combined political forces of Va’ai Kolone and Tupuola Efi, with the
former as leader and Prime Minister, became known as the Coalition Government until the
next general elections in 1988. They defeated the HRPP Government by 27 votes to 19. 
In the period leading up to Parliament’s April 6 meeting to elect a new government,
the Coalition had a one-seat majority. On the night of April 4, however, Tanuvasa
Livigisitone left the Coalition camp, having been there just six weeks, and joined the rival
camp of the HRPP. His nomination of Tofilau as the HRPP’s Prime Ministerial candi-
date was seconded by Sagapolutele Sipaia.45 Having won the Prime Ministership, Tofilau
appointed Tanuvasa to his new Cabinet as the Minister of Economic Affairs and
Development, Tourism and Trade. Sagapolutele was appointed Chairman of the Pulenu’u
(village mayors) Committee. In a speech to officially accept Tanuvasa into the HRPP
camp, Tofilau made it clear to the HRPP caucus that Tanuvasa was a distant relative of
his. Although Tanuvasa has stood as a parliamentary candidate for Tupua’s old
constituency of A’ana Alofa No. 2 against the HRPP-supported candidate, he had been a
known HRPP-supporter. He had twice stood against Tupua (then Tupuola), in the 1979
and 1985 general elections.46 The mood among the Coalition when Tanuvasa ‘sneaked
away’ to the HRPP camp was conveyed by the spokesman of the Sämoa National Party
(SNP), whose political party later sided with the Coalition:
Another newcomer to politics, Tanuvasa Livigisitone hiked to Leufisa [Tofilau’s
residence where the HRPP MPs camped], thus betraying the trust Tupuola [or Tupua]
had in supporting him during the general elections ahead of leading orator Alipia
Siaosi of Leulumoega. Or was it a double job? Tanuvasa’s political career is an inter-
esting topic for discussion by political critics and students alike in years to come.
Especially when this betrayal took place in a so-called Christian country ‘Founded on
God’, and where its elders past and present, often referred to betrayal as — ia soloa i le
vailalo ma ia soloa i le aufuefue [Author’s note: a traditional curse which figuratively
means, ‘Let the betrayer be doomed underneath the ground indefinitely so that he
should never be seen or heard of again’].47
To the HRPP, however, the turn of events regarding Tanuvasa’s sudden defection to
the HRPP camp seemed only fair, given that their 1985 victory had been snatched
from them when the forces of Va’ai Kolone and Tupuola Efi had combined to defeat
their budget. 
On April 8, 1988, two days after their Prime Ministerial defeat, the Coalition
renamed itself the Sämoan National Development Party (SNDP).48 By this time, the
SNP, formed by three of the successful candidates in the 1988 general elections, had
joined the Coalition because, the SNP leader, Leota Itü’au Ale, said the HRPP had not
approached them for support.49
Five new political parties were established in 1993, the year in which the constitu-
tional amendment to increase the parliamentary term was enforced. On June 4, 1993,
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the Western Sämoa Labour Party (WSLP) was founded by To’alepai Toesulusulu Si’ueva,
who had been an MP from the Ä’ana Alofi No. 3 constituency for two consecutive terms
(1982–84, 1985–87). He was one of the 12 HRPP MPs who, in late 1985, defected to
form the Coalition Government, in which he was appointed Minister of Health. He lost
his seat in 1988. Had the WSLP won a seat, it aspired to become a more effective parlia-
mentary opposition than the SNDP, which had been rather ‘mute’, resulting, the WSLP
claimed, in the HRPP Government becoming dangerously powerful. Among the issues
the WSLP stood for were the rejection of the HRPP Government’s policies on a number
of development programs, and opposition to the manner in which the HRPP
Government amended the Constitution in 1991 by a two-third majority of Parliament
rather than through a referendum.
Another political party, the Temokalasi Sämoa Fa’amatai (TSFPP — the Sämoan
Democracy of Matai), lodged its application for registration with the Justice Department
on January 26, 1993. According to the leader of the TSFPP, Le Tagaloa Pita, the party
had passed four main resolutions: that only the matai should have the vote; that only the
matai who respected and had unwavering faith in the merits of the matai system should
join the party; that the Value Added Goods and Services Tax (VAGST) was excessively
burdensome on the substantial majority of the population; that the introduction of
universal suffrage had duped the children of matai who had been granted the right to
vote once they reached 21 years of age but not the right to stand for Parliament, as was
the case with individual voters. In June 1993, the TSFPP organised a march on
Parliament to present a petition registering its objections to the extension of the parlia-
mentary term from three to five years and to the introduction of the 10 per cent VAGST. 
Yet another political party, the Sämoa Liberal Party (SLP), was formed in late June
199350 by three HRPP MPs who had been expelled from the party after they voted with
the chairman and vice-chairman of the Public Accounts Committee and the Opposition
to cut $WST106,522 from the Foreign Affairs budget for the financial year 1993-94.
The Prime Minister told parliament, ‘If the cuts are passed by the House then I will
tender my resignation to the Head of State.’ The Government survived the motion by 26
votes to 19. One of the three expelled HRPP MPs was Nonumalo Leulumoega Sofara.51
He became the leader of the SLP.
Leota Itü’au Ale, deputy leader of the SNDP since September 1992, announced in
Parliament on June 26, 1995, that he was leaving the SNDP to form his own political
party, to be called the Sämoa Conservative Progressive Party (SCPP).52 In the same
announcement, Leota said that his party supported the incumbent HRPP Government.
Subsequently, as the first MP to speak on the Budget, Leota told the House that it was a
‘responsible budget’ and moved that it be passed. He also thanked the Prime Minister for
all he had done for the country. Leota told the Savali newspaper that in February 1995
a member of the SNDP had suggested it might be time for the current leader of the SNDP,
Tupua Tamasese Efi (formerly Tupuola Efi), to step down from the leadership. Tupua had
refused to give up the party leadership, hence Leota’s decision to form his own party.
Another political party, the Sämoa All People Party (SAPP), was formed on March
24, 1996.53 It was a landmark in Sämoa’s democratic development because the party’s
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leader and co-founder, Matatumua Maimoaga, became the first female party leader.
Matatumua had been an HRPP MP who had tendered her resignation the day before the
SAPP was created. She told people at the party launch: ‘We are a legal entity, duly consti-
tuted and registered as an incorporated society with the Department of Justice … [The
party] is founded on principles and truth. It is not concentrated around individual politi-
cians or personalities. It is truly a Party of the People.’54 Matatumua on a different
occasion said:
Our party has had to reject candidates that want to be members of SAPP but run as
independent candidates. It is not right. It is an attempt to deceive voters, we will not
tolerate deception. People must be made aware of this so that they can make an
informed decision when they vote.55
Although the party does not depart from the tradition of having only matai as parlia-
mentary candidates, it allows people as young as 16, regardless of sex and whether or not
they are matai, to be officers of its organisational structure, which includes village
branches.56
Even though more political parties were formed in the period between the 1991
and the 1996 general elections, most have not been able to survive. The most impor-
tant reason for this is that once the leaders lost their parliamentary seats or were unable
to win a seat, that was also the end of the party. It thus left the HRPP and the SNDP
as the main political parties to contest the next general election in 2001. As in 1982,
1985, 1988, 1991 and 1996, the HRPP became the Government after the 2001
general election.
The establishment of political parties saw another important development in
Sämoa’s political scene: the emergence of independent candidates without any party affil-
iation contesting general elections. Three independents won seats in the 1988 general
election,57 five in 1991,58 13 in 199659 and 12 in 2001.60 The usual pattern for most, if
not all, of these independents was to join one of the established political parties either
immediately before the first meeting of Parliament or during the parliamentary term.
After the Prime Ministerial election in 2001, however, the independents formed
themselves into the Sämoa United Independents Political Party (SUIPP). Recently,
though yet to be declared official by the Speaker of the House under the relevant
Standing Orders, SUIPP has combined with the SNDP to form the Sämoa Democratic
United Party (SDUP).
The issues of party-switching and independents later joining established parties
prompted the Commission of Inquiry into Sämoa’s Electoral System to make the
following recommendations in its October 2001 report: (a) a candidate must remain
affiliated to his party; (b) if he defects to another party, then a by-election should be
called; (c) if he runs as an individual, or if he leaves the party to become an
independent member, he cannot join another party in coalition, nor should he be
allowed to hold a ministerial post in the ruling party for the duration of his parliamen-
tary term; and (d) political parties must comply with the law and should be formed by
election time, if they are to be accorded legal recognition.61 The Parliamentary
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Electoral Review on the Commission of Inquiry’s Report 2001 accepted recommenda-
tion (a) subject to the following:
[i] A Member of Parliament elected under a Political Party which is not recognized as
a Party in Parliament pursuant to Standing Orders of Parliament may become a
member of a Parliamentary Party on the Leader of that Party notifying the Speaker
before the member takes the Oath of Allegiance; and
[ii] A Member of Parliament ceasing to be a member of a Parliamentary Party through
expulsion from that Party shall have his name omitted from that Parliamentary
Party list and thereafter to become an Independent member.62
The Parliamentary Committee report also states that:
A Member of Parliament who was elected as an Independent member may join a
Parliamentary Party if the leader of that Parliamentary Party gives notice of his
membership required under Standing Orders before that member takes the Oath of
Allegiance.63
The Parliamentary Electoral Committee goes on to argue that the provisions already
quoted provide the opportunity:
1. To a Member of Parliament who was elected under a political party which can
not form a parliamentary party in pursuance to Standing Orders of Parliament
to join a recognized parliamentary party.
2. [To] A member elected as an independent member to join a parliamentary party
of his choice by giving notice pursuant to the Standing Orders of Parliament
before he takes the Oath of Allegiance.
3. [To] A Member ceasing to be a member of a parliamentary party through expul-
sion to become an independent member.64
Section 15F of the Electoral Amendment Act 2005 has incorporated the recommendations
of the Parliamentary Electoral Committee as follows. A candidate elected as a member of
a recognised political party ‘shall sit in the Legislative Assembly as a member of that
political party during the term for which the Candidate was so elected’. On the other
hand, a candidate who is elected as an independent or under a party that does not have
the number of members for it to be recognised in Parliament as a party can join another
party as long as this is done in the period between the general elections and taking the
oath of allegiance in Parliament, and as long as the Speaker of Parliament is notified
about this by the leader of the candidate’s new party. Failure to abide by these provisions
would result in the loss of the parliamentary seat, resulting ultimately in a by-election to
elect a new MP for that seat. The bottom line of section 15F is to prevent party-
switching during the parliamentary term.
Even though the party system has governed the political affairs of the country since
1982, political parties as such were legally recognised only after the enactment of the
Political Parties in the Pacific196
    
Electoral Amendment Act 1997. This amendment specifies the criteria for the registration
of a political party, including that the party must have at least 100 financial members
who are eligible to enrol as electors. The act also stipulates that: ‘No application for regis-
tration [of a party] will be accepted after the day on which the writs for an election or
by-election are issued.’ 
The growing importance of political parties prompted their inclusion in the
Standing Orders of Parliament when the first major revision of that document since
1972 was carried out in 1997. As well as providing for the recognition of political parties
in general and the Leader of the Opposition’s party, the 1997 Standing Orders also stipu-
late that there have to be at least eight MPs in a political party before it can be recognised
by the Speaker of Parliament.
The Parliamentary Electoral Review Committee (chaired by the Speaker of the
House and including the Deputy Speaker as Deputy Chairperson, the Leader of the
Opposition, the Leader of Government and five other MPs) sat on August 9, 2004, to
discuss and refine issues relating to political parties. Recommendations of the committee
have since been enacted in the Electoral Amendment Act 2005 already referred to.
Previously, issues that arose relating to political parties were dealt with by a ruling of the
Speaker. One such ruling is that once an MP leaves his political party, he will remain an
independent for the rest of the parliamentary term. He cannot join another political
party.65 Moreover, the recent announcement by the leaders of the SNDP, Mamea Ropati,
and the Sämoa United Independents Political Party (SUIPP), Asiata Säle’imoa Va’ai, that
they had formed a combined political party called the SDUP seemed to be invalid
because they had not satisfied provision 7(1–4) of the Standing Orders of Parliament,
which stipulated that:
(2) A party must inform the Speaker of:
(a) The name by which it wishes to be known in parliamentary proceedings;
(b) The identity of its leader and deputy leaders;
(c) Its parliamentary membership.
The Speaker must be informed of any change [to] these matters.66
(3) A coalition between two or more parties must be notified to the Speaker but
each party to the coalition remains a separate party for the purposes of the
Standing Orders.
(4) In the period between the general election and the House electing a Speaker, the
matters specified in this Standing Order may be notified to the Clerk.
According to the Clerk of Parliament, the announcement concerning the establishment
of the SDUP is out of line because the Speaker of Parliament has not been informed of
these developments as stipulated in the quoted provision of the Standing Orders.
According to the Clerk of Parliament, as far as the Speaker of Parliament and Parliament
are concerned, no new political party has been formed. Information given to the author
on April 11, 2005, by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour at which political
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parties are officially registered confirmed that the SUIPP and SDUP have not been regis-
tered. Eventually, the Speaker informed Parliament on April 6, 2005, that the SDUP
could not be recognised as a political party. Instead, what existed were the SNDP and
independents, in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders of Parliament
and the Electoral Amendment Act 2005 already cited.
Effects of the party system
The year 1991 will go down as a watershed in Sämoa’s political history. For the first time,
Sämoan citizens without matai titles could exercise their democratic right to elect
Members of Parliament to represent the country’s 41 territorial constituencies.67
The introduction of universal suffrage in the 1991 general election would not have
been possible without the party system that became the main vehicle for rallying and
consolidating support for the change in voting rights. More specifically, the HRPP wisely
used its influence to push for the introduction of universal suffrage, arguing that there
had been a proliferation of matai titles in order to give parliamentary candidates an
improved chance of winning parliamentary seats. Giving all adults over 21 years of age
the right to vote in parliamentary elections would help minimise the political need to
confer titles indiscriminately, thereby upholding the dignity of the matai system. The
introduction of universal suffrage would also give educated Sämoans who might never
have the chance to hold matai titles the right to influence political decisions, thereby
making use of their education to influence national developments. 
Opinion in the HRPP Cabinet and caucus was divided on the question of whether
or not universal suffrage should be introduced. In the end, Sämoan respect drowned
these dissenting views in favour of the Prime Minister, their party leader and father of
the country, as the local population prefer to call him, whose political conviction was
that the introduction of universal suffrage would uphold the dignity of the matai system
even if it had no other value. The political appeal of giving mothers and old women (the
substantial majority of whom did not have matai titles and were therefore not able to
vote in parliamentary elections) the right to vote in elections for the first time became a
political magnet that drew in support behind the HRPP’s cause. Even culturally conser-
vative supporters of the HRPP who preferred that voting rights remain restricted to
matai titleholders did not want to jeopardise their political support of that party by
voting against universal suffrage in the referendum. Once the public gave its positive
verdict on universal suffrage, the HRPP was also guaranteed another term in office. The
1991 general elections easily returned the HRPP with Tofilau Eti Alesana continuing as
Prime Minister.
Looking back to Matä’afa’s Prime Ministership, which has been criticised for being
so cautious that it did not achieve a great deal, it can be seen that Matä’afa and his
Cabinet were constantly frustrated by a lack of political support for their development
policies from a party bloc in Parliament. As already mentioned, in those days, all MPs
who were not appointed to the Cabinet in effect became the Opposition, making it
extremely difficult for the Government to get things through the House even if, out of
respect for the Prime Minister’s status as a tama-a-aiga, Parliament never went so far as to
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move a motion of no confidence against Matä’afa. As one of the members in the
Working Committee of the Constitution in 1960 said: ‘[tama-a-aiga should] be paid the
respect due to them as Tama-a-aiga and would thus … be appointed to some office such
as PM and would undoubtedly hold these positions for life.’68
With the operation of the party system since the 1980s, the pace of development
picked up significantly as can be seen in the discussion about whether to establish a
national university; this had become a hotly debated parliamentary issue by the early
1980s. As the HRPP was committed to that cause, the strongly critical but minority
voice of Tupuola Efi’s opposition faction was drowned out, and the National University
of Sämoa (NUS) was duly established by an act of Parliament in 1984 with a budget of
only $WST5. Today (2005), NUS has 1,700 students, about 80 academic staff and
a budget of more than $WST5 million. 
Besides the NUS project, other initiatives delivered thanks to the operation of a
party system include: the electrification program, which took electricity to all homes in
the country; the road improvement program, which for the first time saw all roads
around the country sealed; the introduction of television in the early 1990s; the estab-
lishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs and a national Mothers of Sämoa Day in the
period leading up to the introduction of universal suffrage in 1991; and the introduction
of the Old Age Pension Scheme. 
The parliamentary majority of the HRPP not only gave it the mandate to formulate
policies but to implement them. The HRPP could also pass laws, including amendments
to the Constitution, to suit its own political agenda. Until the enactment of the Special
Posts Act 1989,69 Cabinet found it a constant headache that some heads of departments
(HoDs), all of whom were appointed by the Public Service Commission, would not heed
their instructions in terms of implementing government policies. The passing of the
Special Posts Act 1989 gave Cabinet the right to hire and fire HoDs by means of a two-
year contract system. The attitudes of senior government officials quickly changed in the
Government’s favour.
The establishment of the party system is one thing. Keeping supporters in the party
organisation is quite another and examples of party-switching are commonplace. The 11
HRPP MPs who crossed the floor in late 1985 to form a coalition with Tupuola Efi’s
supporters did so when it became clear that they had not been considered by Tofilau Eti
Alesana for Cabinet portfolios. In 1988, another MP left the party on whose ticket he
had contested the election to join another that rewarded him with a Cabinet portfolio.
Va’ai Kolone’s brother, whom Va’ai Kolone expected to join his faction in the Prime
Ministerial election of 1979, opted instead to remain with his old political clique. He was
appointed by Tupuola Efi to his new Cabinet. The SNDP candidate who switched
allegiance in 1991 when it became clear that the SNDP did not have the numbers to
form a government was elected Speaker of Parliament by the HRPP, his new party. 
To minimise such party-switching, new ways to reward political support had to be
created, hence the passing of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary Act 1988 (although there
were other arguments put forward by the Government in its support) and the successful
amendment of the Constitution in 1991 to increase from eight to 12 the number of
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ministers in Cabinet. Besides creating opportunities for loyal party members, the strategy
of offering political rewards also strengthened the HRPP’s overall position in Parliament.
Another constitutional amendment passed in the same parliamentary session in 1991
increased the number of parliamentary seats from 47 to 49. With the Prime Minister and
his 12 cabinet ministers each entitled to one parliamentary undersecretary, the HRPP
now had guaranteed support in Parliament from 26 of the 49 seats, giving it the numbers
to continue its hold on government at least until the next general elections.
The conservative politics of the 1960s and 1970s were a great contrast with the
vibrant and effective manner in which the HRPP had passed laws and introduced policy
changes since the 1980s. Interestingly, the HRPP’s increased power and its unbroken
success in the polls has been accompanied by a sense of political paralysis not only within
Parliament but within the HRPP. Le Tagaloa Pita, one of the founding members of the
HRPP, told the media that the main reason he left the HRPP in late 1985 and joined
forces with the CDP was because his HRPP Cabinet would not heed any advice from
caucus.70 Le Tagaloa was making the point that non-Cabinet members of the HRPP
caucus and the rest of Parliament felt that they were merely rubber-stamping decisions
already made by Cabinet. Parliament was no longer doing its role of debating issues
brought before it and making decisions accordingly. There was (and still is) a growing
belief that Cabinet was no longer responsible to Parliament. If anything, it seemed to be
the other way around. Thus, while the party system has achieved the intention of the framers
of the Constitution for a strong Cabinet government to develop in Sämoa, it is coming to be
disliked by the majority of parliamentarians, except, of course, those in Cabinet.
It took a controversial government policy for these anti-HRPP and anti-party
system political sentiments to surface. In the early 1990s, the HRPP Government intro-
duced the VAGST. Given the secure HRPP majority in Parliament at the time, the
Opposition SNDP felt powerless to use Parliament to prevent the Government from
implementing its VAGST policy. But with the public rallying behind the SNDP to get
the Government to reverse its decision, the anti-HRPP forces wisely turned to other,
traditional power bases in their fight against the Government. Thus, the Tumua ma Pule
ma ‘Äiga (TPA) protest movement was born. The inclusion of traditional institutions in
the movement introduced an added dimension and intensified the magnitude of the
protest. The general talk around the country and within the traditional political elite was
that Parliament had no legitimacy in the country as it was a foreign and relatively new
institution. Symbolically undermining the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the protes-
tors bypassed them and handed their petition instead to the Head of State because of his
traditional status as one of the four tama-a-aiga titleholders. The Head of State’s response
was a delaying tactic that eventually resulted in the petition being handed back to the
Government to consider. Although the VAGST on some goods was reduced and on
others eliminated, the general policy remains unaffected.
There was also a general public feeling that the party system could easily act in the
interest of no one but the party in government. That sentiment had some justification.
One of the controversial issues in the TPA’s petition related to the report of the
Controller and Chief Auditor (CCA) in which he pointed to corruption in high places.
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After several heated debates in Parliament and repeated court actions involving law suits
against the Government by the CCA, the issue was put to rest through constitutional
means. Taking advantage of its two-thirds majority in Parliament, the HRPP easily
passed a constitutional amendment in which the CCA’s term of office was reduced to a
three-year contract in line with the rest of the heads of departments under the Special
Posts Act 1989. The CCA, who had been suspended from his job by that time, was given
the right to reapply. He did not.
Another complaint in the TPA petition related to the extension of the parliamen-
tary term from three to five years. What was controversial about this extension was that
rather than introducing that amendment in the next Parliament, as the majority of the
voting public had expected, the HRPP enforced the extension in the current Parliament.
Thus, although the establishment of the party system brought about positive policy
changes that benefited the majority of the public, it also introduced elements that made
the public sceptical of not only the party system but democracy generally. The passing of a
number of laws (such as those discussed above; namely, the increase in Cabinet positions,
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary Act 1988, the Special Posts Act 1989, the reduction of the
CCA’s contract period and the extension of the parliamentary term) that seemed
engineered by the HRPP for its own benefit contributed to that scepticism. Negative
aspects of the HRPP regime aside, its ability to consolidate and win support can be attrib-
uted to its organisation and campaign strategies. I shall discuss its organisation first.
Party organisation
Because of its long record of success at the polls, the HRPP seems to be the most organ-
ised of all the existing political parties. Therefore, I shall discuss that party here as an
example of a Sämoan political party structure. The party was founded in May 1979. It’s
name, Human Rights Protection Party reflects the international ideologies of the time;
however, when asked how the name was derived, one senior HRPP MP said that it was a
catchphrase in Sämoa arising out of the Tupuola Government’s undermining of people’s
rights.71 Moreover, the late Prime Minister, Tofilau Eti Alesana, said that the establish-
ment of the HRPP was directly related to the Tupuola Government’s ‘infringement of
the right of the people, especially the rights of the public servants’.72 The immediate aim
of the party was to overthrow the Tupuola Government.73 Its long-term aim, according
to one former prominent HRPP MP, was to prevent Tupuola from ever again becoming
the Prime Minister of Sämoa.74
The official objectives of the party are very general:
1. To foster political education and provide leadership necessary to safeguard the
rights, liberties, privileges and freedoms of the Sämoan people and individuals;
to protect their interests and to secure … [for] them peace, security and
prosperity in their native land; and to provide institutions which promote and
guarantee … [for] them economic, social and political welfare.
2. To uphold the constitution of Western Sämoa.
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3. To encourage and foster amongst the Sämoans collectively and individually the
spirit of independence, self-reliance, industry, assertiveness and acquisitiveness.
4. To demand and guarantee the protection of the vital Sämoan interests by means
of appropriate constitutional safeguards in the constitution of Western Sämoa
or any future constitution of any government to be established in Western
Sämoa.
5. To devise the means of informing the … [Sämoan] people by means of political
education or otherwise about the international or local body politics, and finer
and worthy aspects of other cultures, arts, music, philosophy, economics and
other disciplines.
6. To promote and encourage the means of improving the living standards of the
people of Sämoa.
7. To do all such other lawful things as are incidental or conducive to the attain-
ment of the foregoing … [objectives].
Women also had an influence on shaping the party. The wife of one former MP said that
having always accompanied her husband to the HRPP’s caucus meetings at Vaivase, she
became tired of waiting outside for her husband. She and the wives of the other MPs
therefore decided to organise the women’s section of the party. At the time, she was
reading the book by PNG’s Chief Minister, Michael Somare, Sana: An Autobiography of
Michael Somare, on how he had organised the Pangu Party. Somare’s book gave her and
the other women ideas on how to strengthen the organisation of the HRPP. Not only did
the women conduct numerous fundraising activities for the party, they helped win over to
the party the support of elected MPs and intending candidates through their spouses.75
The HRPP’s constitution established the party’s organisational structures and their
respective functions. Elected every year at the party’s annual general meeting (AGM), the
executive committee comprises the president (the leader of the parliamentary caucus), vice-
president (caucus member), secretary (not a caucus member), treasurer (caucus member),
six members appointed by caucus, one non-caucus member each from Upolu and Savaii
Islands and one representative of women (HRPP Constitution, Art.7.a[i–vii]). All party
policies are formulated by the executive committee but have to be approved at the AGM.
They are made available to constituencies before by-elections and general elections (Art. 3).
The constitution also provides for the establishment of committees such as those for
fundraising, policy and planning, campaigning and education, women, youths and
membership. The president and leader of the party can be present in meetings of all the
committees (Art. 6). Membership of the party is open to all people aged 18 years and over,
who have paid an initial $WST2 registration fee and $WST5 every year thereafter (Art. 4).
For a long time, Sämoan parties relied solely on their own members and donations
for funding. Generally, all parties were reluctant to publicise the names of their donors as
this was one of the conditions under which financial and other means of support were
given to them. Recently, the Government budget has allocated a total of $WST100,000
for the support of party offices. That amount is divided between the parties on the basis
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of the number of parliamentary members each has. Given that in the present Parliament
about two-thirds of its members are HRPP MPs, the bulk of present government
funding for political parties goes to the Government party, the HRPP.
Party campaign strategies
Party campaigns can be divided into two general categories: the collective party campaign
and the individual candidate’s personal campaign. For an example of an individual’s
personal campaign, see So’o 1998a.76 Examples of party campaign strategies, however,
are given here.
In the 1982 general elections, the names and photographs of HRPP candidates
were published in a party statement, thereby making it the first post-independence polit-
ical party to utilise modern campaign tactics. For the first time, parliamentary candidates
were made known to the public. The HRPP declared that its aim was to change the
Government.77 In 1985, the HRPP adopted the practice of including not only the
photographs of its candidates in the party’s official campaign statement, but the
programs and projects the party intended to complete in the next term. For example, its
1991 election manifesto stated its policies on roads, water, the country’s electrification
program, wharves, communication, town beautification, agriculture, education, hospi-
tals, environment, sports development, tourism and other revenue-earning industries,
women, old-age pensions and reconstruction of houses damaged by Cyclone Ofa.
Because copies of this document were distributed throughout most parts of the country
by the HRPP candidates and their supporters, a substantial majority of the public had a
good idea of who the candidates were and what the party intended to do. 
Although the CDP and SNDP, in 1985 and 1988 respectively, adopted the practice
of publicising the names of their parliamentary candidates and their programs, neither
party included the photographs of its members in their party statements. The reasons for
this are not clear. Perhaps, these parties were not as well organised (in terms of having a
party constitution and other necessary party regulations with which to discipline party
members) and did not have enough funds for such activities. Or perhaps they suspected
that the HRPP was more popular among the people, hence identifying their candidates
would not help the party’s cause. Whatever the reasons, the fact that a substantial
majority of voters did not know who the parties’ candidates were probably contributed to
their lack of success at the polls. In 1991, at the launch of its manifesto, the SNDP
invited all its candidates who were present to line up at the front of the hall so that
members of the public could see who they were. About 400 people were present and
most of them were SNDP supporters. The party campaign strategies given above have
generally remained unchanged.78
Conclusion
The nature of the party system and the manner in which Sämoan political parties have
developed are in part a reflection of the Sämoan context. For example, the selection of
candidates for elections, the campaign strategies adopted and some of the factors that
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contributed to the emergence of the party system, contain elements of Sämoa’s tradi-
tional political culture. On the other hand, the emergence of the party system also lends
credence to the modernisation theory of the origin of political parties espoused by
Labalombara and Weiner. Duverger’s thesis that political parties originate within
Parliament is also proven in the case of Sämoa.
Despite some of the politically stinging criticisms against political parties and the
party system, it seems clear that these institutions of democracy are here to stay.
Ironically, some of the staunchest critics of political parties and the party system have in
the end reversed their original positions and formed their own parties. Their change of
view follows the realisation that to have any hope of winning government, they must
form political parties. The Government, on the other hand, has found it politically useful
that it has been able to utilise the party system to get some of its controversial policies
through Parliament. The issue of the Executive becoming so powerful that Parliament
feels powerless to control it remains a problem for which the constitutional experts will
have to find solutions. Meanwhile, the party system and democracy in general are
becoming entrenched in Sämoa even if they are still not fully endorsed by a substantial
section of the local population. 
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SDUP Sämoa Democratic United Party 
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SNDP Sämoan National Development Party
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SUIPP Sämoa United Independents Political Party 
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UC Union Calédonien (New Caledonia)
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